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1 Introduction 
Is Sub-Saharan Africa on the upswing or in the middle of a breakdown and 
economic crisis? Will free trade agreements support Africa’s economic 
development or destroy the livelihoods of millions of smallholder farmers?  
Since the 1990s an increased overall economic growth could have been 
observed in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA): 5.2% in 2004, 5.3% in 2005 and 5.7% 
in 20061 while the annual average growth rate between 1990 and 2003 was 
2.7%.2 Agricultural growth accelerated: from 2.3% in the 1980s to 3.8% 
between 2001 and 2005.3  
The World Bank seemed to be optimistic with regard to African development, 
but Asche states that the positive development between 1995 and 2004 was 
achieved of a group of only 15 countries. Moreover, he criticises that this growth 
is not sustainable in these countries for the following reasons: catch-up effects 
in post-war countries; commodity booms; their growth is still below the 7% that 
the World Bank defines as necessary to achieve poverty alleviation; and finally 
the absence of diversification. Growth is a result of the growing demand for oil.4 
The optimistic view at the beginning of the millennium is being threatened by 
the emerging global financial and economic crisis that began in 2008. 
Furthermore, there is increasing “concern that the recent global financial crisis 
may erode these gains.”5 The IMF warns that the global crisis will continue and 
will have an impact on developing countries’ investment, trade, remittances, and 
tourism revenues. The UNECA recommends taking advantage of the global 
crisis “as an opportunity to consolidate recent macroeconomic achievements 
and for putting measures in place to further diversify our economies”. Moreover,  
“We need to increase agricultural production and diversify into 
manufacturing and services in order to provide jobs […]. Diversification will 
                                            
1 UNECA: Economic report for Africa 2007. Accelerating Africa’s development through 
diversification, 2007, p.32. 
2 World Bank: World Development Report 2005. A better investment climate for everyone, 2004, 
p.261. 
3 World Bank: World Development Report 2008. Agriculture for development, 2007, p.19. 
4 Asche, H.: Der Afrika-Aktionsplan der Weltbank: neue Aktionen?, 2006, p.1. 
5 Osakwe, P.N.: Sub-Saharan Africa and the global financial crisis, 2008, in: TNI, Vol.7, No.7, 
September 2008, p.4. 
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also give our economies the resilience to deal with future economic 
shocks.”6 
Osakwe suspects that there might be negative short-term and medium-term 
effects on SSA countries. The short-term effects would be relatively small 
except for some countries “where stock markets have some degree of exposure 
to the international financial system”,7 e.g., South Africa and Nigeria. The 
medium-term effect could emerge if there is a reduction of international trade 
that could negatively affect SSA exports and reduce their foreign exchange; this 
could lead to a reduction of capital imports and inputs for domestic markets. 
Moreover, a reduction in FDI could lead to a reduced investment in 
infrastructure and production sectors; therefore, this situation might increase 
unemployment as a result of factory closures. Thirdly, the reduced remittances 
will affect people in developing countries. A decreased demand for commodities 
will affect negatively on the SSA exporters of raw materials. And finally, ODA 
flows might be reduced; thus, deepening the crisis in developing countries.8 
Will the current economic crisis be an opportunity to further develop SSA 
economies? Additionally, will currently negotiated free trade agreements 
contribute to Africa’s development and support the expected consolidation 
towards diversification away from agriculture? What kind of role will agriculture 
play in economic growth, poverty alleviation and in the new free trade 
agreements? 
There are very contentious debates regarding economic and trade liberalisation 
and their effects on developing countries. In theory, trade liberalisation should 
lead to increased access to a wider market; thereby, increased economies of 
scale and competition. Moreover, business will be encouraged to produce more 
efficiently and cheaper. This leads to improved access to cheaper imports and 
technology; as a result consumer prices might decrease and benefit consumers 
(while producer’s income might be reduced). However, South Centre states that 
often trade liberalisation has failed to increase economic growth. Schneider and 
Kernohan conclude that “No country in recent decades has achieved economic 
                                            
6 TRALAC: UN urges African economies to diversify, 30 January 2009. 
7 Osakwe: Sub-Saharan Africa and the global financial crisis, 2008, p.4. 
8 Ibid. 
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success, in terms of substantial increases in living standards for its people, 
without being open to the rest of the world.”9 
Bazaara argues that devaluation of currency could prevent developing countries 
from benefiting from liberalisation efforts because devaluation can “nullify the 
gains of price increases by raising costs of agricultural production”.10 
Devaluation leads to increased exports but it also raises import costs; therefore, 
the nominal prices will not be translated into real incomes. In general, Bazaara 
concludes that liberalisation benefits countries with good preconditions and 
harms those without.11 
With regard to agriculture, past experience has shown that “opening national 
agricultural markets to international competition in developing countries can 
lead to negative effects on poverty alleviation, food security and the 
environment.”12 Furthermore, it can result in the “stagnation and decline of local 
food systems in Africa.”13 Therefore, it is suspected that free trade might have a 
negative impact on agriculture in developing countries’ economies and 
negatively influence food security. 
From a more theoretical point of view, Borrmann et al. analyse theories on trade 
liberalisation and structural adjustment. They pursue the question, does trade 
liberalisation benefit developed and developing countries in the same way? 
According to them traditional trade theory deals with  
“free trade under perfect competition and with constant returns to scales 
leads to optimal allocation of resources globally if countries specialise in 
production of goods where they have comparative advantages”.14 
The new trade theory acknowledges imperfect competition and increasing 
returns to scale, but in general it highlights benefits arising from trade 
liberalisation. Free trade can encourage companies to utilise economies of 
scale not used in domestic trade. Moreover,  
                                            
9 Schneider, A./Kernohan, D.: The effects of trade liberalisation on agriculture in smaller 
developing countries. Implications for the Doha Round, 2006, p.10. 
10 Bazaara, N.: Impact of liberalisation on agriculture and food security in Uganda, 2001, p.11. 
11 Ibid., p.12. 
12 Lambrechts: Responding to Africa’s agricultural challenges: The need for new paradigms in 
aid, trade and science, 2008, in: TNI, Vol.7, No.8, October 2008, p.7. 
13 Ibid. 
14 Borrmann, A. et al.: The WTO compatibility of the Economic Partnership Agreement between 
the EU and the ACP states, 2005, p.17. 
 4
“It also reduces the concentration on domestic markets and the market 
power of the companies, so that global prices will fall, profit margins shrink 
and allocation inefficiencies be reduced.”15 
Both developed and developing countries will benefit according to this theory. 
The danger is that countries tend to increase their welfare by imposing import or 
export tariffs, which result in “welfare losses for trading partners, so that the 
global level of welfare declines”.16 This could be counteracted by multilateral 
trade negotiations, while bilateral trade negotiations risk trade diversion: the 
“possible advantages of international division of labour are not fully exploited in 
the context of regional or bilateral integration”.17 
While acknowledging these considerations, Borrmann et al. criticise that both 
theories ignore adjustment costs. According to them, benefits from 
specialisation are “based on the assumption that factors of production displaced 
from import-competing industries can be readily employed in other domestic 
industries.”18 Due to the fact that most production factors have limited mobility, 
the improvement of imperfections in domestic markets causes adjustment 
costs.  
They summarise further trade theories, including ex ante and ex post studies, 
but conclude that non of these theories answers the question if and under which 
circumstances trade liberalisation can benefit developing countries. Moreover, 
they discuss several studies on the empirical link between economic growth and 
various economic, political, and institutional factors; finally coming to the 
conclusion that improved institutions will be necessary to enable developing 
countries to benefit from free trade. According to them there is  
“no reason to assume that countries will necessarily have higher economic 
growth if they liberalise their trade. As it takes time to develop the 
necessary institutions, a trade policy is needed which takes into account 
the institutional quality of the developing countries.”19 
                                            
15 Ibid. 
16 Ibid. 
17 Borrmann et al.: The WTO compatibility of the Economic Partnership Agreements, 2005, 
p.17. 
18 Ibid., p.18. 
19 Ibid., p.27. 
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Despite theoretical considerations on free trade and its effects on developing 
countries’ economies, currently various free trade agreements (FTAs) either in 
South-South trade or between developed and developing countries are 
negotiated. Amongst others, ACP (African, Caribbean, and Pacific) countries 
are negotiating new trade agreements with the European Union.  
Stevens and Kennan analyse the role of (agricultural) trade liberalisation and 
these new trade agreements. They state:  
“most of trade policy change […] has been the result of policy-based 
lending led by the international financial institutions (IFIs), bilateral/regional 
trade negotiations among African countries as well as autonomously 
determined change.”20 
According to them the “impetus for any agricultural liberalisation for African 
LDCs over the next 10-15 years, therefore, is likely to lie outside the WTO”21 
and these new trade agreements “are the prime candidates as likely drivers of 
change”.22 
These new trade agreements, the Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) 
change EU-ACP relations significantly. Trade relations between both trading 
partners were introduced in colonial times and renewed in the 1970s; they were 
based on unilaterally granted trade preferences for the ACP countries. After the 
end of the Cold War the EU pushed for a renewal of these trade relations. The 
new relations should be negotiated between equal partners and be based on 
partnership. Trade should rely on reciprocity rather than the granting of 
unilateral trade preferences that were considered as ineffective. The ACP 
countries welcomed the new partnership approach but preferred to maintain the 
preferential trade system rather than the introduction of reciprocity. 
Unfortunately, ACP countries voices were not heard and their preferences did 
not succeed. However, the new trade relations introduced reciprocal trade 
between EU and ACP countries but regarded the asymmetry between the 
negotiating partners and intended to respect the development needs of the ACP 
countries. The Cotonou Partnership Agreement (CPA), agreed in 2000, is 
                                            
20 Stevens, C./Kennan, J.: Agricultural reciprocity under Economic Partnership Agreements, 
2006, p.2. 
21 Ibid. 
22 Ibid. 
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based on five pillars; one of these pillars addresses negotiations of new trade 
relations.  
There is consensus regarding the broad development objectives, which is 
reflected in the Cotonou Partnership Agreement: 
“The partnership shall be centred on the objective of reducing and 
eventually eradicating poverty consistent with the objectives of sustainable 
development and the gradual integration of the ACP countries into the 
world economy.”23 
Moreover, the agreement states that  
“Negotiations shall take account of the level of development and the socio-
economic impact of trade measures on ACP countries, and their capacity 
to adapt and adjust their economies to the liberalisation process.”24 
While there is consensus about the broad development objectives of the EPAs, 
EU and ACP countries totally disagree with regard to the concrete negotiating 
proposals and their inherit development dimension.  
For the European Commission “trade is an essential motor of development”25 
and according to Development Commissioner Michel there is “no alternative”26 
to the EPAs. If EPAs are “correctly controlled, opening up to trade is a good 
thing for development”.27 From the point of view of the European Commission 
trade liberalisation, a sufficient policy framework, and increased investment will 
foster development as long as it is supported by trade facilitation measures and 
the provision of related services.28 A key aspect in the EC concept is the 
introduction of reciprocity into the trade relations with the idea that increased 
competition reduces consumer prices, stimulates investment and technology 
transfer; thereby, leading to “more efficiency and economic growth.”29 
                                            
23 European Community/ACP Group of States: Partnership agreement between the members of 
the African, Caribbean and Pacific group of states, of the one part, and the European 
Community and its member states, of the other part, signed in Cotonou, 23 June 2000, Article 1. 
24 European Community/ACP Group of States: Partnership agreement between the members of 
the African, Caribbean and Pacific group of states, of the one part, and the European 
Community and its member states, of the other part, signed in Cotonou, 23 June 2000, Article 
37. 
25 Michel, L.: Economic Partnership Agreements: Drivers of development, 2008, p.114 et seq. 
26 Ibid., p.13. 
27 Ibid., p.18. 
28 Bilal, S./Rampa, F.: Alternative (to) EPAs. Possible scenarios for the future ACP trade 
relations with the EU, 2006. 
29 Ibid., p.41. 
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During the negotiating process, it became clear that from the ACP countries’ 
point of view, trade liberalisation and regional integration were no sufficient 
conditions to foster development: it would be necessary to have additional 
elements so that ACP can benefit from trade and regional integration. ACP 
countries highlighted the risks of liberalisation, the need for additional resources 
due to high adjustment costs, as well as Special and Differential Treatment 
(SDT) in order to meet their development needs. Moreover, sequencing 
became an important issue: “Proper sequencing of liberalisation commitments 
and implementation”30 would be necessary to address capacity problems and 
supply-side constraints.  
Harsh criticism has been voiced by civil society organisations, for instance, the 
StopEPA campaign, together with some ACP countries warning that EPAs will 
increase poverty instead of reducing it: radical trade liberalisation will disrupt 
local production, reduce government revenues, and increase unemployment. 
CSOs requested for a radical change towards non-reciprocity. To illustrate, the 
StopEPA campaign organisations wanted a radical change towards non-
reciprocity, the protection of national and regional markets, as well as a request 
for more policy space and flexibility.31 
Not only ACP countries and civil society organisations, but also EU member 
states like the UK and other like-minded states’ governments, are concerned 
about a lack of development dimension and a loss of policy space.32 
FTAs always implicate a loss of policy space, but the use of instruments varies 
from agreement to agreement. In the case of EPAs, South Centre judges that 
“the loss of policy space that the implementation of EPAs will entail is 
unprecedented for the ACP governments that have initialled these 
agreements.”33 According to their analysis “EPAs place real restrictions to the 
regulation of trade in goods.”34 
                                            
30 Ibid., 2006, p.47. 
31 http://www.stopepa.de and http://www.epa2007.org  
32 Bilal, S.: EPAs process: Key issues and development perspective. With specific references to 
East and Southern Africa, 2006, p.23. 
33 South Centre: Market access for trade in goods in Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs), 
2008, p.17. 
34 Ibid., p.18. 
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As far as the trade in goods in concerned, agriculture is of high importance for 
African ACP countries because SSA countries mainly export commodities and 
agricultural goods. Therefore, agriculture in trade is crucial for African ACP 
countries; this is reflected in agriculture’s high share of GDP. Moreover, 
agriculture is also important for the rural population: smallholder farmers often 
produce agricultural goods for their own consumption. In the light of this the 
question arises, is the importance of agriculture for these economies and the 
livelihoods of small-scale farmers adequately reflected in the EPA negotiations 
and the outcome thus far? 
South Centre goes so far as to assess that agriculture in the EPAs is the 
“determining factor”.35 And farmers' organisations state that EPAs induce 
“significant changes into the trade environment of agricultural producers and 
agro-food commodity chains.”36 
But in the so-called interim EPAs there are only a few specific provisions on 
agriculture and these are in very general wording: there are “no binding 
measures and it is therefore not possible to determine the contribution of EPAs 
to agricultural development.”37 Moreover,  
“these agreements do not explicitly or concretely promote an improvement 
in sub-Saharan agricultural production. On the contrary, the instruments for 
sectoral promotion established by the EPAs are rather limited and merely 
emphasise greater competition with European imports to stimulate African 
agricultural production. In that sense, EPAs are a missed opportunity and 
even risk aggravating some of the problems of African agricultural (such as 
a deterioration in food security, intensification of the current terms of trade, 
etc.).”38 
Thus, the role of agriculture and the outcome of the EPA negotiations will be 
examined in this thesis. Therefore, a more detailed description of the analytical 
framework is necessary. 
This paper describes the EU and ACP trade relations that are highly relevant for 
both trading partners. EU and ACP countries can look back on long-lasting 
                                            
35 South Centre: A positive agenda for African agriculture in EPAs, 2008, p.1. 
36 EAFF, PROPAC, ROPPA, SACAU, WINF: Midterm review of the Economic Partnership 
Agreements (EPAs) according to the terms of article 37.4 of the Cotonou Agreement. 
Independent contribution of the regional networks of farmers’ organizations. Synthesis of the 
regional assessments. Working document, 10 December 2006, p.9. 
37 South Centre: A positive agenda for African agriculture in EPAs, 2008, p.13. 
38 Ibid., p.17. 
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relations resulting from colonial times. After the independence of ACP countries 
in the 1960s and 1970s, both parties agreed to continue their trade relations 
with a preferential trading system under the so-called Yaoundé and Lomé 
agreements. In the 1990s, the trade relations experienced a significant change. 
Initiated by the European Union, the Cotonou Partnership Agreement was 
agreed in 2000. One important aim of the new agreement was the negotiation of 
free trade agreements, Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs), between EU 
and ACP countries. The trading partners have negotiated these EPAs since 
2002 at all-ACP level. In 2003 and 2004 negotiations began at the regional level 
with six negotiating regions: four in Africa, one in the Caribbean, and one in the 
Pacific region. Negotiations should have been finalised at the end of 2007 
because the expiring WTO waiver that allowed ACP and EU countries to 
maintain their preferential trading relations, which were not WTO compatible. 
Despite the pressure for ACP countries to fall back on a less preferential trading 
system, they were not able to conclude these EPAs. The EU offered the so-
called interim EPAs in November 2007, limited on the trade in goods. Individual 
countries and sub-regions initialled these interim EPAs; further negotiations on 
other areas should have been finalised in 2008. Until April 2009 only the 
Caribbean region has signed a comprehensive EPA, and Cote d’Ivoire and 
Cameroon signed an interim EPA. The signing of the other interim EPAs and 
the negotiations towards comprehensive EPAs are still outstanding. Therefore, 
the focus of this thesis is the negotiating process since 2002 and the outcome 
of the interim EPAs with regard to agriculture. 
Agriculture is regarded as crucial for both trading partners. It is essential for 
economic development and the livelihoods of millions of family farmers in 
Southern African agriculture, and therefore plays an important role in 
multilateral (WTO) and bilateral (EPA) negotiations. But agriculture is also of 
high importance to Europe. Though the share in the economy and employment 
is marginal, the EU still spends nearly 40% of its total budget on agriculture; 
therefore, it is still an important policy in Europe. Agricultural trade is negotiated 
at WTO level as well as in the EPA negotiations, but agriculture is also an 
important issue at the regional level in Europe because it is a common policy 
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(Common Agricultural Policy, CAP). On the contrary, agriculture plays a less 
important role at the regional level in SSA due to the poor performance of 
regional integration in Southern Africa. Moreover, national agricultural policies in 
SSA are relatively weak due to the liberalisation processes in the 1980s and 
1990s. Furthermore, government should play a facilitating role in agricultural 
policy rather than intervene in economic processes. The private sector should 
fill the gap but in many countries this has not yet occurred. 
Because agriculture is negotiated at the multilateral level in the current WTO 
negotiations, both EU and ACP countries negotiate at these WTO negotiations, 
this will be the first level of analysis in this thesis (chapter 2). The analysis of the 
WTO negotiations examines the role of agriculture in multilateral trade 
negotiations and the interests of EU and ACP countries. Moreover, the WTO 
rules determine the framework for negotiations on free trade agreements; 
therefore, they are of vital importance for the current EPA negotiations. 
Furthermore, the WTO analysis is necessary to examine the European 
agricultural policy and the interplay between reforms of the CAP and the WTO 
negotiations on agriculture in the next chapter (chapter 3). It is assumed that 
agriculture is crucial in WTO negotiations and it is one of the most contentious 
issues; developing countries are relatively strong in these negotiations despite 
the disadvantageous structure of the negotiations.  
Chapter 3 analyses the European agricultural policy. As already mentioned 
agriculture is very important for Europe and the CAP plays a central role in 
European common policies. The European agricultural market is important for 
developing countries’ exports and these European agricultural exports are of 
vital importance for African ACP countries. Therefore, in a first step, data and 
principles of European agriculture will be examined; in a second step, the 
current agricultural policy will be analysed and will then focus on the interplay 
between CAP reform and WTO negotiations on agriculture. In a last step, the 
importance of CAP (reform) for ACP countries will be examined. It will be shown 
that European agricultural policy is crucial to world trade, world food prices, and 
that its impact on WTO negotiations is central, i.e., WTO negotiations are an 
incentive for CAP reform and CAP reform is used by the EU to strengthen the 
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negotiating position in the WTO negotiations. Moreover, it will be shown that the 
liberalisation efforts in EU agricultural policy are ambivalent. On the one hand, 
the EU tries to maintain protection for its agricultural products. While on the 
other hand, there are high costs for this protection. Furthermore, the reliability in 
international trade negotiations that aim at the liberalisation of trade (in 
agriculture) make CAP reforms towards greater liberalisation necessary.  
The fourth chapter describes SSA agriculture. In a first step, a historical 
perspective will be introduced to better understand the previous liberalisation 
processes and the current situation of African agriculture. In a next step, the 
necessity to transformation the economy away from agriculture and the attempt 
to introduce a green revolution in SSA will be discussed. A closer look at 
farming data and structure as well as trade in African ACP countries is 
necessary to measure the importance of agriculture for these countries. This 
thesis will answer the following questions: if agriculture is still necessary to 
promote economic development and alleviate poverty; if a green revolution is 
possible in African economies; and how sustainable agriculture should be 
constructed.  
This analysis will be necessary in order to examine the role of agriculture in 
EPA negotiations and outcomes, as discussed in chapter 5. If agriculture is of 
vital importance for African ACP countries, have they been able to enforce the 
dominant role of agriculture in these free trade negotiations? As already 
mentioned, South Centre states that the role of agriculture is underrepresented 
in the interim EPAs. This thesis will observe this more in detail in an analysis of 
one of these interim EPAs. First of all, it will describe the negotiating process in 
order to better understand the dynamics of the negotiating process. It will be 
shown: that the necessity to comply with WTO rules was a major incentive to 
continue with negotiations until the end of 2007; that the ACP countries, split 
into six negotiating blocs, were less successful than in WTO negotiations; and 
that the delay in negotiations was caused by the lack of negotiating capacity of 
ACP negotiators and also by the inability to agree on the most contentious 
issues. 
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In a second step, the direct and indirect agricultural provisions of the Southern 
African interim EPA will be examined. Because market access to the European 
market for African ACP countries is essential, these provisions will be analysed 
first. Secondly, the market opening of African ACP countries for European 
goods will be examined – always keeping in mind the effects of European 
agricultural trade on developing countries, in particular, ACP countries. The 
analysis of several specific provisions is required to assess the potential impact 
of these provisions on agriculture. In a third step, the potential implications on 
regional integration – as this is one of the most important objectives of the new 
trade agreement – will be analysed. Fourth, the danger of revenue losses will 
be discussed. Finally, in a last step, this thesis will discuss the ongoing 
negotiations on services and trade-related issues. In a short chapter (5.4) the 
outcome of the EPA analysis will be concluded. The analysis will determine if 
the assumption of South Centre, agriculture is underrepresented in the interim 
EPAs, could be confirmed. The thesis will illustrate: that market access to the 
European market could have been maintained and that this was the most 
important motivation for Southern African ACP countries to initial the interim 
EPA; that the liberalisation offer for the Southern African countries goes far 
beyond WTO requirements due to several reasons; that other provisions are 
WTO plus and not necessary to conclude a free trade agreement; that regional 
integration is negatively affected; and that revenue losses might have a serious 
impact on African economies. 
The analytical framework has three dimensions to its analysis. First, the 
question will be what kind of role agriculture plays in EU and ACP countries. 
Moreover, the role of agriculture in their trade relations will be examined at 
WTO level as well as at the EPA level. The interdependencies between the 
different levels will be analysed.  
The second objective of this analysis will be within the framework of policy 
studies. The aim is to identify the concrete outcome of the negotiations and 
explain it as a result of the negotiating process (politics) and the structure of 
negotiations (polity). Emerging questions will be: 
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• What are the original objectives of the trading partners? Is the outcome 
consistent with the original objectives? If not, why? 
• How do actors influence the negotiating process? 
• How does the negotiating structure influence the outcome of 
negotiations?39  
Answers to these questions should explain the concrete outcome of 
negotiations at WTO and EPA levels and provide a better understanding of the 
negotiating results as well as their impact on ACP agriculture.  
The third dimension of analysis focuses on the fact that the new trade relations 
are negotiated between highly unequal partners with regard to economic 
strength, regional integration, and negotiating capacity. Therefore, some 
assumptions from negotiation theory will contribute to the analysis of the 
negotiating process.40 First, it will be questioned which actors participate in 
negotiations and the sort of instruments they use to achieve their interests. How 
does this influence the outcome of negotiations? Negotiating power depends on 
the ability to threaten with the break off of negotiations; the threatening partner 
would be no worse-off than before negotiations. In general, negotiating partners 
react with concessions until negotiation offers are congruent; thereby, they tend 
to balance between potential losses and the risk that their partner will break off 
negotiations.41 
This analysis acts on the assumption of bounded rationality. Actors do not 
weigh all options in negotiations but are influenced by “pressure groups, 
impacts on voters and revenue, foreign repercussions, ideological 
preferences.”42 Weller and Ullmer suppose that the EU is influenced by 
ideological thoughts, e.g., when stating that there were no alternatives to EPAs, 
and developing countries in trade negotiations often overestimate the role of 
exporters and ignore interests of other stakeholders.43 
                                            
39 Blum, S./Schubert, K.: Politikfeldanalyse, 2009. 
40 Benz, A.: Verhandlungen, in: Handbuch Governance. Theoretische Grundlagen und 
empirische Anwendungsfelder, hg. v. Benz, A. et al., 2007, p.106-118. 
41 Ibid. 
42 Weller, C./Ullmer, K.: Trade and Governance. Does governance matter for trade?, 2008, 
p.13. 
43 Ibid. 
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This paper chooses the empirical-analytical methodology which is based on 
experience and evidence. Moreover, the approach of this paper is multi-
methodical as it applies qualitative analysis as well as quantitative analysis, 
e.g., the examination of economic data. Furthermore, trade experts have been 
interviewed.  
This thesis has a strong descriptive focus that is necessary when analysing 
WTO, EU, and EPA level agricultural policy. In the light of the importance of the 
EPA negotiating process, a careful analysis of the IEPA provisions that affect 
agriculture is necessary. The debate about the potential impact of (I)EPAs 
caused quite a stir and needs to be brought down. A careful analysis of these 
provisions can contribute to this discussion and provide a basis for further 
debate. This analysis, together with the policies studies framework, will focus on 
the outcome of the negotiations bearing in mind the interplay with EU 
agricultural policy and negotiations on agriculture at WTO level. 
The paper needs to concentrate its focus to be able to answer the research 
questions adequately. It focuses on agricultural policy due to its vital importance 
to: EU policy; ACP economies; ACP economic development; and the future 
development of ACP states, for instance, the liberalisation of services.  
The ACP group consists of 78 countries from Africa, the Pacific region, and the 
Caribbean; therefore, it is necessary to constrict an analysis for smaller group of 
countries in order to be able to provide an adequate and significant 
investigation. Africa is the largest country grouping in the ACP configuration 
with 48 countries; EPA negotiations take place with four regional configurations. 
Africa is of importance to the EU with regard to raw materials, security policy, 
development policy, and potential competition from China and the US. But the 
African EPA group is still too vast for scientific research; therefore, this paper 
will constrict the analysis on one of the four negotiating groups – the SADC EPA 
configuration. 
SADC is economically important in SSA, agriculture plays an important role in 
this configuration and the heterogeneity of agriculture seen even in this small 
group will become evident. The question of regional integration can be 
discussed as an example due to the challenge of overlapping memberships. 
 15
Moreover, it is a heterogeneous region comprising LDCs, non-LDCs, and has a 
strong trading partner in South Africa.  
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2 Agriculture at International Level 
This chapter examines agriculture at the international level, in particular the 
WTO negotiations that have taken place since the launch of the Uruguay Round 
in the early 1980s. Agriculture has played an important role within the GATT 
(General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade) history since the 1950s and is still of 
crucial importance in the current negotiations as will be shown in this section. 
The regulations on agriculture that will be negotiated at the WTO level will be 
crucial for ACP and developing countries’ agriculture because they determine 
the international trade framework and influence EU agricultural policy.44  
The WTO is of vital importance for trade negotiations at bilateral and regional 
level because it determines the rules for free trade areas between trading 
partners: the “WTO aims to function as a facilitator to achieve multilateral 
agreement on international trade rules”45. One has to keep in mind that these 
rules are contested and should be reformed within the current negotiating 
round. Currently these negotiations are unresolved and bilateral and regional 
trade negotiations rely on the present rules. Any changes in these WTO rules 
might have an impact on bilateral and regional trade negotiations but it is 
impossible to forecast the dimension of potential changes. Nevertheless, it is 
important to link the WTO regulations to the current negotiations on Economic 
Partnership Agreements. WTO compatibility and requirements have always and 
will continue to play an important role during the negotiations; therefore, the 
second part of this chapter will analyse the WTO framework for free trade areas 
and the concrete impact on EPA negotiations.  
2.1 WTO Negotiations on Agriculture  
This chapter examines the previous and ongoing negotiations on agricultural 
trade liberalisation at WTO level. The focus of the analysis is on the negotiating 
process and structure and its effects on the outcome of negotiations. 
                                            
44 A more detailed analysis of the European agricultural policy is available in chapter 3. 
45 Halderman, M./Nelson, M.: EU policy-making: Reform of the CAP and EU trade in beef and 
dairy with developing countries, 2005, p.39. 
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2.1.1 Agriculture in GATT and WTO Negotiations  
Tariffs have always been an important instrument to regulate international trade. 
However, after the Second World War the GATT aimed at the reduction of 
tariffs in order to increase international trade. Beginning in 1948 non-agricultural 
tariffs have been reduced from 35% at that time to today’s level of 5%. As a 
consequence world trade and the exchange of services and knowledge have 
increased, especially in developed countries with large service and skill-
intensive companies.46 This liberalisation process involved non-agricultural 
products while agricultural goods, clothing, and textiles were exempted from 
liberalisation.47  
The most important principle of the GATT is the general most favoured nation 
(MFN) principle, which is supplemented by the principle of national treatment. 
The most favoured nation principle states that  
“any advantage, favour, privilege or immunity granted by any contracting 
party to any product originating in or destined for any other country shall be 
accorded immediately and unconditionally to the like product originating in 
or destined for the territories of all other contracting parties.”48 
Therefore, any liberalisation commitment granted to one trading partner has to 
be granted to all trading partners. The provision on national treatment prohibits 
the discrimination of foreign products in favour of equal domestic products 
(GATT 1947, Article 3). In the GATT tariffs are seen as the single instrument of 
trade policy with bound levels that inhibit increases over a certain level, and any 
other trade distorting measures should be dismantled. In the case of disputes, 
the GATT allows to inflict a penalty which is singular in the international 
system.49 
GATT was created following WWII in order to provide opportunities for  
“extensive liberalization of trade barriers protecting the US market to help 
to rebuild the war-torn economies of Western Europe and thus provide a 
                                            
46 Frein, M./Reichert, T.: Fortschritt durch Stillstand. Die Dauerkrise der WTO-Verhandlungen 
aus entwicklungspolitischer Sicht, 2008, p.5. 
47 Schott, J.J.: The future of the multilateral trading system in a multi-polar world, 2008, p.1. 
48 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), 1947, Article 1. 
49 Frein/Reichert: Fortschritt durch Stillstand, 2008, p.8. 
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stable economic base for democratic governance and a reliable buffer 
against Soviet expansionism.”50 
With regard to developing countries the US has been generous by allowing 
them, “to ‘free ride’ on the trading system without undertaking substantive 
commitments to reduce barriers to their markets.”51 Therefore,  
“the cost of non-participation in the reciprocal negotiations […] often left 
intact major barriers imposed by industrial countries that restricted 
competitive agricultural and manufactured exports of developing 
countries.”52 
In six rounds, tariffs were liberalised until the end of the 1970s. The inclusion of 
developing countries after their independence influenced the balance of power 
and the requirements of the next liberalisation round. The negotiations within 
the Uruguay Round began in 1982 and ended in 1994 with the creation of the 
World Trade Organisation (WTO) 1995.  
While agriculture has been exempted from the liberalisation rounds under 
GATT, the Uruguay Round was the first round that included the agricultural 
sector with the Agreement on Agriculture 1994 (AoA). 
In the Uruguay Round negotiations developed countries insisted on the 
inclusion of services and intellectual property rights (IPR) in the liberalisation 
process while most developing countries refused to include these issues. In a 
compromise, the trade in goods has been broadened with separate agreements 
on agriculture and clothing/textiles in exchange for the inclusion of the single 
undertaking (“Nothing is agreed until everything is agreed.”), special 
agreements on services (GATS), and intellectual property rights (TRIPS). The 
developing countries agreed with GATS and TRIPS in the hope of intensified 
trade in food and clothing.53  
With regard to market agricultural access, the aim of the AoA has been: the 
conversion of non-tariff barriers, for instance, quota restrictions, into tariffs 
(tariffication); the definition of bound tariffs; and in a final step the reduction of 
these bound tariffs on average by 36% for developed and 24% for developing 
                                            
50 Schott: The future of the multilateral trading system, 2008, p.1. 
51 Schott: The future of the multilateral trading system, 2008, p.1. 
52 Ibid. 
53 Frein/Reichert: Fortschritt durch Stillstand, 2008, p.6. 
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countries.54 For particular protected products a minimum market access of 5% 
for developed countries and 3% for developing countries has to be granted.55 
The tariff cuts have been essential but the “abnormally high base levels 1986-
88” together with “low world market prices at that time [that] were directly 
reflected in high EU tariff equivalents as variable import levies” which implicated 
that  
“the cuts and the degree of trade liberalisation arising from the round were 
partly illusory, resulting in higher permitted tariffs than if the base were for 
a representative period. After the cuts many EU bound tariffs were still 
relatively high”56. 
The Special Agricultural Safeguard (SSG) is available for developed and 
developing countries to stop import surges. It can be applied if prices for 
shipments fall below a certain level or in case of rapid increases of imports. It 
can only be applied to goods that are “tariffied”, which causes a problem for 
developing countries whose products often are not “tarriffied”. The developing 
countries often set ceiling bindings that cannot be cut. Therefore, the SSG is not 
available for most developing countries (16 developed and 22 developing 
countries are allowed to use the SSG57); the only African ACP countries that 
can use the SSG are Botswana, Namibia, Swaziland and South Africa in 
notification of certain specific products.58 These products include: meats, live 
animals, cereals, fruits/vegetables, dairy, sugar, and food items. 59 
As far as export subsidies are concerned, those countries that exerted export 
subsidies in the past were allowed to continue but had to reduce these 
subsidies (reduction of expenditure by 36% and reduction of the amount by 
                                            
54 Until a reduction of 15% for developed countries is achieved; Von Urff, W.: Agrarmarkt und 
Strukturen des ländlichen Raumes in der Europäischen Union, in: Die Europäische Union. 
Politisches System und Politikbereiche, hg. v. Weidenfeld, W., 2006, p.218. 
55 Frein/Reichert: Fortschritt durch Stillstand, 2008, p.21. 
56 Roberts, I./Gunning-Trant, C.: The European Union’s Common Agricultural Policy. A 
stocktake of reforms, 2007, p.23. 
57 South Centre: South Centre’s analysis and news of the WTO’s mini-ministerial, No.1, 2008, 
p.1. 
58 Alpha, A. et al.: WTO and EPA negotiations. For an enhanced coordination of ACP positions 
on agriculture, 2005, p.34. 
59 Roberts/Gunning-Trant: The European Union’s Common Agricultural Policy, 2007, p.23. 
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20% of the base level at the beginning of the 1990s). Those countries that did 
not apply export subsidies were not allowed to introduce them.60  
In matters of domestic support61 the term of different boxes – amber box, blue 
box, green box – has been arising and is in use in WTO language today. The 
amber box contains direct payments coupled to the production output. The AoA 
assented to reduce these payments by 20% for developed and 13.3% for 
developing countries; if the support comprises less than 5% for developed and 
10% for developing countries of the production value (de-minimis) it is not 
included in the calculation.62 Base level (the total aggregate measurement of 
support/AMS) has been the base years of 1986-88. The amber box support is 
seen as trade distorting as it leads to over-production and price dumping at the 
world market; therefore, its reduction is seen as essential. The other boxes 
seem not to have the same effect on trade distortion, because of their indirect 
impact on production; therefore, they were not subject to any reductions63. The 
blue box support involves several direct payments to farmers, for instance, 
payments that require farmers to limit production, and is seen as transitional.64 
The green box support contains payments that do not depend on prices or 
production output. These decoupled payments are seen as minimally trade 
distorting.65 
Because the amber box reductions did not have serious implications further 
negotiations were envisaged. The AoA itself (Article 20) stated that new 
negotiations should start no later than one year before the end of the transition 
period.66  
In the Doha Development Agenda (DDA) the debates about the reduction 
and/or elimination of export subsidies, further reduction of domestic support in 
developed countries and improved market access continued.  
                                            
60 Frein/Reichert: Fortschritt durch Stillstand, 2008, p.21. 
61 The question of domestic support will be discussed more detailed in chapter 3.  
62 Frein/Reichert: Fortschritt durch Stillstand, 2008, p.21. 
63 Frein/Reichert: Fortschritt durch Stillstand, 2008, p.21. 
64 Ibid. 
65 Ibid., p.22. 
66 Von Urff: Agrarmarkt und Strukturen des ländlichen Raumes in der Europäischen Union, 
2006, p.218 et seq. 
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The first Ministerial Conference of the WTO was held in Singapore where the 
EU and US pushed for the so called Singapore issues (government 
procurement, trade facilitation, investment, and competition) in working groups. 
Most developing countries refused to negotiate these Singapore issues. At the 
Doha Ministerial Conference the countries decided to negotiate these issues 
later.67 
In 2000 several developing countries proposed a “development box” and called 
for more “flexibility in agricultural trade policies” and a central role of agriculture 
due to its importance on economies. Moreover, 
“Agriculture in developing countries is therefore not just another sector of 
the economy, but one that has far-reaching implications on people's 
livelihoods and employment, food availability as well as a countries' 
balance of payment situation.”68 
They requested measures such as increased flexibility in tariffs for developing 
countries, stronger tariff reduction in developed countries as well as the 
abolition of export subsidies and of SSG for developed countries.69 Presently 
only some elements of this “development box” have been pushed through, for 
instance, the sensitive and special products and the SSM included in the July 
Package.70 
The Doha Development Round commenced with the 4th Ministerial Conference 
in Doha/Qatar 2001 after the failure of the Seattle Ministerial Conference 1999. 
In the Ministerial Declaration it was acknowledged that the “majority of WTO 
Members are developing countries” whose “needs and interests” shall be 
placed at the heart of the agenda.71 Above all, the “marginalization of least-
developed countries in international trade and […] their effective participation in 
                                            
67 Frein/Reichert: Fortschritt durch Stillstand, 2008, p.11. 
68 Cuba, Dominican Republic, Honduras, Pakistan, Haiti, Nicaragua, Kenya, Uganda, 
Zimbabwe, Sri Lanka, El Salvador: Agreement on Agriculture: Special and Differential 
Treatment and a Development Box. Proposal to the June 2000 session of the Committee on 
Agriculture, 2000. 
69 Ibid. 
70 Frein/Reichert: Fortschritt durch Stillstand, 2008, p.16. 
71 WTO: Ministerial Conference. Fourth session, Doha, 9-14 November 2001. Ministerial 
Declaration, adopted on 14 November 2001, 20 November 2001, p.1. 
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the multilateral trading system”72 should be in focus of further negotiations. One 
important point has been further negotiations on agriculture that include:  
• substantial improvements in market access, 
•  reductions of all forms of export subsidies, 
• substantial reductions in trade-distorting domestic support, 
• special and differential treatment for developing countries “to enable 
developing countries to effectively take account of their development 
needs, including food security and rural development”73, 
• elimination of tariffs (tariff peaks, high tariffs, and tariff escalation, non-
tariff barriers in particular on products of export interest to developing 
countries), 
• comprehensive product coverage, 
• less than full reciprocity in reduction commitments.74 
Negotiations on services, IPR and Singapore issues were still on the agenda, 
as well as the reform of WTO rules, in particular, the WTO provisions applying 
to regional trade agreements where the “negotiations shall take into account the 
developmental aspects of regional trade agreements.”75 
The completion of negotiations has been destined for 2005 but negotiations still 
continue and have not been finalised in 2009. After the Doha Ministerial 
Conference several Ministerial Conferences have been taking place between 
developed and developing countries.  
2002 the EU made a proposal to repeat the tariff reductions of the Uruguay 
Round and to reduce export refunds by 45% and domestic support by 55% 
(amber box) while maintaining blue and green box support. The Harbinson76 
proposal 2003 provided a stronger reduction of tariffs (between 40-60%), the 
abolition of export refunds after nine years and reduction of domestic support by 
60% within seven years. The Harbinson proposal even recommended blue box 
                                            
72 Ibid. 
73 Ibid., p.3. 
74 Ibid., p.4. 
75 Ibid., p.6. 
76 Head of the agriculture negotiating group.  
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reductions by 50%. Both concepts intended to grant developing countries more 
generous conditions.77  
The countries could not agree on modalities in the run-up to the next Ministerial 
conference; therefore, EU and US made a proposal regarding agriculture on the 
verge of the fifth Ministerial Conference in Cancun 2003. This proposal did not 
offer substantial commitments with regard to reductions in domestic support of 
EU and US but requested developing countries to liberalise their markets. A 
safeguard mechanism should allow them to protect a certain number of 
agricultural products relevant for food security. The emerging group of G-20 – 
including countries with different agricultural interests like India, Brazil, and 
Egypt – on their part requested for a stronger reduction commitment from the 
EU and US concerning domestic support and more generous liberalisation 
commitments from developing countries.  
The Ministerial Conference in Cancun itself has not come to a successful end. 
The WTO members were unable to agree to a compromise in the field of 
agriculture or with regard to the Singapore issues.78 A Ministerial Statement 
declares that  
“All participants have worked hard and constructively to make progress as 
required under the Doha mandates. We have, indeed, made considerable 
progress. However, more work needs to be done in some key areas to 
enable us to proceed towards the conclusion of the negotiations in 
fulfilment of the commitments we took at Doha.”79 
After the failure of this conference the countries agreed to authorise the General 
Council to prepare further negotiating steps.  
The next meeting in July 2004 in Geneva was an informal level of talks that 
ended with the so-called July Package with a commitment to conclude the Doha 
Round. In matters of Singapore issues the developing countries ensured 
success in only one of four issues – trade facilitation – to be negotiated further.  
                                            
77 Von Urff: Agrarmarkt und Strukturen des ländlichen Raumes in der Europäischen Union, 
2006, p.219. 
78 Frein/Reichert: Fortschritt durch Stillstand, 2008, p.12 et seq. 
79 WTO: Ministerial Conference. Fifth session. Cancún, 10-14 September 2003. Ministerial 
Statement, adopted on 14 September 2003, 23 September 2003, p.1. 
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With respect to NAMA (non-agricultural market access) the developing 
countries have been less successful.80 The Cancun proposal has been carried 
over and contained the request for a  
“non-linear formula applied on a line-by-line basis which shall take fully into 
account the special needs and interests of developing and least-developed 
country participants, including through less than full reciprocity in reduction 
commitments.”81 
The stronger reduction of higher tariffs is more problematic for developing 
countries, as well as the request for the incentive for a stronger reduction of 
tariffs in certain sectors.82 
With regard to agriculture  
“Members agree to establish detailed modalities ensuring the parallel 
elimination of all forms of export subsidies and disciplines on all export 
measures with equivalent effect by a credible end date.”83 
While the proposed elimination of export subsidies (even if no concrete date is 
entitled) is a success for the developing countries they had to accept the tariff 
reduction formula in the July Package. It is stated that a “single approach for 
developed and developing country members” is applied and that the tariff 
reductions should be made from bound level rather than the applied level 
(“Tariff reductions will be made from bound rates.”).84 Moreover, “Progressivity 
in tariff reductions will be achieved through deeper cuts in higher tariffs with 
flexibilities for sensitive products.”85 For the first time sensitive (Annex A, 
Paragraph 31-34) and special products (Annex A, Paragraph 41) and the 
Special Safeguard Mechanism (Annex A, Paragraph 42) are included. These 
measures are meant to grant more developmental flexibility. But many issues 
                                            
80 Frein/Reichert: Fortschritt durch Stillstand, 2008, p.14. 
81 WTO: Doha Work Programme. Decision adopted by the General Council on 1 August 2004 
("July Package"), 2 August 2004, Annex B, Paragraph 4. 
82 Frein/Reichert: Fortschritt durch Stillstand, 2008, p.15. WTO: Doha Work Programme. 
Decision adopted by the General Council on 1 August 2004 ("July Package"), 02 August 2004, 
Annex B, Paragraph 7. 
83 Ibid., Annex A, Paragraph 17. 
84 Ibid., Annex A, Paragraph 28, 29. 
85 Ibid., Annex A, Paragraph 29. 
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still remained unclear and the “question of the special agricultural safeguard 
(SSG) remains under negotiation.”86 
The July Package should have been the foundation for further negotiations of 
modalities until the sixth Ministerial Conference in Hong Kong 2005. But due to 
further delays the ambitious objective has been reduced to find a way to 
approximate to these modalities in Hong Kong.87  
In Hong Kong the negotiations were more successful in moving forward. The 
EU offered the abolition of export subsidies until 2013 and further concretisation 
of other issues occurred (e.g. NAMA and services). The matter of reductions of 
tariffs and subsidies in agriculture were postponed until the summer of 2006.88  
An informal meeting in 2006 of US, EU, Brazil, India, Japan and Australia ended 
without any result and negotiations were interrupted. Furthermore, an attempt in 
2007 to pursue negotiations was not fruitful.89  
Negotiations continued with an informal meeting in July 2008 to discuss the 
modalities which would be a base for broad negotiations. The most contentious 
issues remained the Special Safeguard Mechanism (SSM) for agricultural 
products and the non-agricultural market access. The original principle of “less 
than full reciprocity in reduction commitments”90 implies that developed 
countries would have to undertake larger reduction commitments than 
developing countries. The current proposal seems to be an “inversion of that 
hierarchy as it requires developing countries to shoulder the bulk of tariff cuts in 
NAMA”.91 South Centre raises the  
“difficult question of whether the price developing countries would be 
asked to pay in NAMA is worth hypothetical benefits resulting from 
domestic support and market access negotiations in agriculture.”92 
Again the principle of single undertaking is crucial in the negotiations. 
Mandelson, former EU Trade Commissioner, argues that there is an 
                                            
86 Ibid., Annex A, Paragraph 38. 
87 Frein/Reichert: Fortschritt durch Stillstand, 2008, p.16. 
88 Ibid. 
89 Ibid., p.17. 
90 WTO: Doha Work Programme. Decision adopted by the General Council on 1 August 2004 
("July Package"), 02 August 2004, Annex B, Paragraph 2. 
91 South Centre: South Centre’s analysis and news of the WTO’s mini-ministerial, No.2, 2008, 
p.1. 
92 Ibid., p.2. 
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“impressive list of points for which there was provisional agreement in 
agriculture and NAMA”93. According to him the total progress represented 90-
95% of the overall deal but due to the single undertaking: “nothing is agreed 
until everything is agreed”.94 Therefore, negotiations have not been finalised 
yet. 
2.1.2 WTO Negotiations on Agriculture – State of Play  
With regard to market access a tiered formula of cuts in tariffs is foreseen with 
four bands. There is a more and a less ambitious proposal by the chairman of 
the Committee of Agriculture. According to this proposal the range of tariff cuts 
in the highest band (tariffs above 75% in developed, above 130% in developing 
countries) varies from 66-73% for developed countries and from 44-48% for 
developing countries. In the lowest band (tariffs below 20% in developed and 
30% in developing countries) the reductions vary from 48-52% for developed 
and 32-34% for developing countries.95 While the EU and G-20 position is 
relatively similar, the US proposal is more radical with the request for 90% 
reduction in the highest band.96 The proposal provided a reduction of 36-40% 
for agricultural tariffs while the G-20 proposed 36%, again relatively close 
together.97 
The exemption of sensitive (all countries) and special products (developing 
countries) – criteria for special products are food security, livelihood security, 
and rural development – is also contentious. While developed countries 
designated 4-6% of products as sensitive many developing countries 
designated one third more as sensitive.98 Again, the US proposal went far 
beyond these commitments and asked for an exemption of less than 1%.99 Until 
the end of 2008 no clarification occurred.100 
                                            
93 Hanson, V.: WTO roundup, 2008, in: TNI, Vol.7, No.7, September 2008, p.11-12. 
94 Ibid. 
95 Agritrade: WTO agreement on agriculture: Executive brief, 2008; Frein/Reichert: Fortschritt 
durch Stillstand, 2008, p.25. 
96 Frein/Reichert: Fortschritt durch Stillstand, 2008, p.24 et seq. 
97 Ibid., p.25. 
98 Agritrade: WTO agreement on agriculture, 2008. 
99 Frein/Reichert: Fortschritt durch Stillstand, 2008, p.24. 
100 WTO: Revised draft modalities for agriculture, 6 December 2008, p.2. 
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The question of special products has been problematic as well. While G-33 
proposed to define 20% of all products as special, to exempt 50% of these 
special products from tariff reduction, and to reduce tariffs for the rest by 5-10%; 
the US proposal wants only 5% of products to be declared as special and likes 
to see substantial reduction commitments. This issue is contentious even 
among the developing countries: exporters like Chile, Thailand, and Argentina 
prefer to keep the number of special products small.101 The December 2008 
draft modalities for agriculture propose the following: 
“There shall be 12 per cent of tariff lines available for self-designation as 
Special Products. Up to 5 per cent of lines may have no cut. The overall 
average cut shall, in any case, be 11 percent.”102 
But one of the most contentious issues remained the Special Safeguard 
Mechanism (SSM) for agricultural products which would be available only for 
developing countries and has been proposed by the G-33, a coalition of 46 
developing countries.  
The 10 July revised draft modalities call for additional tariffs to be imposed on 
the applied tariffs rather than the bound tariff levels. The SSG on the contrary is 
silent on the question of applied or bound tariffs with the consequence that most 
countries added additional tariffs on Uruguay bound tariff levels.103 Small 
vulnerable economies would be allowed to add a tariff of 20% on the bound rate 
(or 20 ad valorem percentage points) for up to 10-15% of tariff lines in a certain 
period. Developing countries would be allowed to add a tariff of 15% on the 
bound rate (or 15 ad valorem percentage points) for up to 2-6 products of tariff 
lines in a given period.104 South Centre criticises that many applied tariffs of 
developing countries are already low, for instance, the Cote d’Ivoire tariff on 
poultry with 4% that could be increased with this SSM to only 24%. Another 
critical issue is the comparison with the SSG which is not limited to a number of 
products.105 
                                            
101 Frein/Reichert: Fortschritt durch Stillstand, 2008, p.25. 
102 WTO: Revised draft modalities for agriculture, 6 December 2008, Paragraph 129. 
103 South Centre: Analysis and news of the WTO’s mini-ministerial, No.1, 2008, p.1. 
104 Ibid. 
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The debate regarding the triggers of the SSM still continues. In July 2008 Lamy 
proposed that SSM remedies would be allowed to surpass the pre-Doha tariff 
levels by up to 15% when import volumes rose by 40% over a three year 
average106; the number of tariff lines would be limited to 2.5%. Contrariwise, the 
G33 proposal allows SSM remedies to surpass pre-Doha tariff levels by up to 
30% when import volumes rose by 10%; the number of tariff lines would be 
limited to 7%.107 The December 2008 draft modalities for agriculture proposed a 
more differentiated volume trigger: one tier with a volume increase of 110-115% 
where the maximum applied duty “imposed on applied tariffs shall not exceed 
25 per cent of the current bound tariff or 25 percentage points, whichever is 
higher”; a second tier with a volume increase of 115-135% where the maximum 
applied duty “Imposed on applied tariffs shall not exceed 40 per cent of the 
current bound tariff or 40 percentage points, whichever is higher”; and a third 
tier with a volume increase that exceeds 135% where the maximum applied 
duty “imposed on applied tariffs shall not exceed 50 per cent of the current 
bound tariff or 50 percentage points, whichever is higher”.108 So far, no solution 
has been agreed.  
As far as domestic support is concerned, the July Package proposed that 
developed countries should reduce their aggregate level of domestic support by 
20%109 following the principle, “Members having higher levels of trade-distorting 
domestic support will make greater overall reductions in order to achieve a 
harmonizing result.”110  
The discussions in 2007 provided a basis for the revised draft modalities text for 
2008. This concept proposes a reduction of overall trade-distorting support 
(which includes amber and blue box support as well as the de minimis) by 75 or 
85% (EU), 66 or 73% (US, Japan) and 50 or 60% of other countries including 
an immediate cut of 33% for EU, US and Japan and 25% for the other 
countries. Remaining cuts would take place over five years (developed) and 
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eight years (developing countries). Amber box support should be reduced by 
70% (AMS) for EU, US/Japan 60% and the other countries by 40%. With regard 
to de minimis developed countries should cut to 2.5% or 5% of the value of 
production and developing countries two thirds of this. Blue box support is going 
to be limited to 2.5% (developed countries) or 5% (developing countries) of the 
value of production including caps per product. Green box provisions are going 
to be revised later.111  
The debate about the green box support will be reconsidered in chapter 3 on 
the CAP. The discussions at the WTO level demonstrate a conflict between 
developed and developing countries. The EU favours to preserve the less trade 
distorting blue box support and a complete exemption of the green box support 
from any reductions. However, at the same time there is increasing evidence 
that the green box support “affects farmers’ production decisions, and therefore 
potentially affect[s] world trade”.112 Even the OECD states that “all agriculture-
specific support measures investigated have some effect on production.”113 
Therefore, some (developing) countries require a cut in green box support while 
others, in particular the EU, prefer to maintain these payments.114 
Export refunds will expire 2013 and complementarily there will be an expiry of 
“parallel moves on the regulation of the activities of state-trading companies, 
disciplines on export credits, export-credit guarantees and insurance 
programmes as well as international food aid.”115 Until 2013 the EU still has the 
possibility to use export refunds and currently makes use of it e.g., the re-
introduction of pig meat export refunds in May 2008116 or for milk products in 
January 2009.117  
Until the end of 2008 no new meeting took place – there still has been no 
agreement on the modalities on NAMA and agriculture/SSM – and at the end of 
                                            
111 Agritrade: WTO agreement on agriculture, 2008. 
112 Ibid. 
113 Ibid. 
114 Ibid. 
115 Ibid. 
116 Ulmer, K.: Making a pig's ear of African agriculture, in: European Voice, 19 May 2008. 
117 European Commission: Press release: Dairy market: Commission proposes additional 
measures to help dairy sector, 15 January 2009. 
 30
2008 no new meeting for 2009 has been scheduled.118 The chair of WTO 
agricultural negotiations, Ambassador Falconer, planed to call “’carousel 
meetings” to discuss the December 2008 draft text. Unfortunately, the new US 
Trade Representative may not be ready to negotiate until April and Indian 
elections in May could delay the negotiations further.119 
Agriculture has always played an important role in international trade. Since the 
Second World War the protection of developed countries’ agriculture has been 
a central issue in international trade. With the emergence of developing 
countries as independent actors and the liberalisation attempts since the 1980s 
the liberalisation of the agricultural sector became more and more important. In 
the mid-1990s the AoA has been the first agreement at international trade level 
that aimed at the liberalisation of agricultural trade and the restriction of 
domestic production. Agriculture still plays a central role for the negotiating 
partners in the Doha Round negotiations since 2001 and is, among other 
factors, one of the most contentious issues in the negotiations between 
developed and developing countries.  
The offensive interests of the EU in WTO negotiations call for the reduction of 
tariffs with regard to of non-agricultural market access (NAMA), to pursue export 
interests and enter new markets for export products. Moreover, the EU seeks to 
liberalise the so-called Singapore issues to increase trade in services and 
receive a better access to new markets. With regard to agriculture the EU has 
primarily defensive interests. The position of the EU towards the negotiations on 
agriculture is determined by the Common Agricultural Policy which is 
characterised by the shift from amber to blue and green box payments. 
Therefore, the EU seeks to “get the basics of the European agricultural policy 
agreed upon in the multilateral trading system”120 and first and foremost tries to 
protect the blue and green box support. As far as agriculture is concerned the 
EU also has offensive interests and seeks to maintain liberalisation of 
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agricultural markets as far as possible: it concedes agricultural safeguards to 
developing countries but only limited in scope. 
In the Doha Round negotiations developing countries aim at the reduction of 
developed countries’ agricultural support measures. ACP countries in particular 
try to secure their preferential market access to developed countries’ markets. 
Furthermore, these countries have defensive interests i.e., the maintenance of 
protection for their own agricultural markets as well as the protection of non-
agricultural market access. Moreover, most of those ACP countries oppose the 
negotiation on Singapore issues.  
Both negotiating parties try to improve their access to markets of the other party 
and to maintain protection of their own domestic markets – in the case of the 
EU the agricultural support system while developing countries seek to protect 
agricultural and non-agricultural markets.  
In comparison, predictions are mixed regarding the outcome of negotiations that 
are not yet finalised. With regard to NAMA ongoing negotiations developing 
countries oppose the EU request for a stronger reduction of higher tariffs 
arguing that this violates the principle of “less than full reciprocity”. As far as 
domestic support of agriculture in the EU and the attempt to liberalise 
agricultural tariffs is concerned, ACP countries agree with the four band 
approach but differ about concrete volumes of tariff reduction. Green box 
support is exempted from liberalisation commitments. Negotiations on this issue 
have been postponed but the EU offered the abolition of export refunds to begin 
in 2013 – not immediately – thereby, making the offer less valuable. With 
reference to export refunds ACP countries seek a more rapid phase-out of 
these subsidies. Agritrade recommends to pay attention to the so-called “‘non-
annex I’ products, that is value added food products that use CAP-covered 
agricultural raw materials on which export refunds are paid on the basic of raw 
material”,121 because they observe an increase in EU value-added exports to 
the ACP countries of 33% since 2000.122 While it is important for ACP countries, 
and developing countries in general, to include the reduction of domestic 
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support into the WTO disciplines they have to maintain at least the option to use 
domestic support tools to ensure food security and poverty reduction.123  
Developing countries and particularly ACP countries were able to introduce a 
more or less flexible handling of special and sensitive products though details 
are still under negotiation. Developing countries have been successful in 
introducing a safeguard for agricultural products (SSM) though the scope of this 
safeguard is still controversial. In general ACP countries welcomed the 2008 
revised draft modalities and in particular the special treatment of small and 
vulnerable countries but call for more support to address supply-side constraints 
and issues of diversification.124 
As far as the Singapore issues are concerned developing countries have been 
successful in refusing most issues though they acknowledged the negotiation of 
the liberalisation of services; but this issue is, at least for some developing 
countries, quite interesting. 
In the Uruguay Round negotiations the developed countries pursued a 
“mercantilist approach […] which protected their interests before anything 
else”125 while the developing countries “did not realise early enough the 
importance of the negotiations in the Uruguay Round for their development.”126 
Moreover, not only a lack of awareness but also the fact that developing 
countries are a heterogeneous group with different interests (e.g., import-
sensitive developing countries that seek for protection of their markets and 
competitive farm exporters) is another reason for their weak position in the trade 
negotiations.127  
Therefore, creating coalitions is essential in the WTO negotiations. EU and US 
“still [have] a tendency to highlight their divergences”128 but for the most part 
they have common positions, especially with regard to the “improved access to 
expanding markets.”129 Developing countries have built several coalitions in the 
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course of WTO negotiations. One example is the Cairns Group.130 Since the 
Uruguay Round this coalition followed the aim of liberalisation of agriculture 
while emphasising their lack of capacity to compete with larger countries. 
However, the Cairns Group has become less important since Cancun because 
many developing countries are now engaged in G-20 and G-33. The G-20 
comprises the most developed developing countries131 aiming at the abolition of 
export subsidies; thus, G-20 has become increasingly important. The G-90 is a 
large group containing all LDCs. In this group the ACP countries and the African 
Union countries desire to protect their agriculture. As it is a large group with 
heterogeneous countries it is often hard to find a common position. The G-10,132 
formed in July 2004, consists of countries that are net importers of agricultural 
products and are in favour of a strong protection of agriculture. Also in July 
2004 the G-30133 was created with the aim to defend the concept of special 
products necessary for food security and rural development.134  
During the negotiations of the Doha Development Agenda a change seemed to 
approach in the negotiating position of the developing countries. Normally, EU 
and US bring in a proposal and accept smaller modifications from other 
countries. While this scenario took place at the beginning of the Doha Round 
the developing countries were able to strengthen their position in the course of 
negotiations and eventually played a more active role in the emerging 
coalitions. One example is the proposal of developing countries to introduce a 
safeguard mechanism to protect domestic agricultural production in the 
development box in 2000. EU and the US acknowledged this mechanism in the 
July Package though details of the SSM are still contentious.  
Since 1960/70s more and more developing countries joined the WTO but they 
are more or less underrepresented in the negotiating structure. Technically 
formal WTO members should have the same rights in formal negotiating 
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groups; however, the reality is different in practise. For example, negotiations 
often take place in so-called green room meetings instead of formal negotiating 
groups. The quad group – EU, US, Japan, and Canada – invite others to this 
green room and sets the agenda. It is in these green room meetings that 
decisions are made. Therefore, developing countries only have limited 
opportunity to be proactive. Moreover, everyday business is difficult for 
developing countries due to their limited capacity in human capital, travelling 
costs and so on. For instance, it is impossible to join parallel meetings with only 
one representative. Furthermore, the consensus principle is crucial as it means 
the consensus of the attendees, which is difficult for developing countries. 
Private companies have better access to meetings and information than civil 
society organisations and even national parliaments which is a signal of a lack 
of transparency.135 
During the Doha conference there have been no green room meetings but ad 
hoc working groups and a “Committee of the Whole”. However, it has still been 
difficult for developing countries to participate in all meetings and to deal with 
translation problems; therefore, in the end of this round WTO members recurred 
to green room meetings again. While in the Cancun Ministerial NGOs were in 
attendance they did not have the opportunity to join the negotiations. Further 
meetings at informal levels exacerbate the participation of NGOs e.g., the July 
meeting in Geneva 2004.136 The informal meeting in Geneva in July 2008 tried 
to improve the information flow to countries that did not participate in green 
room meetings. Regional and issue-oriented groups have sent representatives 
to the meetings. But after three days the new style of meetings was abandoned 
and negotiations continued in smaller, issue-oriented groups. South Centre 
refers to the fact that the most important group – EU, US, Japan, Brazil, India, 
Australia, and China – has not been issue-oriented but included the most 
powerful negotiators.137 
Even though developing countries have become more successful in these 
negotiations by creating coalitions, there has not been any reform of the 
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negotiating structures in the WTO regardless of the attempts to change these 
structures. The Doha Declaration aims at the improved inclusion of developing 
countries and promised to focus on their development needs; the introduction of 
the ad hoc meetings have been a positive signal in that direction as well as the 
new structure at the Geneva meeting in 2008. However, efforts have been 
rather tentative and neither a formal reform of the WTO negotiating structure 
has been envisaged nor informal changes have improved the negotiating 
position of developing countries. Moreover, the inclusion of civil society is still 
insufficient. Therefore, the structure of WTO negotiations made it difficult for 
developing countries to improve their position. 
2.2 WTO as Framework for (EPA) Trade Negotiations  
In general an increasing importance of Regional Trade Agreements (RTAs) can 
be observed. Multilateral and regional trade incentives have coexisted since the 
1950s; however, since the 1980s there has been a sharp increase in the 
numbers of RTAs.138 At present, the increasing importance for developing 
countries in particular might be related to the lack of progress in the Doha 
negotiations and might be used to “complement and often propel domestic 
economic reforms.”139 
Schott shows that RTAs can both undercut and complement the multilateral 
system. They can complement multilateralism because they advance trade 
liberalisation, establish useful precedents for WTO talks, lock in domestic 
reforms, and bolster alliances between trading partners. On the other hand, 
they can undercut the multilateral trading system because they might lead to 
trade and investment diversion, they create overlapping and conflicting trade 
rules, they cause attention and resource diversion from WTO talks, and are bad 
precedents for other trade accords.140 While RTAs “achieve deeper cuts in trade 
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protection than WTO reforms” they do this “on a discriminatory basis.” so that 
preferences for some countries result in discrimination against others.141 But 
Schott argues that the risk of trade diversion is less evident in practise and often 
the growth impetus results in “net trade creation over time.”142 
Although the most important principle in the WTO is the MFN treatment there 
are a few exceptions. These include import remedies (e.g., antidumping duties, 
import and balance of payment safeguards), regulatory exceptions (general in 
Article XX, national security controls Article XXI), RTAs and plurilateral 
exceptions as well as developing countries preferences (part IV/GATT, 
S&DT).143 The most important one is defined in Article XXIV/GATT (and Article 
V/GATS). The article allows the creation of a free trade area between trading 
partners with the elimination of trade barriers, defined as “substantially all the 
trade” (Paragraph 8) within a “reasonable length of time“ (Paragraph 5).144 No 
special conditions for developing countries are foreseen.  
The so-called Enabling Clause, officially “Decision on Differential and More 
Favourable Treatment, Reciprocity and Fuller Participation of Developing 
Countries”, allows developed countries to provide differential and more 
favourable treatment to developing countries and is a basis for regional 
agreements between developing countries. One precondition is that tariff 
preferences granted to a group of developing countries must not discriminate 
among developing countries (except LDCs). 
The discussion about the role of developing countries in trade agreements 
began in the 1960s.145 EU ACP relations were the first example of an 
outstanding role of developing countries in regional trade relations. The 
association agreement between the European Commission and former colonies 
(Overseas Countries and Territories, OCT, 1958) allowed the imposition of 
customs duties (if they encourage development, industrialisation, and creation 
of revenue), which has been seen as violation of GATT Article XXIV. The 
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Yaoundé and Lomé Conventions induced similar discussions about the 
inclusion of North-South agreements in Article XXIV. Some countries argued 
that GATT Article XXIV does not apply in such cases but GATT part IV (1966) 
“in which developing countries are generally exempted from the reciprocity 
obligation (GATT Article XXXVI:8146).”147 The European Community answered 
that reciprocity is addressed under GATT Article XXIV “so that Article XXIV in 
combination with Article XXXVI:8 accordingly permits nonreciprocal North-South 
arrangements.”148 
The compatibility between regional and multilateral trade rules is still 
characterised by an uncertainty of rules. Borrmann et al. argue that one reason 
might be a lack of political interest because many countries are not interested in 
a critical review of their trade agreements.149 This difficulty is also an issue in 
the current Doha Development Round. The problem is that WTO rules must 
take “into account the particular adjustment problems of developing countries 
facing forced market opening in this framework.”150 
The July package offering longer implementation periods for developing 
countries and exempting LDCs from reciprocity could have made a contribution 
to the negotiations on WTO rules. One solution could be that the “coverage of 
GATT Article XXIV and GATS Article V could be extended to trade 
arrangements between developing countries, freeing South-South agreements 
from the Enabling Clause.”151  
The ACP countries made a proposal to include in the compatibility criteria of 
GATT Article XXIV “a ‘formal and explicit’ claim for developing countries to 
Special and Differential Treatment in North-South arrangements.”152 With 
regard to breadth and depth developing countries should be allowed to have 
lower limits and use protective measures and a more expanded transition 
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period – longer than the ten years the EU normally specifies. Moreover, 
“substantially all the trade” is not qualified in the GATT but the EU interpretation 
is that 90% of trade has to be liberalised.  
The EU recognises that adjustment problems of developing countries should be 
taken into account, in particular, the duration of the transition period, the level of 
final trade coverage, and the principle of asymmetry in the removal of tariffs.153 
The flexibility of the GATS provision that, in contrast to the GATT provisions, is 
required with regard to breadth, depth and speed of liberalisation could be 
transferred to GATT but there is “little likelihood that any substantial reform of 
the regional exception will emerge from the Doha Round.”154 Moreover, there is 
no characterisation of flexibility entailed; therefore, Borrmann et al. judge that 
“its practical scope is less than obvious.”155 
With regard to trade relations one of the most important motives to alter these 
relations between EU and ACP countries has been the lack of WTO 
compatibility of the Lomé Agreement. First of all, granting preferences to a 
certain group of developing countries – the historically grown ACP group – and 
not granting these preferences to other developing countries with similar 
development level is not compatible with WTO rules under the Enabling Clause. 
Moreover, the trade relations of the Lomé agreement provide unilateral 
preferences for the ACP countries and are not compatible with the rules on 
RTAs in GATT Article XXIV. Therefore, the EU pushed for the introduction of 
reciprocal rather than unilateral trade relations with the ACP countries. But 
reciprocal trade between a strong trading partner like the EU and some of the 
poorest developing countries in the world endangers the economic development 
of these countries and the livelihoods of millions of people. Therefore, the new 
trade relations should “structure a liberalisation process in the ACP states which 
is in line with the capability and development policy priorities of the countries 
and at the same time meets WTO requirements.”156 
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The EU introduced reciprocity – which seems to be a “new paradigm” in its “new 
regionalism”157 – in its trade relations with developing countries since the 1990s. 
Several elements of asymmetry are established in these trade agreements to 
accommodate the smaller adjustment capacity of the developing countries. The 
principle of Special and Differential Treatment (SDT) allows the unilateral 
preferential treatment (e.g., in the Generalised System of Preferences, GSP) 
and privileges South-South agreements under the Enabling Clause. Part 
IV/GATT entails general exceptions for developing countries but is not available 
for North-South agreements.158 Another element of asymmetry, the definition of 
“substantially all the trade” under a “reasonable length of time”, remains 
ambiguous and became a contentious issue in EPA negotiations. 
The institutional framework for the new trade relations, the Cotonou Partnership 
Agreement, must be seen in the WTO context as it is “conditioned by WTO 
rules and determine[s] the trade policy strategies of ACP countries”159. 
Article 34:1 of the CPA defines the objective of the renewed trade relations:  
“Economic and trade cooperation shall aim at fostering the smooth and 
gradual integration of the ACP States into the world economy, with due 
regard for their political choices and development priorities, thereby 
promoting their sustainable development and contributing to poverty 
eradication in the ACP countries.“160 
Article 34:2 aims at “their transition to the liberalised global economy” while 
Article 34:4 recognises that 
“Economic and trade cooperation shall be implemented in full conformity 
with the provisions of the WTO, including special and differential treatment, 
taking account of the Parties’ mutual interests and their respective levels of 
development.”161 
The need for SDT is acknowledged in Article 35:3 where the “different needs 
and levels of development of the ACP countries and regions” should be taken 
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into account and where “special and differential treatment for all ACP countries 
and […] special treatment for ACP LDCs and […] of small, landlocked and 
island countries” is central.162  
The EPAs should aim at “establishing the timetable for the progressive removal 
of barriers to trade between the Parties, in accordance with the relevant WTO 
rules.”163 Moreover, the level of development of the ACP countries should play 
an essential role and be reflected in appropriate flexibility: 
“Negotiations shall take account of the level of development and the socio-
economic impact of trade measures on ACP countries, and their capacity 
to adapt and adjust their economies to the liberalisation process. 
Negotiations will therefore be as flexible as possible in establishing the 
duration of a sufficient transitional period, the final product coverage, 
taking into account sensitive sectors, and the degree of asymmetry in 
terms of timetable for tariff dismantlement, while remaining in conformity 
with WTO rules then prevailing.”164 
Since the outcome of the current WTO negotiations round is unclear WTO-
compatibility is “an objective which is ill-defined at the moment.”165 Moreover, 
ACP and EU positions differ on how to bring the EPAs in line with WTO rules.166 
The ACP countries complain about a “deficiency in the legal structure of WTO 
rules applying to RTAs” and call for “S&D treatment for developing countries be 
formally and explicitly made available to developing countries.”167 Unfortunately, 
“This could, however, mean that the compatibility of the EPAs with the 
WTO rules called for in the Cotonou Agreement would ultimately become 
impossible to achieve, as it could probably not be unambiguously 
established on the basis of the existing rules.”168  
Borrmann et al. remark that even if no reform of WTO rules has occurred there 
is still the necessity to defend EPAs to the WTO169 (CPA, Article 37:8): 
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 “The Parties shall closely cooperate and collaborate in the WTO with a 
view to defending the arrangements reached, in particular with regard to 
the degree of flexibility available.”170 
Bilal refers to the parallel negotiating schedules and their meaning for the 
developing strategy of ACP countries: “it is likely that the ACP countries will 
have to take decisions within the framework of EPA negotiations before the 
WTO negotiations are concluded.”171 Therefore, it will be necessary to develop 
“a coherent strategy and positions which encompass negotiations both within 
the framework of WTO and of EPAs.”172 Moreover, WTO and EPA negotiations 
have the same negotiating areas: agriculture, services, NAMA, Singapore 
issues, SDT and others.173 Interplay between both trade negotiations can 
proceed at different levels. With regard to the market opening it has to be 
considered that the more the EU opens its market to developing countries within 
the DDA the smaller the preferences for ACP countries will be. On the contrary, 
the more the ACP open their markets during the DDA “the less the reciprocal 
opening of their markets to EU products […] will entail adjustment costs for their 
economies.”174  
As far as the definition of sensitive products is concerned  
“The WTO negotiations on domestic supports and exports supports can 
nevertheless affect indirectly the EPA negotiations on the identification by 
the ACP countries of the products that they want to be excluded from the 
EPAs; the strongly subsidised character of certain products can be used 
as a criterion for selecting such products.”175 
The expiry of export refunds guaranteed at WTO level could influence the 
negotiating position of the EU in EPA negotiations. With regard to the debate 
about market opening of the ACP countries and their fear of import surges of 
EU agricultural products that are more competitive, the expiry of export refunds 
might be an argument of the EU to proof that EU agricultural exports are less 
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threatening. This could lead to the request of a more extensive definition of the 
scope of trade liberalisation and more rapid schedules. 
The attempt to negotiate the Singapore issues at WTO level and the fact that 
developing countries acknowledged negotiations on the liberalisation of 
services can have twofold implications for EPA negotiations. First, the fact that 
developing countries agreed to negotiate the liberalisation of trade in services 
could increase the pressure to include services in EPA negotiations as well. 
Moreover, the EU could try to introduce the other Singapore issues into the EPA 
negotiations in order to negotiate them at bilateral level where ACP countries 
might have a weaker negotiating position.  
Interdependencies between WTO level and EPA negotiations are related to the 
fact that both trade negotiations deal with the same negotiating areas and 
overlapping is in all probability. Moreover, the trend of international trade 
liberalisation that is expressed by WTO negotiations on the liberalisation of 
agricultural and non-agricultural goods and services has been the incentive for 
the European Union to push for a change of ACP-EU trade relations. The result 
has been the introduction of reciprocity in a free trade area with the ACP 
countries to comply with WTO obligations. As already shown the Cotonou 
Partnership Agreement refers to the WTO framework emphatically.  
The uncertainty of rules and outstanding reforms of WTO provisions with regard 
to the treatment of developing countries in North-South trade might have 
implications for EPA negotiations as well. EPAs might create realities at bilateral 
level and thereby influence negotiations at WTO level. 
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3 Agriculture in the European Union 
The Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) has been an important common policy 
since the 1960s. Over time there have been three phases of CAP reforms. First, 
the shift from price support to direct aid paid for farmers. Then came the partial 
shift from direct production-related aid to farmers to area payments and 
subsequently to historical payment obligations, progressively ‘decoupled’ from 
production. And most recently there has been envisaged the complete shift to 
non-production-related farm assistance, the so-called full decoupling. A 
consequence of this shift towards decoupled payments as a compensation for 
reduced intervention prices is a boost of consumption, a reduction of the gap 
between world market and European prices, and a reduction of surpluses.176 
This chapter will focus first on the importance of agriculture for European 
countries and the Community (3.1). Second, this chapter deals with the 
interplay between CAP reform since the 1980s and the WTO negotiations on 
agriculture (3.2). The CAP impact on ACP countries will be analysed in the last 
part of this chapter (3.3). 
3.1 European Agriculture – Data and Principles 
This chapter entails a data analysis of European agriculture as well as the 
principles and instruments of the CAP. 
3.1.1 Character of European Agriculture 
In contrast to the ACP countries agriculture plays a less important role for the 
European economy with regard to the share in GDP and employment. In the 
late 1950s (EU-6) agriculture accounted for 20% and in 2000 only for 2% of 
GDP (EU-15). Similarly, in the 1950s agriculture was one third of overall 
employment while in 2000 it is only 5% (EU-15).177 Compared to the mid-1980s 
the production still rises gradually but growth today is much slower than those of 
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other sectors.178 In the eastern countries that entered the EU 23% of total 
employees work in agriculture and the share of GDP is 7%.179 
Another shift in agriculture becomes apparent with regard to farm size and the 
number of farms. From 1985-1995 the number of farms fell over 2 Million (23%) 
in EU-12. 1995-2005 the number of farms declined an additional 1.5 million 
(20%) in EU-15. Between 1980 and 2005 the averaged size of the farms 
changed significantly – from 1980 15.7 hectares to 21.4 hectares in 2005 
(increase of 35%).180 
The structure of farming is still different in the EU member states, in particular, 
after the enlargement process of the EU. In the UK large farms dominate and 
only 1% of the population is employed in the farm sector, while Greece and 
Portugal have 10% and 16% respectively of the population employed in 
agriculture. Yields are higher in UK, France, and Italy but rather low in countries 
with smaller farms e.g., Poland, Hungary, and Slovenia.181 But there is also 
differentiation within the countries with regard to the farm size. Most farm land is 
concentrated in the most productive regions; in Southern Europe part-time 
farming is common.182 
With regard to the farm income the net value added per farm in the EU 
increased in nominal terms; whereas, those farms specialising in horticulture 
and the production of pigs and poultry realised the highest incomes. While the 
change in farm incomes over time is difficult to compare due to the enlargement 
of the EU, with the continuous addition of member countries, the “increasing 
farm size has been a major determinant of the average increase in farm 
incomes.”183 According to a projection EU farm income between 2005 and 2013 
will increase by 23% (for the EU-15 by 9% and the new members by 37%).184 
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Another factor that contributes to the changes in the European agricultural 
sector is the fact that the population growth is slowing; therefore, the tax income 
is decreasing and less agricultural support is available. Moreover, a change in 
demand and the production of agricultural products, for instance, dietary needs 
and smaller meals due to an aging population, together with a decline in total 
population “might reduce urban encroachment onto agricultural land.”185 The 
change in demand is not only observable in changes due to an aging population 
but food consumption patterns also change for other reasons. As a result of 
increased incomes and reduced support prices food consumption is rising. This 
causes a higher consumption of fruits and vegetables as well as meat (luxury 
purchases) while there is a lower consumption of cereals and potatoes, which 
applies for the new EU member states as well.186  
Worldwide the EU is the largest importer and the major net exporter of 
agricultural products. This stems from the European advances in technology, 
high production efficiency, EU prices being above the world market level as well 
as restrained domestic consumption.187  
With regard to cereals and beef the EU has been a net exporter since the 
1960s. Since the peak in the early 1990s exports are declining. In the case of 
cereals, there is an increasing consumption due to decline in price support. 
Similarly, beef exports are declining due to diseases, the reduction of milk 
quotas resulting in a reduction of dairy cow numbers as well as declining 
consumption and production. As a consequence the EU imports specific quality 
wheat and beef.188 
As far as dairy products are concerned, the EU has been a net exporter since 
the 1970s. While exports of cheese rose gradually due to an increase in 
demand for butter and skim milk powder overall dairy exports have been in 
decline since the early 1990s. This is due to a declining demand – a 
consequence of a reduced intervention price and health considerations.189  
                                            
185 Ibid., p.38. 
186 Ibid., p.40. 
187 Ibid., 2007, p.41. 
188 Ibid., p.43. 
189 Ibid., p.50. “Because of the large size of the EU market and production relative to world 
trade, even moderate increases in quotas could markedly increase EU exports and depress 
 46
Since the 1970s sugar production is above the consumption level. Therefore, 
the EU uses a combination of domestic grown and imported raw cane sugar 
from ACP and other countries which is refined for use within the EU. Thus, the 
EU has substantial availabilities for export as a result of technological advances 
and imports from ACP and other countries.190 
The effect of EU agricultural policies on world trade and prices is enormous:  
 “Where EU trade is small relative to the size of the domestic market but 
large in world trade, relatively small changes in the balance between EU 
production and consumption can have major consequences for EU 
exportable supplies and for world market supplies and prices.”191 
Roberts and Gunning-Trant set the following example to illustrate this point. The 
EU market for cheese is 9 million tonnes per year and the world trade accounts 
for 1.3 million tonnes per year. An increase of EU production by 0.3 tonnes/year 
(that equates to 3.4%) without an increase in EU demand would cause an 
increase in world market supplies by 23%, which would have a major price 
depressing effect.192 
3.1.2 European Agricultural Policy – Aims, Principles, 
Instruments 
The European agricultural policy must be seen against the background of the 
Second World War and the beginning of the Cold War where food imports were 
necessary. High internal prices should stimulate domestic food consumption. 
Another argument is that not only the shortages of the Second World War but 
also the EEC needed a common agricultural policy, only “with regard to 
agriculture did the scale of political governance reach proportions resembling 
those of a federal government.”193 Moreover, for “a long time, the CAP has been 
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the only genuinely common policy in the European Union.”194 Additionally, the 
so-called Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) has been an instrument to 
integrate the rural population into the transnational and national policy.195  
Bureau and Matthews state that the introduction of the CAP in the 1960s has 
been a result of post war reconstruction, concomitant balance of payment 
difficulties, the memories of wartime, and immediate post-war food shortages. 
They show that there have been two previous waves of protection in agriculture. 
The first was in the last quarter of the 19th century to deal with the competition 
in grains, dairy products, and meat from North America and Oceania and with it 
the revolution in transport and refrigeration. The second one refers to the 
depressed interwar period with agricultural intervention and self-sufficiency 
policies.196 
The objectives of the CAP are: 
• to increase agricultural productivity through technical progress and the 
efficient use of production factors (labour), 
• to ensure a fair standard of living for the agricultural population through 
increasing the earnings, 
• to stabilise markets, 
• to make supplies available, 
• to ensure adequate prices for consumers.197 
The common organisation thereby follows: 
• common rules on competition, 
• the coordination of national market organisations, and 
• a European market regime.198 
The measures of the CAP include the 
“regulation of prices, aids for the production and marketing of the various 
products, storage and carryover arrangements and common machinery for 
stabilising imports or exports.”199 
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These measures include price-support systems; for instance, intervention prices 
and minimum grower prices to stimulate production and to guarantee high 
prices for producers.200 Some market regimes consist of quotas which is a price 
support only for a determined production volume e.g., milk.201 Another measure 
is the use of tariff protection and quantitative import restrictions to protect the 
domestic markets and maintain internal prices. Moreover, the CAP uses 
market-support mechanisms like storage and withdrawals to deal with surpluses 
as well as export refunds to clear markets in case of surplus production.202 
Furthermore, preferential arrangements allowed for the management of the 
quantity of imports and the sources of imports e.g., ACP countries and their 
preferential trade agreements.203 
The Common Organisation of the Market (CMO) under the CAP available for 
many agricultural products follows the principles of free movement of goods 
within the Community, trade preferences for member states and within 
bilateral/multilateral agreements and unilateral concessions as well as a 
common financial accountability.204 Previous to the reforms of 1992 and 1997 
most CMOs were those with guaranteed prices and automatic intervention.  
The consequences of the CAP have both positive and negative dimensions. 
The positive outcome of the CAP is the success in productivity increases, the 
stabilisation of markets and the increase of self-supply as envisaged in the 
objectives.205 
The negative consequences include four main aspects. The first aspect 
concerns the environment because through the intensification and 
concentration of agriculture a number of unintended consequences emerged 
including the suspension of agricultural production that led to the pollution of 
groundwater, a loss of biodiversity, as well as the degradation and erosion of 
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land.206 The second negative implication is the surplus production; to guarantee 
high prices and keep down costs for storage surpluses were exported. Together 
with the US-American competition in agriculture this led to a decrease of world 
market prices. These low world market prices are hurtful to countries without 
subsidised production (e.g. Australia) and smallholder farmers from importing 
countries (e.g. Burkina Faso).207 The third aspect is the discouragement of 
internal consumption due to high agricultural prices.208 As a fourth consequence 
the EU has had to struggle with budgetary pressures.209 In the first half of the 
1980s the Community began to struggle with high budgetary cost pressures due 
to large surpluses, high support prices, large export subsidies, and large 
storage costs. 70% of the total Community budget accounted for agricultural 
costs; today agriculture still accounts for 40% of the total budget.210 
3.2 Agricultural Reforms and Interplay with WTO 
Negotiations  
1980s and 1992 
The Community had to response to these increasing costs in the mid-1980s. 
The measures taken were:  
• the increase of member states contributions: from 1 percentage point of 
value added tax (VAT) to 1.2% of Community GDP 1992 to 1.24% of GNI 
today, 
• new guidelines for agricultural expenditure: the growth in expenditure on 
agriculture must not exceed 74% of the annual growth in the Community 
GNI.211 
Other steps taken were the introduction of guaranteed quantities arrangement 
for milk, only marginal or no increases of the market regulation prices for other 
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products, and the easing of the intervention system. The Community introduced 
voluntary set-aside and extensification programmes as well as early retirement 
programmes. But all these measures did not reduce the budgetary costs in a 
satisfactory way.212  
Halderman and Nelson argue that the CAP has been a “victim of its own 
success”213 because the successful production led to huge surpluses, which in 
turn led to extensive export and expensive storage.214 
At the end of the 1980s not only the increasing costs but also other reasons 
contributed to a change in the agricultural system of the EU. The end of the 
Cold War “removed imperative for food self sufficiency”215; therefore, multilateral 
trade negotiations took place, and environmental problems became more and 
more important. Moreover, the EU had to deal with several food scandals.216 
Another reason for reforms in the agricultural policy was conflicts with external 
trading partners. For example the US, whose agricultural export volume 
declined, insisted on making agriculture central to the GATT.217 
From the CAP reforms in 1992 under Commissioner MacSharry EU policy 
makers expected a greater control over agricultural budgets, a better position in 
the Uruguay Round negotiations (reduced export refunds and no reductions in 
domestic support), the reduction of direct government involvement in market 
management, and a reduced burden for the European consumers.218 
Among the measures taken has been the lowering of intervention prices for 
cereals, oil seeds, and beef to lower the incentive for surplus production.219 With 
regard to arable crops the intervention prices were reduced by 33% and the 
farmers received assistance if they set-aside land. The intervention prices for 
beef were reduced by 15%.220 
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The farmers received compensation for their income losses. These payments 
were not directly related to their current production but to areas and yields 
(“area payments”) or cattle numbers (“animal premiums”).221 Furthermore, the 
reforms introduced the concept of setting-aside cultivable land to curtail the 
area devoted to arable crops.222  
A positive outcome of these reforms has been the reduction of consumer 
transfers to farmers, which has been largely the case for grains but low for 
beef.223 The surplus production has been reduced only marginally; however, 
there has been a cutback in export refunds and a decline between internal and 
world market prices. Reichert argues that the reduction of exports of cereals 
has been a result of the fact that cereals were increasingly used for forage. The 
reforms avoided the inclusion of sugar and milk.224 
 
1999/2000 
The incentive for further reforms had its seeds in expiring financial 
arrangements in 1999, the beginning WTO negotiations, and the forthcoming 
eastern enlargement of the EU.225 They followed the strategy to bring the 
internal prices closer to the world market prices (successful in cereals and skim 
milk powder; whereas, beef, butter, and sugar continued to be above world 
market prices), to move away from commodity specific support payments, and 
to reduce the scale of intervention operations.226 
Furthermore, the EU adopted measures with regard to production support – in 
relatively small steps. These have been the further reduction of intervention 
prices and a corresponding increase of compensation. The intervention prices 
for cereals were reduced by 15% and for beef by 20%. Other products have 
also been affected by this reduction; namely, dairy products, rice, cotton, olive 
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oil, tobacco, hops as well as a proposal on the reform of the fruit and vegetables 
sector.227 For oil seeds the “compensation was only partial”.228 
The common organisation of agricultural markets (CMO) – responsible for 
governing the domestic market, trade with third countries, and competition rules 
– was reformed 1992/1999. 21 separate CMO regimes for certain products 
offered external protection and, in case of imports, levies in the amount of the 
difference between the lower world market price and the higher internal price. In 
the case of exports, export refunds were paid (again the difference between the 
lower world market price and the higher internal price). Moreover, these CMOs 
offered guaranteed prices and interventions for most of the agricultural 
products.229 The 1992 and 1999 reforms changed the design of the CMOs. This 
can be classified into five categories:  
• CMOs without direct production support: these products only receive 
customs protection (one quarter of agricultural products e.g., poultry, 
eggs); 
• CMOs with guaranteed prices and automatic intervention: in case of low 
market prices minimum/guaranteed prices are paid to farmers by public 
intervention agencies which affects one fifth of the agricultural production 
(e.g. sugar, dairy products); 
• CMOs with guaranteed prices and conditional intervention: the 
guaranteed price scheme is only applicable in case of crisis (decided by 
the EC), one fifth of European production can be classified in this 
category (e.g., wine, pig meat); 
• CMOs with guaranteed prices and direct aids to complement production 
(one third of Community production and increasing since reforms 1992 
and 1999 (e.g. cereals, rice); 
• CMOs with direct production aids only: flat rate/proportional to quantities 
produced or yields (e.g., oil seeds, protein crops).230 
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A further measure has been the direct support for rural development and 
environmental objectives.231 This included encouraging environmental 
production processes, rededicating areas for environmental protection, 
increasing the share available for the early retirement of farmers above five 
years, and increasing contributions to afforestation.232 The creation of the 
second pillar “rural development” has been “limited in terms of budgetary 
outlays” but represents a “major change in the overall orientation of the CAP.”233 
At the very least a “dedicated financial allocation was included in the budget.”234 
This pillar aims at increasing the competitiveness of the food industries and the 
agricultural sector as well as the development of non-agricultural activities in 
rural areas. Furthermore, “various environmental and rural development 
measures were brought together into a single Rural Development 
Regulation.”235 
The principle of modulation has been introduced: member states were allowed 
to modulate up to 20% of the total amount of farmers’ direct payments. France, 
Germany, and Spain have chosen these voluntary measures.236 Under the 
principle of modulation member states are allowed to reduce direct payments if 
the number of employees is below a certain level, if the total earnings are above 
a certain level or if the total payments are above a certain level (maximum of 
20% of total payments to the farm).237 
The 2000 reform introduced the principle of cross compliance: the compliance 
with environmental guidelines became necessary to receive compensation 
payments. In the case of noncompliance direct payments could be cancelled.238 
The structural funds created 1968, which aimed at concentrating support to 
promising farms and the reduction of the number of employees in agriculture, 
were reformed in the late 1980s and again in 2000. Furthermore, the funds 
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aimed its support toward less developed regions, supporting regions with 
restructuring requirements, and developing human resources.239 
The spending of EU member states has still been important in the case of 
structural policy and general services to farmers (e.g., research). However, 
there were no subsidies allowed that could result in distortion of competition 
because “the CAP is highly centralised at the EU level.”240 
 
2003 
Reichert argues that the hitherto CAP reform and the new tasks as a result of 
the European enlargement have broadened the objectives of the European 
agricultural policy. He refers to the introduction of sustainability at the 
Gothenburg European Council 2001 and the consequences for the CAP reform: 
a trend towards sustainable development, environmental protection, promotion 
of regional development, and food safety.241 Moreover, Reichert points to the 
objectives of the European Community for the EC policy. Examples of this 
include: Article 2 of the EC Treaty establishes the “sustainable development of 
economic activities" and Article 6 postulates the “Environmental protection 
requirements […] of Community policies” while Article 153 maintains “consumer 
protection”. Similarly, Article 174 appoints the objectives of “preserving, 
protecting and improving the quality of the environment” and Article 178 
specifies that “the Community shall take account of the objectives referred to in 
Article 177 in the policies that it implements which are likely to affect developing 
countries.”242 
The most important innovation has been the introduction of the Single Payment 
Scheme. These decoupled payments are granted independent from production 
– instead of the area payments and animal premiums introduced 1992 – and 
stand for a shift from price support to direct aid. The aim of decoupling has been 
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“to make EU farmers more competitive and market-oriented, while providing 
income stability.”243 
The payment is made once a year244 and entered into force in 2005.245 Under 
the Single Payment Scheme farmers are allowed to produce all crops except 
permanent crops, fruits and vegetables as well as potatoes (these products 
have no direct production support/price guarantee and fall under tariff 
protection246). The payment can be made within two models. The Single 
Payment Scheme can be calculated on the basis of direct payments granted to 
individual farmers during a past reference period (historic model) or can be paid 
uniformly over a region or state (regional model).  
In the historic model payment entitlements are based on an individual historic 
reference amounts per farmer. The payment of premiums corresponds with the 
average individual farm payments for area payments and animal premiums 
during the reference period 2000-02 plus compensation payments for milk 
during 2004-06.247 Reichert argues that due to the orientation towards 
payments in the past the extent of decoupled payments complies with the 
amount of payments paid before.248 The regional model entails flat rate 
payment entitlements based on the amounts received by farmers in a region 
within the reference period.249 
There is also the opportunity to apply a mixed system – either a mixture 
between model 1 and 2 or in a temporal manner the historic payments in a first 
step and then payments within the regional model.250 
Bureau and Matthews indicate that decoupling has only been partially 
implemented and a part of these payments has still been coupled. Moreover, a 
“degree of decoupling varies across countries” so this is “a certain degree of re-
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nationalization.”251 With regards to the crop sector arable crops payments were 
still coupled up to 25%, durum wheat quality supplement up to 40%, and hops 
up to 25%. The olive oil sector was still coupled up to 40% and in the animal 
sector suckler cow premium (up to 100%), special beef premium (up to 75%), 
slaughter premium (up to 40% for adults, 100% for calves), and sheep/goats 
(up to 50%) were still coupled.252 Reichert criticises that decoupled payments fix 
disadvantages for small and peasant farms and that the regional payments 
benefit the extensive cultivating farms. Moreover, the payments do not provide 
an incentive to create employment.253 
While the CMO was still in force the intervention prices were reduced 
significantly beginning in 2004. One element of the 2003 reform was to create 
one single CMO instead of 21 separate regimes. The aim has been the slim 
down of regulation efforts, increase transparency, and better accessibility.254 In 
2007 the EU introduced the single CMO, which would replace the previous 
system and go into effect during the year 2008.255  
With regard to modulation there has been a transfer from the first to the second 
pillar. Direct payments that excess per farm payments should be gradually 
curtailed (2005 by 3%, 2006 by 4%, 2007 by 5%). 80% of this savings for 
member states were available for measures within the second pillar while the 
remaining 20% are be redistributed within the EU depending on area, 
employment, and per capita GDP.256 
The second pillar was strengthened in the 2003 reforms through the improved 
modulation and the consolidation of funding under a single instrument the 
European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development (EAFRD), which replaced all 
previous regulations. Agritrade points to the fact that for the period 2007-2013 
37% of total rural development funding has been targeted to improve the 
competitiveness rather than the other areas of the second pillar.257 Other aims 
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of the second pillar are the sustainable cultivation of natural resources and 
economic and social coherence in the rural area.258  
Thereby, the second pillar has been categorised by three axes; the fourth axis 
is the LEADER concept.259 The first axis deals with the competitiveness of 
agriculture and forestry with aims at the strengthening human resources (e.g., 
occupational training, modernisation of farms). The second axis aims at 
improving the countryside and environment, includes payments for 
disadvantaged areas (e.g., mountain areas), and measures to protect the 
environment and animals. The third axis pertains to rural development. It 
includes the diversification of employment towards non-agricultural activities, 
enhanced services of basic provisions for the rural population, vocational 
training and support for local development strategies. The fourth axis aims at 
establishing local capacity for employment and diversity within the LEADER 
concept. It integrates the three previous axes and supports local activists and 
groups to create a development strategy.260 
Agritrade points to the fact that the second pillar on rural development reacts to 
a change of patterns regarding food consumption. Instead of an increase in the 
overall demand in agricultural products there is a shift to luxury purchase 
products in the EU: one could say a shift from quantity to quality. The 
instruments of the second pillar should support this shift and enhance 
competitiveness.261 Former Trade Commissioner Mandelson said in a speech to 
UK farmers that it is necessary to “shift production away from bulk commodities 
where Europe simply cannot compete in the long run with third country 
producers like Brazil, Argentina or elsewhere.”262 Reichert’s criticism is that 
enhanced competitiveness and investment promotion could imply 
modernisation; however, it does not aim at social objectives and that the second 
pillar does not dispose of a large budget.263 
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The new distribution of financial resources after the eastern enlargement of the 
EU determines that the new members obtain 25% of the EU-15 payment and 
will be allowed to make national top-up payments equivalent to 30% of the 
complete EU rate.264 
 
2008 and future development 
In the debate about the financial strength of the agricultural budget 2006-13 the 
EC made a proposal: the first pillar should have been reduced to 201 billion 
Euro (2006-2013) and the second pillar rise to 87 billion Euro (through 
modulation additional 9 billion Euro). EU member states (the net contributors265) 
refused this proposal and requested lower expenditures: 293 billion Euro for the 
first and 69 (with modulation 77) billion Euro for the second pillar. Both 
proposals still provide nearly three quarters of the agricultural budget to protect 
established protection of acquired possession. The European Parliament 
refused both proposals.266 
A further reform has been envisaged and initiated by the European Commission 
in September 2007 with the communication "Preparing for the ‘Health Check’ of 
the CAP reform"267. While the reform of 2000 introduced the second pillar and 
the 2003 reform introduced the decoupling principle motivated by the need to 
enhance WTO compatibility and to anticipate further reforms at multilateral 
level, now the health check completes these reforms rather than changes the 
agricultural system.268 The health check in general aims at the continuation and 
consolidation of decoupling towards full decoupling,269 the increase of budget 
for the second pillar270 and the move towards the regional model.271  
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The compromise of November 2008 entails the abolition of the set-aside 
obligation to leave 10% of land fallow to increase the production potential of 
farmers. Remaining coupled payments will be integrated in the Single Payment 
Scheme while few exceptions are allowed for member states (i.e., suckler cow, 
goat, and sheep premia). Furthermore, a series of small support schemes will 
be decoupled and shifted to the Single Payment Scheme from 2012. Another 
point is the simplification of cross compliance: the simplification will be done “by 
withdrawing standards that are not relevant or linked to farmer responsibility.”272 
Moreover, it introduces new requirements concerning environmental benefits to 
retain set-aside measures and improved water management. Due to the fact 
that “Market supply measures should not slow farmers' ability to respond to 
market signals”273 intervention buying is abolished for pig meat, set at zero for 
barley and sorghum, and limits were set for wheat, butter, and skimmed milk 
powder (intervention is done by tender).274  
With regard to modulation the current arrangement where farmers are receiving 
more than 5000 Euro in direct aid have had their payments reduced by 5% 
which is transferred into the rural development budget now will have their 
payments reduced by 10% by 2012. For payments above 300 000 Euro there 
will be a cut of 4%. The EU will co-finance the transferred money by 75% (90% 
in convergence regions with lower GDP).275 
Agritrade argues that the European Commission pursues a progressive 
expansion of modulation because the second pillar is important to promote 
“competitiveness in the agricultural and food-processing sectors.’”276 The food-
processing industry is very important for the EU as the EU food and agricultural 
sector accounts for 19 million jobs in the EU-27 (9% of total employment).277 
Finally, the question arises why agriculture is supported in this way though the 
meaning for the European economies in terms of GDP and employment in 
general is relatively low. A first answer is the heterogeneity of the EU; in 
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particular with regard to the eastern enlargement: in eastern European 
countries agriculture is important to employment. Secondly, the EU is a major 
exporter of agricultural goods; in particular, the interests of the food and 
beverages industry are of importance with regard to trade. Moreover, some EU 
member states pushed for the maintenance of agricultural support. A good 
example is France with a strong agriculture (e.g., many regional politicians are 
farmers) and strong agricultural groupings that defended the CAP for many 
years due to inter-state bargaining and the EU institutions.278  
One reason for the high agricultural budget despite the relative low share of 
agriculture in the economy depends on policy-making in the EU at different 
levels and how actors can push for their interests. Moreover, the timing of 
policy-making between the different levels does not follow a logical movement 
as there is not only a two-stage sequence of national preference formation but 
also EU-level interstate negotiations where the “broad-level policy change is a 
much more complicated, back-and-forth affair”.279 EU institutions mediate 
bargaining of EU member states, interest groups, and the international 
environment, but also promote their own interests. With regard to (agricultural) 
trade negotiations the European Commission is of importance, in particular DG 
Agriculture plays the most important role. Member states exert influence in the 
European Council: member states’ ministers make decisions at EU level but are 
primarily accountable to their own member state.280 Most important as far as 
CAP is concerned is the Council of Agricultural Ministers (Agricultural Council) 
responsible for decision-making with regard to common agricultural policy.  
Halderman and Nelson show that since the establishment of the CAP this policy 
“has greatly improved conditions for Europe’s farmers”281 who received effective 
support. This is the reason why agriculture has played such an important rule 
during the past 40 years. But with the declining share of agriculture in workforce 
and overall economy, the interest groups (farmers, farmers' organisations) had 
a weakened position in the EU policy formulation. Another reason for the 
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weakening influence of farmers is the increased heterogeneity: farmers do not 
equally benefit from the CAP. To illustrate, only 20% of farms receive 80% of 
the CAP support while the smallest 40% of farms receive only 8% of the 
subsidies.282 Therefore, small farmers formed a coalition with environmental 
groups and are more interested in an increase of protection.283  
Contradictory interests and attempts towards maintaining the support system as 
well as a further liberalisation of this system have characterised the CAP 
reform. But a strong incentive that contributed to the reform processes of the 
CAP has been the budgetary pressure since the 1980s. Even though the share 
of agriculture in the overall budget declined from 70% to today’s level of 40% 
the high costs still are a motivation for further reforms including the Health 
Check in 2008. The enlargement of the EU contributed to the need for 
budgetary reforms of the CAP because at the end of the 1990s the new 
member’s economies began requesting agricultural support. 
Also the food and beverage industry pushes for the CAP reform. The artificially 
high prices under the old CAP increased input prices for this industry. 
Therefore, the food and beverage industry is interested in low internal prices 
and cheap imports.284 
Moreover, the reform of the European CAP coincided with the liberalisation 
processes in world economy. While the EU as a powerful actor pushed for 
liberalisation at the international level and reformed the CAP internally it 
similarly tried to maintain at least a certain level of protection for the European 
agricultural market. The CAP reform occurred only gradually and has not been 
aimed at the total elimination of agricultural support while the EU pushed for the 
liberalisation of other countries’ markets within multilateral and bilateral trade 
relations. For a better understanding, the attempts of the CAP reform should be 
pulled together with the WTO negotiations since the Uruguay Round and the 
establishment of the WTO in the mid-1990s. It will be illustrated that steps of the 
CAP reform occurred in the run-up to WTO negotiating stages and are closely 
connected with the WTO reform process; however, the WTO negotiations are 
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not the only motivation for CAP reform as already shown. The gradual reform 
steps of the agricultural protection system have improved the EU’s negotiating 
position at multilateral level and have also improved the reliability of the EU 
requesting for increased liberalisation of the agricultural markets of emerging 
and developing countries.  
While under GATT agricultural products have been exempted from liberalisation 
they were targeted within the Uruguay Round and the establishment of the 
WTO in the mid-1990s. First changes in the CAP took place in the 1980s – due 
to surplus production, discouraged internal consumption, and the increasing 
agricultural budget – but these changes have not been successful. The failure 
of CAP reform as well as the forthcoming Uruguay negotiating round entailed an 
incentive for further reforms to improve the EU negotiating position in the 
multilateral negotiations on liberalisation. The Uruguay Round with the AoA led 
to reductions of export refunds and of amber box payments. As already shown 
these reductions did not have serious implications so that further reforms have 
been envisaged. The beginning WTO Ministerials since 1999 and the failure of 
the first negotiating rounds increased the pressure on the EU to reform the CAP 
towards more liberalisation of agricultural policies. In a further restructuring of 
the CAP in 2000 – in the run-up to the Doha Development Round – the EU 
again reduced intervention prices, reformed the CMO, and introduced the 
second pillar “rural development” (including the aim of increased 
competitiveness), as well as the principles of modulation and cross compliance. 
In the course of Doha negotiations in 2002 the EU has made the proposal to 
repeat reductions of the Uruguay Round: the EU offered reductions in amber 
box support as well as decreasing export refunds while maintaining blue and 
green box payments. In 2003 EU and US made a further proposal without 
substantial reduction commitments but requested developing countries to open 
their markets; negotiations did not make significant progress. 
In 2003 – whilst stagnancy of Doha negotiations – the EU undertook a further 
step in internal agricultural reforms with the introduction of the Single Payment 
Scheme and the principle of (partial) decoupling of payments.  
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To advance WTO negotiations and to maintain other sources of support in 2004 
the EU offered the phase-out of export refunds and substantiated this offer in 
2005 by designating the date of expiry (2013). Moreover, EU and US were 
willing to include (rather weak) safeguards for developing countries and the 
inclusion of (rather narrow) sensitive and special products. Meanwhile, 
reductions of amber and blue box support were discussed while green box 
payments were not included in the reduction schedule.  
The Health Check in 2008 took place while Doha Round negotiations still 
stagnated; the Health Check completed previous reforms rather than changing 
the agricultural system by further broadening of the Single Payment Scheme, 
cross compliance, and modulation.  
It can be concluded that liberalisation efforts in European agricultural policy 
have been ambivalent; diverging interests within the EU as well as in EU 
member states contributed to this effect. Moreover, the attempt to maintain 
agricultural protection of European agriculture is restricted in two ways. First, 
the high costs of protection put pressure on EU member states to reform this 
system. Moreover, the attempt to achieve market access to agricultural and 
non-agricultural markets within multilateral and bilateral trade negotiations with 
developing countries requires increased reliability of the EU, which has to show 
its commitment to free trade principles. As a consequence, domestic support 
has been reduced but it has not been eliminated – due to the shift from the 
amber box to the less trade distorting green box support as well as the shift to 
the second pillar and the objective of increased competitiveness. The WTO 
negotiations clearly influenced the European agricultural reform process by 
determining the liberalisation framework and providing an incentive for internal 
reforms at least to improve reliability. Inversely, the EU anticipated WTO 
negotiations in the CAP reform and provided an improved negotiating position 
for the EU; thereby, maintaining the opportunity to support agriculture and 
improve competitiveness of European farmers. The EU is a strong negotiator in 
WTO negotiations and plays an active role in the Doha negotiating process as 
already shown in chapter 2. 
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3.3 Impact of European Agriculture on ACP Countries 
In general developing countries did not profit by the European agricultural 
policy. Halderman and Nelson argue that the support in the OECD countries in 
2001 accounted for 311 million US-$ which is equivalent to “twice the value of 
developing country agricultural exports, and it is six times the value of official 
development assistance.”285 Moreover, they calculate that the “Net agricultural 
trade of developing countries would triple if the industrialized world eliminated 
its agricultural protectionism and subsidies.”286  
The border protection within the EU market protected agricultural products and 
kept imports away from flooding the market; in particular high tariffs for 
processed food products have been imposed. Developing countries therefore 
exported raw materials to the EU market rather than value-added products. 
Only products that were exclusively of interest for developing countries and did 
not compete with European produce entered the European market duty free 
e.g., coffee, cocoa, and tropical fruits.  
While the high-price agricultural policy required a highly regulated trade regime 
to protect agricultural production that threatened developing countries’ export of 
agricultural products the ACP countries benefited from this high-price policy due 
to their preferential access to the European market.287 The ACP countries had a 
better access to the European market than other developing countries but also 
for them the export of raw materials has been remunerative.288 
Roberts and Gunning-Trant criticise the preferential system in general and 
argue that “aid through trade preferences is inherently inefficient and 
inequitable”289 and particular industries receive these preferences that do not 
necessarily benefit ACP economies most. Moreover, there is the danger that 
preferences replace other developing countries’ more efficient exports as such, 
“preferences promote inefficient patterns of resource use and production 
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internationally and reduce global welfare.”290 Along the lines of this rationale the 
ACP preferential access has been considered as unsuccessful in the 1980s and 
strengthened the attempt to shift to reciprocity in ACP-EU trade relations. 
However, in retrospect it is difficult to judge how ACP economies would have 
developed without the preferential access to the European market. 
Due to preference erosion since the 1990s the ACP countries benefit less and 
less from the preferential access to the European market. This commenced with 
the CAP reform 1992 and has been tightened with the multilateral trade 
negotiations and the EU free trade policy in bilateral trade negotiations since the 
mid-1990s.291 The emergence of other lesser preferential systems for 
developing countries like the Generalised System of Preferences (GSP) or the 
Everything-but-arms initiative (EBA) also contribute to the preference erosion. 
 The declining internal prices at the EU market resulting from CAP reform 
affected ACP producers. For instance, in the case of rice where the prices 
declined by 16-37% (depending on the rice variety), “by 2007 prices were still 
around 17.5% below the average price per tonne obtained in 2001”292 and 
significantly below the prices received in 1990s.293 
With regard to market access to developing countries’ and in particular ACP 
countries’ markets there is a debate about the impact of European subsidies 
and particularly subsidised agricultural exports. The question is do NGOs 
overestimate or is there a real danger caused by import surges?  
Halderman and Nelson show that several simulation studies tried to assess 
developing countries’ losses as result of the CAP and that most of the studies 
agreed in their results: there is a loss of income due to the CAP and without 
CAP export subsidies exports of developing countries would increase. Several 
studies focus on certain products like dairy products in India or beef in South 
Africa but according to them one has to keep in mind that in these studies “the 
issues involved are very contextual, and that careful field research is required to 
fully understand the interrelated factors.”294 These studies have found evidence 
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that in the case of dairy products the EU has dumped subsidised exports and 
reduced world market prices that affected developing countries.295 They 
highlight the effect that even “small [EU] quantities on a global scale might well 
be important to a small developing country’s market with a fledging dairy 
industry.” 296 On the contrary, Bureau and Matthews argue that there is little 
evidence for import surges “except for some anecdotal cases highlighted by non 
governmental organisations”297 and that critical NGOs overestimate these 
effects.298 One of these NGOs, South Centre, enumerates up to 170 import 
surges between 1982 and 2003 for ACP countries like Botswana, Ghana, and 
others.299 But also the Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations 
(FAO) identifies import surges: depending on the methodology between 7000 
and 12000 during the period of 1980-2003. They point to the fact that the 
number alone allows no conclusion on the impact these import surges had or on 
the – external or internal – reasons for these surges.300 In the case of export 
subsidies the FAO states that  
“Export subsidies appear to be of limited relevance for global markets of 
most commodities, accounting for less than 3 percent of the value of trade 
in those products.”301 
However, with regard to dairy products “where subsidies support approximately 
one-third of global shipments”302 and the EU is the largest provider of export 
subsidies in dairies there is the danger of import surges. The FAO concludes: 
“Among policy measures, export subsidies are not very likely to contribute 
to import surges at the global level, except in the case of dairy products. 
However, at a specific point in time, and for a specific destination, the 
effects may be much stronger.“303 
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Agritrade argues that not only export refunds but the CAP aim of increased 
competitiveness affects ACP competitors because price competitiveness will be 
derived from 
“supply-side effects of the system of direct aid payments which allows 
prices to be reduced without necessarily affecting the overall levels of 
production, but which also allows markets to be cleared at world market 
price levels.”304 
The effects of the CAP reform on ACP countries are not only enhancing price 
competitiveness of EU exports, in particular of simple value-added food 
products, but also lower prices that result in a lower value of preferences for 
ACP exporters to the EU market. Moreover, a more differentiated internal 
market with a change in demand towards luxury purchases implies for the ACP 
countries that they need to serve this market. There will be increasing costs of 
placing agricultural goods due to increasing requirements with regard to food 
safety and control procedures.305 Only a few exporters in developing countries 
would be able to meet the enormous costs for certification, inspection, analytical 
bodies and personnel.306 
The shift to the decoupled Single Payment Scheme is a step in the right 
direction since decoupled payments are less trade distorting. But decoupling 
still is only partial.307 And even if payments are fully decoupled one has to keep 
in mind that 
“Economic theory suggests that to give a sum of money, even 
unconditionally, to a farmer necessarily influences the amount produced. In 
reducing the risk of insolvency, even decoupled payments encourage 
higher production or riskier cultivation. There is often an implicit 
anticipation that cultivated areas will be used as a reference in the next 
reform which keeps land in cultivation.”308 
Moreover, the effect on developing countries after the removal of indirect 
payments is still unclear; a study suggests that the impact will be rather small 
and uncertain.309 
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While it is “undeniable that the subsidies are unfair competition for other 
potential suppliers”310 the consequences for developing countries are not 
uniform: developing countries “which are net importers of food benefit from 
more favourable terms of trade when the EU taxpayer subsidised their 
imports.”311 Therefore, a reduction and abolition of export subsidies does not 
benefit all ACP countries. 
An example is the cereals sector where the shift to direct aid led to a decrease 
of prices (up to 50% since 1992) which boosted domestic consumption and 
export. The increase in exports since 2005/2006 is concentrated on ACP 
countries  
 “Indeed, in 2006 the ACP was taking 20% of EU cereal exports, the 
highest level since 1998. In a context of increasing competition on 
traditional EU markets, to a certain extent the ACP has emerged as a 
‘market of last resort’ for EU cereals traders.”312 
The impact of CAP and CAP reforms will also depend on the scope and speed 
of the liberalisation commitments that the ACP countries negotiate in the 
Economic Partnership Agreements. In general the impact could be larger if 
deeper and faster liberalisation of ACP agricultural markets takes place. The 
impact will also depend on the ability of EPAs to support ACP countries with 
regard to competitiveness and the improvement of supply-side constraints. 
These issues will be discussed in chapter 5. 
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4 Agriculture in ACP Countries 
Chapter 4 analyses the importance of agriculture in ACP and in particular in 
SADC IEPA countries. Ultimately the question will be if this importance will be 
reflected in the outcome of EPA negotiations – that will be analysed in chapter 
5. 
A short look at the historical perspective including trade liberalisation processes 
in the 1980s and 1990s will be followed by an analysis of the transformation 
processes in agriculture and the attempt to maintain the green revolution in 
Southern Africa. The following step will be to examine the farming structure and 
trade of SSA and particularly SADC IEPA agriculture. 
4.1 Agriculture from Historical Perspective 
Stein states that “The ‘holy’ trinity of adjustment, stabilization, liberalization and 
privatization has been the core strategy of last two decades”313 but for Sub-
Saharan-Africa the “impact of these policies has been at best disappointing. 
Virtually every economic and social indicator since 1980 has declined.”314 
The GDP per capita fell dramatically since the 1980s, the share in the global 
merchandise exports declined from 4.5% in 1980 to 1.4% in 2001 and the 
merchandise trade is 13% below the level of 1980s in nominal terms. Only 8.3% 
of exports are manufactured goods in 2000, which is at the same level as 1983. 
Also in 2000 the share of FDI declined to 2.7% from 7.6% in 1982-87 and the 
available FDI goes into the oil industry in Angola and Nigeria.315  
During the 1950s/60s SSA countries had a “highly government controlled 
agriculture with roots back in the later part of the colonial period.”316 The 
governments controlled export, food crops and livestock317 by parastatal 
marketing boards that aimed at the support of small-scale farming and the 
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expansion of the production of export and food crops mainly to secure 
government revenue. The control included the process (post-harvest trade and 
the collection and processing of crops), the definition of low fixed prices, and the 
mono-cropping of major export and staple food crops. The marketing boards 
had a monopoly over trade and transport of controlled crops while private trade 
has been restricted or even interdicted. The boards even controlled farm credit 
schemes.318 The parastatals conducted a “narrow sector planning”319 and 
concentrated the processing industries in large towns to provide food to urban 
areas. Due to this concentration and the provision of subsidies the small mills 
and oil presses in rural areas became unprofitable.320 Many countries exported 
mineral resources and due to high prices they profited from high foreign 
exchange earnings. Zambia, for instance, profited from high copper prices (90% 
of foreign exchange earnings, 70% of government budget, 40% of GDP) and 
used the revenues for the provision of free social services and the provision of 
subsidies in agriculture. Following an import substitution strategy – many firms 
were high dependent on import inputs – combined with food imports in times of 
shortfall allowed a positive external balance as long as raw material prices were 
stable.321 
The oil shock 1973 led to a price decline of mineral resources and caused 
declining export revenues, fiscal deficits, and a negative balance of payments in 
SSA countries. The dependence on the import of raw materials reduced 
capacity utilisation, eroded GDPs, and caused arrears on loan repayments. The 
countries did not adjust domestic consumption but increased borrowing from 
domestic and international markets. Moreover, they introduced stricter trade 
barriers and other controls to protect their economies.322 
The increasing indebtedness resulted in the turn to international financial 
institutions that imposed structural adjustment on the import substitution 
economies to create open market economies. The structural adjustment 
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programmes (SAPs) followed the principle to reduce the role of the state in 
economy, to open markets for foreign competition (liberalisation), and the 
establishment of macro-economic stability.323 
The SAPs included the devaluation of foreign currency, the liberalisation of 
external trade and prices, the reduction of government spending, the 
privatisation of public enterprises including parastatals, and the development of 
the private sector. Through trickle-down effects social development was 
expected to benefit the SSA populations. 
With regard to agriculture the main objective has been to increase incentives for 
agricultural exportation. The measures included the devaluation of currency, the 
reduction of the excessive taxation on export crops, the increase of rural 
incomes and the reduction of the urban bias.324 The measures aimed at the 
elimination of government support including the elimination of fertilizer and input 
subsidies, disbandment of crop parastatals, abolition of fixed prices, reduction 
of export crop taxes and non-tariff import barriers, and the devaluation of 
currency.  
The results for the SSA agriculture have been mixed. The introduction of fiscal 
and monetary discipline to prevent inflation did not work due to that fact that  
“Inflation by itself almost immediately cancelled out the beneficial effects of 
devaluation on real farm prices, while monetary tightening caused several-
fold increases in interest rates, severely curtailing farmers’ ability to take 
on loans.”325 
Doubling or tripling of fertiliser prices and other inputs over night in many 
countries prevented farmers from using this input adequately or at all. 
Moreover, Ellis shows that liberalisation happened at a time of declining 
commodity prices in the world market. This caused “underlying price pressures 
rather than the buoyant real trends predicted by the soothsayers of 
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liberalization”326 and private traders were not able to fill the gap. While the 
deregulation of parastatals led to new markets and enterprises, the trade has 
been constricted through a lack of capital. Instead of the anticipated domestic 
traders international companies filled the gap in the area of export crops. With 
these international companies a change of input supply occurred (e.g., a narrow 
time window) and domestic farmers were not able to satisfy export market 
demands.327 Furthermore, the improvement of rural farming failed. Under the 
parastatal system smallholder farmers often were not paid or only paid late; 
therefore, they aimed at maintaining their own food security: the “outcome is 
little exchange in the rural economy, little cash in circulation, and unpropitious 
circumstances for economic dynamism of any kind.”328 
The main international actors within these structural adjustment processes have 
been International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank together with 
governments of SSA countries. 
While the World Bank focused on infrastructure support in the beginning of its 
engagement in the 1950s the focus shifted to agriculture and social issues in 
the 1960s.329 After the IMF’s turn to developing countries after 1973 when fixed 
exchange rates were abandoned the “Fund gradually evolved to a lending 
institution”.330 Since the 1970s SSA countries used the IMF facilities and the 
overall credit allocation rose ten times from 1960s to 11.3% end of the 1970s.331 
At the beginning of the 1980s IMF and World Bank introduced the structural 
adjustment programmes for the indebted SSA economies: “After 1980, the IMF 
jumped into Africa with enormous enthusiasm while the Bank moved more 
cautiously in its new direction”332 and “Through much of the 1980s the Bank all 
but forgot the problems of poverty.”333 Stein argues that overvalued currencies, 
export taxes, and protectionism benefited the urban population. Similarly, for the 
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majority of poor people living in rural areas, the liberalisation would raise the 
income of the rural poor and eliminate poverty.334 
“In the mid-1980s, criticism emerged concerning the negative social impact 
and the failure in the programmes’ primary approach – in many cases 
countries suffered from the absence of growth and the promised trickle-
down effects.”335 
Besides new loans and structural adjustment the failure of SAPs during the 
1980s led to an endorsement of further measures. The broadening of the 
agenda towards governance, decentralisation, ownership, social capital, legal 
reform, participation, and poverty reduction find bases in the “core set of 
adjustment policies”336 and additional policies are foreseen only to “complement 
to adjustment”.337 In 2008 the World Bank again focused on agriculture with its 
annual World Development Report (WDR) entitled, “Agriculture for 
Development”.338 
Staatz and Dembélé refer to the fact that changes in Southern Africa that 
influence agriculture did not occur only due to economic reforms but several 
other factors. First, they point to the political, in this case democratic, reforms 
since the 1960s and the increased participation of the private sector and civil 
society including farmers and traders organisations. The second point is the 
increased regional integration within SSA but also with other regions and 
countries that affects agricultural trade. Thirdly, the reduced number of conflicts 
“opens scope for faster domestic agricultural growth and increased regional 
trade.”339 Additionally, they mention the negative consequences of HIV/AIDS for 
SSA. An increased morbidity, extensive time demands for caregivers, the 
diversion of funds for treatment, and the reduced remittances have a negative 
impact for urban but also rural families. With regard to agriculture there is the 
danger of a loss of family farming knowledge and also agricultural institutions 
are affected by the mortality though the impact depends on who in the 
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household is affected. Moreover, an increased population pressure, which often 
leads to a reduction of arable land per capita affects agriculture: cultivation may 
be extended to lower-rainfall areas with more fragile soils which causes 
resource degradation and soil erosion. In contrast, in areas with relatively good 
market access an intensification of agriculture is conceivable. As a last factor 
they list the rapid urbanisation that has taken place since the 1980s. The effects 
for agriculture are twofold: a shift in consumer demand towards processed 
products and a shift to imported goods due to the poor domestic market. 
Therefore, they argue that urbanisation may involve a shift away from 
agriculture.340 
In a second step Staatz and Dembélé analyse changes in the global rather than 
the SSA context that may influence agriculture. The reduction in ocean freight 
rates by 30% between 1985 and 2004 reduced the costs for international trade 
and caused more competition for African exporters as well as domestic 
markets. The second international factor is the change in the international trade 
system that caused preference erosion for African countries due to the granting 
of preferences for other developing countries. Moreover, the opening of African 
markets increases the competition from trading partners. The third argument 
they make is the shift in supply chains, particularly the emergence of 
supermarkets that impede smallholder farmers from participating in local trade. 
Additionally, the danger of the biotechnological revolution is that GM crops 
could cause a lack of social consensus, biosafety standards and ownership. 
Fifthly, the information revolution may isolate African agricultural scientists as 
they often are excluded form information exchange via internet. The growing 
demand of Latin American and Asian producers, their informational edge and 
economic power could increase the pressure on African producers. As a last 
factor they mention the global climate change that causes higher instability for 
agricultural producers.341 
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4.2 Transformation of Economy and Green Revolution 
It is common knowledge that the development of industrialised countries 
originated in an agriculture-based society that transformed to an industry-based 
economy to transform in a last step to a society whose economy is based on 
services. Development approaches since the 1970s followed this principle and 
tried to apply this development path to countries of the so-called third world to 
support the catch-up development of these countries. There is a debate about 
the role of agriculture for economic transformation of African countries in the 
light of the failure of the current development strategies in SSA.  
The optimistic view on agriculture emphasises the role of agricultural growth 
that contributes to economic growth and poverty alleviation. Hazell states that 
agriculture played a “key role in kick-starting economic growth and reducing 
poverty and hunger in many developing countries.”342 The potential of the 
agricultural sector’s growth includes a direct effect of this growth for people 
involved in farming,343 a “free up foreign exchange for importation of strategic 
industrial and capital goods”344 and an “Increased upstream demand for inputs 
and downstream demand for marketing and processing that accompany 
expanded agricultural production”.345 Moreover, an agriculture-led strategy is 
able to generate staple food and raw materials at lower prices and grow 
domestic markets due to rising incomes.346 The effects on other sectors can be 
“growing amounts of capital and labor for industrial development”,347 flows of 
labour and capital to other sectors, and increased incomes and employment in 
these sectors. A result of increased farm and non-farm employment and 
increased labour productivity can be the reduction of poverty.348  
There are several preconditions that agricultural development depends on. 
Hazell and Diao define five preconditions that include the important role of 
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technology, which is necessary “so that output prices can fall while farm 
incomes increase.”349 Moreover, another important condition is the incentive for 
farmers “to invest and produce effectively”.350 Thirdly, agricultural growth needs 
to be broadly based in order to put “purchase power into the hands of the rural 
masses”.351 A fourth precondition is a high level of public investment in rural 
infrastructure. The fifth requirement is a gradual liberalisation of the markets, 
which is “necessary to create new market opportunities for agriculture and 
industry”.352 Hazell and Diao conclude that “agricultural growth has powerful 
leverage effects on the rest of the economy, especially in the early stages of the 
economic transformation.”353 Staatz and Dembélé make a critical argument in 
that in particular for SSA the  
“large absolute numbers of the poor in rural areas, the strong dependence 
of non-farm activities in most SSA on demand emanating from the 
agricultural sector, and consequently the evidence that the income and 
poverty multipliers are greater for the agricultural sector than the non-
agricultural sector.”354 
According to them there is a strong interdependence between agricultural and 
broader economic growth. Furthermore, the meaning of agriculture for other 
sectors is higher than the reverse: agriculture is vital for the generation of 
“demand that stimulates the growth of non-farm activities”.355 They conclude:  
“The evidence shows that growth in agriculture in SSA, particularly in the 
lowest-income countries that are most agrarian, leads to both stronger 
overall growth and more poverty alleviation than growth in other 
sectors.”356 
A more negative consideration of the role of agriculture can be found in the 
current debate as well. Hazell and Diao have collected several arguments that 
disagree with the assumption of a crucial role of agriculture for the economic 
development in SSA. The first argument claims that cheap and plentiful food 
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imports will allow African economies to leapfrog agricultural development and, 
“proceed directly to industrialization.”357 Moreover, agriculture seems to be 
irrelevant for rural poor due to rural-urban integration, migration, and rural 
income diversification. The reasons are that the long-term decline on 
agricultural commodity prices “has undermined the profitability of agriculture as 
a business”358 and crucial policy instruments are not available anymore. 
Moreover, the pressure on the natural resource base leads to degradation and 
lower productivity, which is the reason why agriculture is irrelevant for rural 
poor. The third argument they detected in the current debate is the fact that 
many small farms are not included in relevant markets; therefore, they should 
not have relevance in investment strategies. Fourth, due to low cereal prices the 
focus should shift to high-value agricultural goods rather than food staples 
production. Their last argument asserts that there should be a consideration to 
strengthen the private sector rather than public sector engagement.359  
Hazell and Diao try to disprove these arguments and prove the importance of 
agriculture for economic development and the alleviation of poverty in SSA. 
Their first refutation states that the shift to industry encouragement is 
problematic due to the inefficiency of these industries and that they are not 
competitive within an open economy. According to them the Asian economies 
“first nurtured their industries through growth in protected domestic markets and 
subsidized exports before exposing them to the full force of international 
competition.”360 And although the liberalised world trade may offer new 
opportunities the SSA countries still struggle with the problem of high food 
costs, low employment inelasticity of its industries, and too little basis of labour 
force.361  
In their eyes agriculture is still of relevance for the rural poor. Income 
diversification has already occurred “and has long been observed as a strategy 
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by which rural households cope with risk and enhance their incomes”362 but this 
did not lead them out of poverty. Moreover, they argue: 
“If most African farmers have not been able to find pathways out of poverty 
despite income diversification strategies over many decades, then it is not 
clear why that strategy should suddenly work much better today, 
particularly in countries where the nonagricultural sectors are not actually 
thriving either!”363 
Rural-urban migration and diversification can be a sign for economic growth and 
structural transformation. For instance, agricultural tradables sold on local 
markets create income and demand for local non-tradables “with important 
spillover opportunities for rural income diversification”.364 However, 
“when the major engines of growth are stalled, as in much of Africa, 
migration and income diversification are more typically distress 
phenomena, with workers seeking to augment already low and declining 
per capita incomes by increasing production of low-productivity 
nontradables for sale into saturated local markets.”365 
Moreover, according to Hazell and Diao there is no sector ready to replace 
agriculture: other sectors will become important but “are not yet ready to play 
that role”.366 
The third argument addresses the problem that most small farmers are not able 
to meet the more demanding markets (quality, food safety and so on) and have 
no access to key inputs like credit. Furthermore, an agriculture-led strategy that 
focuses on commercial farms loses sight of the economic and social 
advantages of small farms. There is evidence that small farms are more 
efficient producers and “help contain poverty by providing an affordable platform 
from which poor households can experiment with ways to improve their 
livelihoods”.367 Moreover, strengthening small farms prevents urban migration 
and the growth of large cities as well as maintains food security in rural areas. 
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A more differentiated view would be necessary to answer the question of the 
turn towards high-value export products. Although SSA countries do have the 
opportunity to enlarge their non-traditional high-value exports  
“the greatest market potential for most African farmers still lies in domestic 
and regional markets for food staples (cereals, roots and tubers, and 
traditional livestock products). For Africa as a whole, the consumption of 
these foods accounts for about 70 percent of agricultural output […] and is 
projected to double by 2020.”368 
Lastly, the role of public support verses private sector engagement is of 
increasing importance in the international debate. The government should 
enable an environment for economic development and the private sector should 
“be in the driving seat.”369 The green revolution, for instance, in Asia has been 
based on public sector support and so far there is no evidence that the private 
sector can take the lead. 
The debate concerning the green revolution in SSA centres on the roles of the 
public and private sectors as well. In the 1970s during the green revolution in 
Asia the public sector played an important role in providing key services and 
supporting small farmers to participate in agricultural trade. This model was 
successful in the early years where 
“most of these policies and interventions had favourable benefit-cost ratios 
in early years, but the ratios worsened over time once the interventions 
had served their primary purposes.”370  
Ever since these liberalising activities during the 1990s there has been rapidly 
decreasing public support and governments only have the role to create and 
enable a trade-friendly environment “leaving a vacuum that the private sector has 
yet to fill in many countries.”371 A weak private sector and a non-existent public 
sector will make another green revolution for SSA difficult. Regardless, 
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“The international community is now so obsessed with post-Green 
Revolution problems that it is asking Africa to launch its own agricultural 
revolution without these kinds of public interventions.”372 
And Hazell concludes: “The international development community may well be 
asking for the impossible.”373 He emphasises that this is no pleading for a “return 
to costly and inefficient parastatals or to hefty and poorly targeted subsidies” but 
“what is really needed is a better understanding of those aspects of public 
intervention that really worked in Asia and why.”374 
In the light of the relatively successful green revolution in Asia375 there was a call 
for a green revolution in Africa in the 1970s and, due to the failure of agricultural 
development up to now, there is a call for a green revolution today. EU 
Commissioners Fischer Boel (Agriculture) and Michel (Development) state: 
“Africa needs a revolution. Butt his time not in the streets – rather in the 
fields. A ‘Green Revolution’ for Africa can be a key part of the solution to 
the current food price crisis.”376  
Moreover, this call is (financially) accompanied by international actors like the Bill 
and Melinda Gates Foundation and the Rockefeller Foundation that cooperate with 
large agro-businesses like Monsanto and follow a trickle-down approach to provide 
farmers with fertiliser and seeds.377 Fischer Boel and Michel also propose “more 
and better seeds and fertilizers”378 while Hazell and Diao give priority to an 
“effort to accelerate smallholder-led agricultural development”379 including 
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investment in research, development of human and institutional capital, support to 
rural infrastructure, and service provision for farmers. 
In 2006 also the FAO Director-General Diouf called for a green revolution:  
“In the next few decades, a major international effort is needed to feed the 
world when the population soars from six to nine billion. We might call it a 
second Green Revolution.”380 
But he also recognises that the previous green revolution “relied on the lavish use 
of inputs such as water, fertilizer and pesticides” and that a future green revolution 
has to deal with “a diminishing resource base of land and water in many of the 
world’s regions, and […] an environment increasingly threatened by global warming 
and climate change.”381 
Not only the conditions regarding climate but other factors also distinguish the 
Asian green revolution from the African green revolution. While Asia has been 
confronted with rising real food prices “beginning to undergo rapid urbanization 
and industrialization”382 SSA today has to deal with declining food prices though 
occasional peaks are possible. 
In SSA the availability of arable farm land with good soil and irrigation 
conditions is lower than in Asia. Similarly, climatic conditions are more difficult 
and unpredictable in SSA. Staatz and Dembélé state that there is more 
agroecological diversity383 in SSA with a broad number of staples rather than 
the few (three) crops that played an important role in the Asian green 
revolution.384 Intergenerational land transfers resulted in continuous farm 
subdivision385 and there is a wide range of farming systems – according to FAO 
there are 14 different farming systems in SSA.386 
Moreover, the unequal distribution of water resources (many lakes are 
inappropriate for irrigation),387 the dependence on rain-fed agriculture and the 
low degree of irrigation (3.5% of arable land is irrigated) leads to a high 
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vulnerability to weather shocks.388 And, unlike SSA, India undertook massive 
irrigation investments during the 1970s.389 Today’s SSA irrigation degree is  
“less than a fourth that of India in 1961, at the dawn of its green revolution. 
Increasing the percentage irrigated land up to that which India had in 1960 
would cost approximately US$114 billion, more than 55 times the annual 
ODA allocated to African agricultural development.”390 
The older, weathered soils in SSA increase the necessity for soil amendments. 
Additionally, high transport costs due to the weak infrastructure reduce the 
profitability of fertiliser.391 SSA today has lower densities of rural infrastructure 
than India had even in the 1950s: “SSA’s road density, at 201 km/1000 km2, is 
less than a third of that of India in 1950 (703 km/1000 km2).”392  
Unlike India SSA has weak institutions for rural development and the low 
average population density increases the costs of providing basic 
infrastructure.393  
In SSA there are nearly 40% landlocked countries compared to “other parts of 
the developing world, where over 88% of the population lives in coastal 
countries.”394 Moreover, SSA countries deal with small country problems e.g., 
the difficulty to achieve economies of scale due to high costs for agricultural 
research and marketing.395 
The already mentioned discrepancy with regard to the engagement of the public 
sector is evident. Hoering numbers the expenditure for agriculture as share of 
total public spending in Africa and Asia: while in Africa public spending 
decreased from 6% in 1980 to 5%, in Asia it decreased from 15% in 1980 to 
1998 10%.396  
During the green revolution in Asia agriculture was seen as a sector that could 
generate food and raw materials at lower prices, “free up foreign exchange for 
importation of strategic industrial and capital goods”, and “provid[e] growing 
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amounts of capital and labor for industrial development” that would result in a 
“growing domestic market due to rising incomes”.397 However, SSA still has to 
contend with small domestic markets.  
In the light of these challenges for SSA agriculture Staatz and Dembélé plead 
for “rainbow revolutions”398 instead of a green revolution “suggesting that a 
single path to a green revolution is unlikely.”399 According to them it is 
necessary to build on already existing successes e.g., the promotion of cassava 
in Nigeria and cotton in francophone Africa. These “geographically differentiated 
successes”400 recognise the need for different commodities and production 
systems and follow decentralised regional research.401 
4.3 Farming in Southern Africa 
It is necessary to take a more detailed look at ACP countries’ and in particular 
Southern African agriculture in order to assess the role of agriculture for 
economic transformation and to identify factors that create a green revolution. 
Furthermore, it is also necessary to identify the role of agriculture in 
international trade negotiations, in particular, in negotiations on Economic 
Partnership Agreements as is done in chapter 5.  
4.3.1 Agriculture in Economy – Data 
Agriculture plays an important role for African ACP countries but of course the 
meaning varies from country to country. A more detailed look is necessary to 
analyse the importance of agriculture in ACP, in particular, SADC EPA 
countries.  
There are 48 ACP countries in Africa and 41 of ACP countries are LDCs. SADC 
is comprised of 14 countries: Angola, Botswana, Democratic Republic of 
Congo, Lesotho, Madagascar (pending membership), Malawi, Mauritius, 
Mozambique, Namibia, Seychelles, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia and 
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Zimbabwe. Seven of these are LDCs: Angola, Democratic Republic of Congo, 
Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mozambique, and Zambia. The focus of this 
paper is the BLNS countries: Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, Swaziland and 
Mozambique since these countries formed a negotiating group in the EPA 
negotiations.  
The following data show how asymmetric the trade partners in EPA negotiations 
are in terms of total GDP. To illustrate, in 2005 the total GDP of the EU is 
13,300 billion US-$ compared to 425 billion US-$ ACP countries, which means 
that ACP’s GDP is 3.2% of EU’s GDP. The SADC GDP is 0.5% of EU’s GDP.402 
The economic power in the SADC region is largely different: for SADC countries 
the average GDP per capita is 4,428 US-$ ranging from Botswana with 10,700 
US-$ to Tanzania with 700 US-$.403 South Africa generates 74% of the regional 
GDP, Angola 13%, Tanzania 4%, Botswana 3%, Mozambique 2%, Namibia 2%, 
Swaziland 1%, and Lesotho 0%.404 The constant GDP ranges from 8,200 
million US-$ for Botswana to about 1,000 million US-$ for Lesotho.405 In 2006 
growth rates for SSA accounted for 4.2%, in ACP countries for 4.8%, and in 
BLNS for 3.5%.406 
Table 1: Gross domestic product (GDP) BLNS+M407 
Gross domestic product (GDP), constant US dollars  
(Units: Million constant 2000 US$) 
Country 2000 2002 2004 2006 
BLNS+M 16082 18113 20252 22224 
Botswana 6177 6866 7740 8219 
Lesotho 853 893 954 1053 
Namibia 3414 3729 4114 4433 
Swaziland 1389 1452 1526 1594 
Mozambique 4249 5173 5918 6925 
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Agriculture as share of GDP varies within the ACP group from 1.2% in Trinidad 
and Tobago to 60.7% in Congo-Kinshasa.408 In the BLNS group and 
Mozambique the share varies from 2% (Botswana), about 11% for Namibia and 
Swaziland, to 16% in Lesotho, and 28% in Mozambique in 2006. The highest 
share in the SADC group has Tanzania with 45%.409 With regard to services in 
the BLNS group the share of total GDP ranges from about 41% in Swaziland to 
58% in Namibia (2005).410 The share of manufacturing varies from 3.9% in 
Botswana to 37% in Swaziland (concentrated on clothing and sugar) in 2005. 
For Lesotho the share of sectors remains relatively constant; manufacturing is 
mainly concentrated on the clothing and textiles industry.411 The Namibian 
manufacturing sector consists mainly of food processing (fish and meat) which 
accounts for more than 60% of manufactured outputs.412 In Botswana mining 
and services are most important for GDP – mining and agriculture together 
account for 37% of GDP (with the small share of 2% of agriculture); while 
agriculture was important after independence (40% of GDP in 1966) its 
meaning declined.413 Similarly, in Lesotho the importance of agriculture also 
declined – in the 1990s the share of agriculture in the GDP declined from 23-
25% to 16.3% today.414 
Agriculture and manufacturing are of different importance for BLNS countries 
and Mozambique while the services sector is relatively similar. 
Table 2: Gross domestic product (GDP) from agriculture BLNS+M415 
Gross domestic product (GDP) from agriculture (%) 
Country groups 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
BLNS+M (average) 13,94 13,04 14,28 14,24 13,74 13,84 13,68 
Botswana 2,4 2,3 2,4 2,4 2,2 2 2 
Lesotho 17,9 17 16,5 17,1 17,1 17 16,3 
Namibia 11 10,4 11,1 11,5 10,4 12,1 10,9 
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Swaziland 15,5 13,7 13,6 12,3 11,7 11,2 10,9 
Mozambique 22,9 21,8 27,8 27,9 27,3 26,9 28,3 
 
Table 3: Gross domestic product (GDP) from agriculture BLNS+M416 
 
 
In 2008 the total population in SSA accounts for 830 million people and the 
whole ACP group is 873 million; SADC countries account for 245 million people 
and BLNS countries for 7 million. In 2000 the population growth in SSA was 
2.5% and in BLNS 1.2%; the ACP group has a 1.8% population growth.417 
Koroma and Deep Ford refer to the fact that “food production […] has not kept 
up with population growth”.418 The share of undernourished people in the ACP 
group accounts for 28% of total population, in SSA for 30%, and in BLNS for 
about 20% of total population. 
Table 4: Undernourishment in total population BLNS+M419 
Undernourishment in total population (%) 
Country groups 1990-92 1995-97 2003-05 
BNLS+M (average) 27 28 23 
Botswana 20 24 26 
Lesotho 15 13 15 
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Namibia 29 29 19 
Swaziland 12 20 18 
Mozambique 59 52 38 
 
In 2000 the population living in rural areas accounted for 54% of total population 
in SSA, 61% for BLNS (48% in Botswana, 67% in Namibia) and 53% for ACP 
countries.420 Despite the different percentages of agriculture in GDP the share 
of rural population is relatively similar in the BLNS countries. Lesotho is highly 
dependent on subsistence agriculture: 80% of total population live in rural areas 
and more than 50% derive their livelihood from crops and livestock. In Namibia 
still 3/4 of the population depend on farming for their livelihood, while in 
Swaziland 70% of the total population live in rural areas (with 60% below the 
poverty line). Though Botswana is relatively highly developed compared to the 
other Southern African countries still 50% of the total population live in rural 
areas and 50% of them depend on agriculture for income; moreover, agriculture 
accounts for a large share of informal employment.421 
In 2004 in SSA about 60% of the total labour force worked in agriculture, in 
BLNS 37% (2004) – ranging from 31% in Swaziland and 43% in Botswana to 
80% in Mozambique and 48% in the ACP group.422 Botswana is a good 
example that the “relative small importance of agriculture […] contrasts with the 
importance of agriculture for employment”.423 Moreover, statistical data on 
employment disregard the importance of informal employment in agriculture 
which is important for SSA economies but does not emerge in agricultural data.  
In SSA 8% of total land is arable land; irrigated land as a percentage of total 
land is 0.7% in SSA in 2003, 3.1% in ACP, and 0.9% in BLNS countries. SSA 
withdraws only 1.6% of available water, while in Asia this accounts for 14%. The 
low degree of irrigation is a major constraint in Southern African agriculture.  
The most important sectors for BLNS countries are diamonds and mining for 
Botswana, clothing and textiles for Lesotho, sugar production and processing 
for Swaziland, while Namibia is dominated by mining, fishing, and ranching.  
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The most important agricultural products for Lesotho are in livestock (milk, beef, 
and mutton) with a declining trend in milk production but increases in the output 
of mutton and beef. Also important are animal-based textile products (wool and 
mohair) and five principal crops which are maize, wheat, sorghum, peas, and 
beans). These crops observe a declining output due to a “decline in available 
arable land though housing expansion and a shift of the labour force from 
agriculture to manufacturing.”424 This causes an increasing dependence on 
imports of food and agriculture. 
Namibia is characterised by a dualistic agriculture: commercial farming is 
concentrated on the production of maize, wheat, cotton, and beef425as well as 
irrigated grapes that become more and more important. Subsistence farming 
mainly produces rain-fed crops like millet, sorghum, and maize as well as 
livestock and some horticultural crops (beans, pumpkins, melons, groundnuts, 
spinach).426  
A dualistic agriculture is also characteristic of Swaziland. Subsistence farming 
produces maize, sugar, and livestock on a commercial basis while the industrial 
agricultural sector produces processed sugar products, maize meal, animal 
feeds, and processed dairy products. The main agricultural products are sugar, 
maize, meat, dairy, pineapples, citrus and other fruits. The cash economy is 
characterised by a large-scale, commercial, irrigated, and export-oriented 
agriculture. Moreover, sugar accounts for more than 50% of the farm output and 
more than 92% is exported; the growing food industry is based on sugar.427  
This dualistic agriculture is representative for Botswana as well. The 
commercial farming sector disposes of 30% of total arable land and produces 
mainly cattle while subsistence farmers produce mainly sorghum, maize, millet, 
pulses as well as cabbages, tomatoes, and potatoes. Both parts are engaged in 
crop and livestock activities.428  
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Similarly, this dualism can also be found in Mozambique’s agriculture that 
mainly produces export crops like sugar cane, cotton, cashew nuts, copra, and 
tea as well as food crops like maize, cassava, vegetables, beans, and rice.429 
4.3.2 Farming Structure 
In SSA, in particular, in the SADC region there are several landlocked countries 
(Botswana, Malawi, Swaziland, Zambia, and Zimbabwe) and several countries 
that have access to the sea coast (Angola, Namibia, Madagascar, Mauritius, 
Mozambique, and Tanzania). Due to the different geographical preconditions 
the FAO counts 72 different farming systems worldwide430 and 15 in SSA. 
These systems include criteria like, “land area and agricultural population as a 
proportion of regional totals, principal livelihoods and the prevalence of 
poverty”.431 The farming systems relevant for the Southern African region are 
listed in table 5. 
Table 5: Farming systems in SADC countries432 
Farming System Countries Characteristics 
Tree Crop Farming System 
 
Part of Angola, Congo Industrial tree crops (cocoa, coffee, oil palm 
and rubber); food crops inter-planted 
between tree crops/grown mainly for 
subsistence; few cattle; commercial tree 
crop estates (oil palm and 
rubber)/outgrower schemes for 
smallholders 
Forest Based Farming 
System 
(Among others) Congo 
Democratic Republic, 
the Congo Republic, 
Southern Tanzania, 
Northern Zambia, 
Mozambique, Angola 
Shifting cultivation (clearing new field from 
forest every year/cropping it for 2 to 5 years 
- first cereals/groundnuts, then cassava – 
then abandoning it to bush fallow for 7 to 20 
years, but tendency to reduce fallow 
periods; main staple Cassava, 
complemented by maize, sorghum, beans 
and cocoyams. Cattle and small ruminant 
populations low 
Rice-Tree Crop Farming 
System 
Madagascar 
 
Small farm size; banana/coffee cultivation 
is complemented by rice, maize, cassava 
and legumes; cattle numbers relatively low 
Highland Temperate Mixed 
Farming System 
(Among others) Part of 
Angola, Lesotho 
Small average farm size; numerous cattle 
(ploughing, milk, manure, bridewealth, 
savings and emergency sale); main staples 
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small grains (wheat and barley), 
complemented by peas, lentils, broad 
beans, rape, Irish potatoes; main sources 
of cash: sale of sheep and goats, wool, 
local barley beer, Irish potatoes, pulses and 
oilseeds; mountain areas offer few local 
opportunities for off-farm employment 
 
Cereal-Root Crop Mixed 
Farming System 
Southern Africa 
 
Numerous cattle; cereals (maize, sorghum 
and millet) are widespread; absence of 
animal traction: root crops (yams and 
cassava) more important than cereals 
Maize Mixed Farming 
System 
Tanzania, Zambia, 
Malawi, Zimbabwe, 
South Africa, 
Swaziland, Lesotho 
 
Rather low farm sizes; small-scale irrigation 
schemes; main staple: maize; main cash 
sources: migrant remittances, cattle, small 
ruminants, tobacco, coffee and cotton, plus 
the sale of food crops such as maize and 
pulses; cattle (ploughing, breeding, milk, 
farm manure, bridewealth, savings and 
emergency sale) 
Large Commercial and 
Smallholder Farming 
System 
South Africa, Southern 
Namibia 
 
Two types of farms: scattered smallholder 
farming (homelands) and large-scale 
commercialised farming; both largely mixed 
cereal-livestock systems (maize dominating 
in north/east, sorghum/millet in the west); 
modest level of cattle and small ruminants 
Agro-Pastoral 
Millet/Sorghum Farming 
System 
(Among others) 
Substantial areas of 
East and Southern 
Africa from Somalia 
and Ethiopia to South 
Africa 
Crops and livestock of similar importance; 
rainfed sorghum and pearl millet: main 
sources of food/rarely marketed; sesame 
and pulses sometimes sold; land 
preparation by oxen or camel, hoe 
cultivation common along riverbanks; 
livestock for  
subsistence (milk and milk products), 
offspring, transportation (camels, donkeys), 
land preparation (oxen, camels), sale or 
exchange, savings, bridewealth and 
insurance against crop failure 
Pastoral Farming System (Among others) 
Botswana, Southern 
Angola 
Cattle, sheep, goats and camels 
Sparse (Arid) Farming 
System 
Botswana, Namibia 
 
Limited relevance for agriculture; cattle; 
some scattered irrigation settlements often 
used by pastoralists to supplement 
livelihoods 
Coastal Artisanal Fishing 
Farming System 
(Among others) 
Madagascar 
 
Artisanal fishing (sea fishing from boats, 
seine net fishing from beaches, setting of 
nets/traps along estuaries/in shallow 
lagoons, catching of crustaceans in 
mangrove swamps); supplemented by crop 
production (root crops under coconuts, fruit 
trees and cashews, some animal 
production) 
Urban Based Farming 
System 
 
All countries Estimated total urban population of over 
200 million in the region: significant number 
of farmers in cities/large towns (up to 
10%/11 million agricultural producers); 
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heterogeneous farming system 
 
The most relevant systems for the BLNS countries are the Cereal-Root Crop 
Mixed Farming System (for Southern Africa), the Maize Mixed Farming System 
(for Swaziland and Lesotho), the Large Commercial and Smallholder Farming 
System (for South Africa and Southern Namibia), the Pastoral Farming System 
(important in Botswana), the Sparse (Arid) Farming System (for Botswana and 
Namibia), and the Urban Based Farming System in all Southern African 
countries. These agricultural systems show that there is a large variety of 
agricultural systems in the Southern African countries with cattle production, 
root crops, cereals, and maize being relevant for agricultural production.  
Important for SSA, in particular the Southern African countries, is the dualism 
between smallholder agriculture and large commercial farming. It is important to 
notice that agricultural statistics are based on established farms but do not take 
into account small family farming – since these farmers mainly produce for their 
own consumption they are not registered in national statistics although they are 
very important for SSA agriculture i.e., food security.433  
The large commercial farming is producing commercial cash or industrial crops 
for export (e.g., cotton, tea, coffee, sugar cane, pyrethrum, vegetables, and 
tobacco)434 and is the leading export earner for SSA countries. Large-scale 
commercial farms dispose of modern inputs with access to global input and 
output marketing chains and some are vertically integrated with agro-processing 
business.435 But Chiwandamira states that the contribution to employment and 
poverty alleviation is low or even not existent.436 According to a World Bank 
study commercial farming is less capital efficient but more land and labour 
efficient due to modern capital intensive technologies.437 In general, commercial 
farmers have titles to lease state lands and possess farms with large sizes.438  
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Smallholder farmers mostly produce for own consumption with periodic 
surpluses for the local markets.439 Smallholders often use simple technologies 
like hand hoes or oxen and cultivation practises (e.g. a minimum input of 
fertiliser); cultivation methods vary largely. Often they do not have access to 
functioning input and output markets or support services.440 
Moreover, smallholders can be divided in two groups: the first group producing 
“low-value-to-weight”441 food staples and a second group producing higher-
value crops like cotton, tobacco, paprika as well as small livestock e.g., poultry 
and pigs for home consumption.442 Normally, smallholders do not have access 
to larger markets and are not connected with agro-business; in the few cases 
smallholder produce for export may depend on middlemen to sell their 
products.443 The majority of farmers have average land holdings near 2-5 
hectares per household and only a small area of land is irrigated in comparison 
with commercial agriculture.444 
The economic and social advantages of small farms include the fact that they 
are more efficient producers by growing more food staples with less capital, 
have a higher work force, and their low prices benefit local markets.445 
Moreover, small farmers prevent urban migration, which results in the explosive 
growth of large cities, and provide food security in rural areas. Small farms “help 
contain poverty by providing an affordable platform from which poor households 
can experiment with ways to improve their livelihoods”.446 
Smallholder farming is constrained by poor infrastructure, the lack of effective 
farmers’ organisations, the missing input and output supply, their limited access 
to technology, the poor prices for their products, competition from developed 
countries, demanding market chains, and the broadening of HIV/AIDS.447 The 
danger is that “Left to themselves, these forces will curtail opportunities for 
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small farms, overly favour large farms, and lead to a premature and rapid exit of 
many small farms.”448  
The diversification into non-farm income is an important factor for smallholder 
farmers and an opportunity to increase stability and the security of incomes. 
Furthermore, 
“The extent of such diversification away from agriculture may be an 
indicator of the degree to which farming operations, on their own, can 
provide a secure and improving livelihood.”449 
Ellis states that, “on average, roughly 50 percent of rural household incomes in 
Sub-Saharan Africa are generated from engagement in nonfarm activities and 
transfers from urban areas or abroad”450 and explains that there is a difference 
between poor and better-off households. While poor households often diversify 
in casual wage work and remain reliant on subsistence crop production, better-
off households are able to diversify into non-farm business activities like trade, 
transport, and shop keeping.451 The vulnerability of poor households is 
increased when workers cultivate farms they do not own in lieu of their own 
farms. Likewise adverse natural events affect all farms in the region.452 The 
better-off farmers do not neglect their own farm activities, on the contrary their 
agricultural productivity increases. According to Ellis this  
“also points in a broader direction that is compatible with the agriculture 
skeptic position. It is possible that farm productivity in Sub-Saharan Africa 
rises as a function of household members taking up nonfarm opportunities, 
rather than being the driver of such opportunities, as is proposed in much 
of the agriculture-led growth literature.”453 
Ellis concludes that  
 “The agricultural optimist is essentially arguing that these impoverished 
populations should be kept in agriculture because yield growth on their 
farms is an essential precursor to their ability to move out”.454 
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He continues by saying, “Towns and cities become teeming hives of small-scale 
activity in which people begin to specialize in providing services to others and to 
purchase services in return.”455 
The shift to non-farm activities of smallholder farmers depends on the “human, 
financial and physical assets and the economic context of the region and 
country in which they live.”456 The challenge for policy is to move jobs in low-
growth market segments to more profitable ones by  
“a variety of private assets such as education and start-up funds, and 
public assets such as roads and electricity and information about how to 
access dynamic market segments.”457 
If preconditions do not guarantee local agricultural growth or access to new 
markets a “rapid expansion of non-farm activity can quickly depress local prices 
and wages, making them more a refuge occupation than a productive alternative to 
agriculture.”458 
The functioning of the so-called engines of growth – tradables like agriculture, 
tradable services like tourism, manufacturing – and the resulting increase of 
income leads to growing demand for non-tradables “with important spillover 
opportunities for rural income diversification.”459 Furthermore,  
“In this context, rural-urban migration and rural income diversification are 
indicators of economic growth and structural transformation and a sign that 
workers are typically being “pulled” out of agriculture into higher-paying 
occupations. But when the major engines of growth are stalled, as in much 
of Africa, migration and income diversification are more typically distress 
phenomena, with workers seeking to augment already low and declining 
per capita incomes by increasing production of low-productivity 
nontradables for sale into saturated local markets.”460 
Moreover, declining farm sizes influences smallholder farming: since the 1960s 
farm sizes decreased to an SSA average of 1.5 hectare.461 Staatz and Dembélé 
state that the land availability per person in agriculture has fallen by around the 
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half over the last 40 years in many SSA countries.462 This decrease is result of 
the fact that “the agricultural labor force is increasing faster than the area under 
crops cultivation”,463 which is “difficult for farming alone to sustain the livelihoods 
of land-constrained households without substantial shifts in labor from 
agriculture to non-farm sectors.”464 Ellis states that the small farm size reflects 
norms under customary and state land tenure but also the “failure of rising 
populations to urbanize fast enough to stabilize available farm land per rural 
household”465 and the “unwillingness of SSA citizens to cede their access rights 
to land altogether”.466 
Furthermore, there are large differences not only between smallholders and 
commercial farms with regard to land access but also between smallholders. 
The distribution of land is highly unequal to the extent that  
“Gini coefficients of rural household land per capita among smallholders for 
Ethiopia, Kenya, Mozambique, Rwanda, Zambia and Zimbabwe range 
from 0.50 to 0.56. […] Frequently, the bottom half of the size distribution of 
smallholders has less than one-fifth of a hectare per person available, 
making these households close to landless.”467 
In most SSA there is a coexistence of land that is owned by the rural 
community: this land is usually not set out in writing or land that is considered 
private property. This coexistence of modern and traditional land rights together 
with the scarcity of cultivable land is under pressure due to increasing 
population growth, the expansion of export-oriented agriculture, increasing 
demand for land for building in the periphery of cities, and increasing demand of 
the tourism sector.468 Attempts to clarify land use rights did not succeed and 
often accelerated conflicts rather than avoiding them.469 Hoering states that in 
SADC countries (Botswana, Namibia, and Swaziland) the reform attempt 
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benefited a small elite of land owners and a private agro-business while 
smallholders were missed out.470 
The insecurity regarding land rights together with the low asset levels (no risk 
management support) can prevent smallholders from bearing risks and 
transaction costs involved in production. Therefore, they hesitate to invest in 
pesticides, seeds, and fertiliser due to the threat of losing their land.471 
Jayne et al. conclude that “greater equity in land holding is key to rural poverty 
reduction in the short run”472 and in the long run will “facilitate the movement of 
the rural poor into skilled off-farm and non-farm jobs”.473 They state that second 
round effects of liberalisation arise dependent from the “initial distribution of land 
and other productive assets”.474 
The question is how to achieve food security and if a more sustainable 
agriculture can contribute to this aim: “it is unclear whether progress towards 
more sustainable agricultural systems will result in enough food to meet the 
current food needs in developing countries.”475 
The rising agricultural production since the 1960s – the aggregate world food 
production grew by 145% – has to be seen in conjunction with the population 
growth from three to six billion people in the same period. Worldwide the per 
capita food production rose by 25% while in Africa it declined by 10% since the 
1960s.476 In general agriculture has contributed to environmental harm since the 
1960s, i.e., agricultural area expansion (in developing countries by 23%), 
increasing area under irrigation (twofold), and growing consumption of fertiliser 
(fourfold).477 The environmental consequences are the losses of habitats and 
biodiversity, the contamination of water systems and atmosphere as well as 
water-logging and salinisation.478 The growing population and food crises 
require a “greater use of these inputs” but “it would be both simplistic and 
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optimistic to assume that all these relationships will remain linear in the future 
and that gains will continue at the previous rates”, therefore, it is clear that “this 
approach has reached critical environmental limits”.479 
A sustainable agriculture tries “to make the best use of environmental goods 
and services while not damaging these assets.”480 It includes the integration of 
ecological processes into food production, minimising the use of non-renewable 
assets, productively using farmers’ knowledge and skills as well as collective 
capacities to jointly solve problems, and the fact that no technology/practise 
should be ruled out on ideological grounds.481 
Lambrechts emphasises that local and traditional knowledge should be 
supported; African farmers have already shown that farmers “can double their 
yields using technology that is known and available.”482 Similarly, Pretty states 
that agricultural technologies and practises “must be locally adapted and fitted 
to place.”483 Agricultural technologies and practises are sustainable if they do 
not have adverse effects on environment, if they are accessible to farmers and 
are effective, and if they lead to improvements in food security.484 According to 
him there are “many pathways to agricultural sustainability” and there is a “need 
to fit these factors to the specific circumstances of different agricultural 
systems.”485 
Public support is necessary to bear transition costs but only a few countries 
provide national or regional support; whereas,  
“Most agricultural sustainability improvements occurring in the 1990s and 
early 2000s appear to have risen despite existing national and institutional 
policies, rather than owing to them.”486 
A multi-track approach is necessary and must include: the linkage of 
smallholder development to local markets, the support of agro-business (small 
businesses as well as export-led farms), agro-processing and value-added 
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activities, the improvement of urban agriculture, and livestock development to 
meet local increases of demand.487 
Hoering gives an example for the more differentiated approach with regard to 
sustainable agriculture. The use of fertiliser is profitable for export-oriented 
agriculture while fertiliser does not increase the productivity of the products 
cultivated by smallholders (e.g., sorghum, legumes) and is too expensive for 
them. An example of an organic fertiliser that is applied in Tanzania is 
Mapambano. Mapambano is low priced, locally available and free from 
corruption.488 
Hoering states that the World Bank recommends the increased use of fertiliser 
in SSA and prioritises economic growth rather than food security and poverty:  
“promoting fertilizer and improved land husbandry among poor farmers in 
difficult agroclimates may have positive environmental consequences 
(reduced soil mining) and poverty alleviation implications (better food 
security), but it may not contribute as much to growth in GDP or to the 
development of viable fertilizer supply networks as would a program to 
expand irrigated agriculture or encourage farmers to increase the intensity 
of fertilizer use on irrigated crops.”489  
A similar example is the use of seeds. In SSA smallholders mostly sell seeds at 
the informal market, use their own seeds, and/or exchange seeds with other 
smallholders. Up to 80-90% of the demand covered and the local seeds fit into 
the local environment. Attempts to distribute more expensive commercial seeds 
in the formal market have taken place within the regional SADC market since 
end of the 1990s. These regional markets characterised by free trade and strict 
intellectual property rights regulate the use of seeds. Hoering concludes that 
there is a separation into two independent sectors: a privatised controlled formal 
sector and an informal multifaceted smallholder sector.490 A more differentiated 
approach would be necessary to bring both sectors together and to develop 
more sustainable practises for smallholder farmers that enable them to maintain 
food security.  
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The influence of international institutions has already been shown in chapter 4.1 
(IMF, World Bank) and chapter 2 (WTO). The impact of IMF and World Bank 
policies in the promotion of liberalisation has been serious and initiated a 
change in agricultural policies in the (African) developing countries. The WTO 
aims at further liberalisation but does not impose structural adjustment 
programmes; it negotiates liberalisation in trade agreements and multilateral 
trade negotiations.  
The World Development Report 2008 describes the role of the public sector in 
agriculture and states that the “state is especially important for addressing 
market failures”491 and that 
“The nation state remains responsible for creating an enabling 
environment for the agriculture- for-development agenda, because only the 
state can establish the fundamental conditions for the private sector and 
civil society to thrive: macroeconomic stability, political stability, security, 
and the rule of law.”492 
It recognises the (partial) success of the green revolution but accentuates that 
“public sector interventions are often ill informed, poorly implemented, and 
subject to rent-seeking and corruption, leading to government failures.”493  
The fact that “state agencies have been removed from providing many direct 
marketing and service functions to farmers, leaving a vacuum that the private 
sector has yet to fill in many countries.”494 is approved by the World Bank. In the 
2008 World Development Report the World Bank states that this liberalisation 
“left many market failures unresolved, creating second-generation problems 
[…], especially where a weak private sector could not fill the gap”495. 
Therefore, the challenge of government goes beyond creating an enabling 
environment for economic actors. Moreover, the WDR postulates the enhanced 
coordination of ministries due to the broad agenda which is 
“embracing not only issues of agricultural production, but also food safety, 
biosafety, animal health, human health and nutrition, physical 
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infrastructure, environmental services, trade and commerce, natural 
disaster management, gender equity, and safety nets.”496 
 Furthermore, the agricultural ministries require “new skills and management 
structures”.497 The WDR also calls for an increased role of the national 
parliaments because  
“in emerging democracies, especially in Africa, parliamentarians often lack 
the resources, information, and support staff to engage in the formulation 
of agricultural strategies, policies, and budgets.”498  
The integration of civil society organisations (NGOs, producer’s 
organisations,…) is important as well.499 
Another important task for the government, in particular, the agricultural 
ministries is the regulation of  
“biosafety, food safety, grades and standards, intellectual property 
protection, agricultural input quality, groundwater extraction, and 
environmental protection. The privatization of agricultural markets requires 
appropriate regulatory frameworks to maintain competitiveness”.500 
Further tasks are to align policy with agricultural budgets, decentralisation in 
order to bring government closer to rural areas, and enhance coordination 
challenges. 
Farmers – smallholders and commercial farmers – often are organised in 
farmers' organisations that are characterised by different configurations and 
functions. There are farmers groups, agricultural cooperatives, chambers of 
agriculture and NGOs at local/regional and national levels. They have 
advocacy, economic, technical and local development functions.501 Successful 
farmers' organisations are characterised by a  
“match between the existing skills/experience of members and what is 
required to undertake joint activities; internal cohesion and a membership 
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driven agenda; and successful, commercially oriented, integration of the 
organisation into the wider economy.”502 
Stockbridge et al. judge that “FOs focused on the production and marketing of 
cash crops have clearly met with greater success than the less focused, multi-
purpose FOs”503 and that farmers' organisations with a commercial focus are 
more successful than those with a wider policy focus. If farmers' organisations 
should replace public engagement in the provision of agricultural services there 
is the risk that the organisational viability is undermined: 
 “FOs appear to be most effective when they act and are treated as an 
alternative form of business organisation rather than as an extension of the 
public sector or as a channel for donor aid to the rural sector.”504 
Chirwa et al. also see the role of farmers' organisations after trade liberalisation 
as critical. They state:  
“FOs are undermined by attempts to encourage them to scale up too 
rapidly or to take too many or over-ambitious activities. They can also be 
undermined by subsidies, by a failure to focus on core commercial 
activities offering clear benefits to members, and by donor and government 
support and interference that interacts with them more as development 
agents than as private businesses.”505 
Preville emphasises the domestic character of farmers' organisations as well.506 
In an interview with a Namibian trade expert he also stated that farmers' 
organisations should have a commercial focus as they are “more concerned 
with a conducive political environment to ensure their own survival and to make 
profits from products produced, than in politics per se.”507 
With regard to smallholder farmers there is the danger that the poor can be 
excluded from membership, or the benefits of membership, due to an unequal 
distribution of power and wealth in rural societies.508  
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Large agro-businesses play an increasingly important role in international trade. 
In many sectors only a few companies control the market. Four companies own 
30% of the total commercial seeds and ten leading companies control 80% of 
the agrochemical market. Moreover, five companies share 90% of the 
worldwide cereals trade. These companies are gaining control over the value 
chain and this is of growing importance to international agriculture.509 
The (European) supermarkets play an increasing role in agriculture, in 
particular, in Latin America and Asia. In Southern Africa, European 
supermarkets are nearly non-existent instead South African supermarkets are 
dominant. The impact on local agriculture is serious: street hawkers tend to be 
displaced, the workers often suffer from pricing pressure, and smallholders – 
those that are excluded from restructured markets – are also affected.510 
Smallholder farmers tend to loose recipients because they normally sell to 
intermediaries or smaller shops. There is only a small number of farmers that 
are able to deliver products with supermarket standard and they might get 
crowded out of the market.511 
4.4  Trade in Southern Africa 
South-South trade is growing, especially with regard to agricultural products and 
processed products, but regional trade is still only a small share of total ACP 
trade. Moreover, trade does not take place between the entities Africa, 
Caribbean, and Pacific but only within these entities. Therefore, any trade 
agreement between EU and ACP countries should strengthen trade between 
these ACP countries and regions.512 Southern African intra-regional trade 
increased by 12% in 2001, 24% in 2003, and then declined by 14% in 2004; 
main products were cereals, sugar, and confectionaries.513 
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Between 1995 and 2002 exports from ACP countries to the EU increased by 
67% and imports increased by 52%;514 the EU receives 42% of total exports 
from ACP countries.515 The exports of ACP countries as share of total EU 
exports accounted for 3.21% in 2007.516 In 2002 agriculture accounted for one 
quarter of ACP exports to the EU and Chiwandamira states that “the 
contribution of agriculture to total EU imports is much greater and has 
performed better relative to non-agriculture sectors.”517 But ACP countries 
account for one eighth of EU agricultural imports and trade has been further 
marginalised: the share of EU imports from ACP as share of total imports fell 
from 3.4% 1995 to 3% 2002518 and 2.82% in 2007519. “The main reason that the 
ACP’s share of total EU imports has slumped is that the non-agriculture share is 
tiny and has fallen badly.”520 But, above all “this shows that ACP trade is of 
insignificant economic importance to the EU, and that access to the EU market 
is essential to the ACP countries.”521 
In 2007 the share of EU agricultural exports to ACP countries as percent of total 
exports accounted for 11.6% (manufacturing goods 62.4%).522 The largest 
destination for EU agro-food exports is West Africa (47.5%) followed by 
Southern Africa (including South Africa) with 18.8% and Eastern Africa (10-
13%). EU exports to EPA regions increased and during 2000-2004 there also 
was an increase in total agro-food exports of the EU (166.5%).523  
The total value of exports from the SADC region accounted for 32.277 billion 
US-$ (imports: 13.780 billion US-$) comprised of mining industry exports, 
exports of metals and precious stones, as well as petroleum, diamonds, and 
aluminium. The destination for natural fuel exports (Angola accounts for 95% of 
these exports) is USA, China, and France, while non-oil exports go to the UK, 
                                            
514 Koroma/Deep Ford: The agricultural dimension of the ACP-EU Economic Partnership 
Agreements, 2006, p.43. 
515 Kasteng: Agriculture and development in EPA negotiations, 2006, p.38. 
516 DG Trade: Trade statistics ACP (excluding South Africa), 2008. 
517 Chiwandamira: A review of the negotiation of Economic Partnership Agreements, 2006, p.25. 
518 Ibid. 
519 DG Trade: Trade statistics ACP (excluding South Africa), 2008. 
520 Koroma/Deep Ford: The agricultural dimension of the ACP-EU Economic Partnership 
Agreements, 2006, p.43.  
521 Kasteng: Agriculture and development in EPA negotiations, 2006, p.38. 
522 DG Trade: Trade statistics ACP (excluding South Africa), 2008. 
523 Kasteng: Agriculture and development in EPA negotiations, 2006, p.37. 
 104
USA, and Norway. The EU receives more than 40% of SADC exports: mainly 
diamonds, gold, aluminium, and fish.524 SADC countries import mainly higher 
value added manufactured products: boilers, machinery, propellers account for 
about 15%; while ships/vessels, vehicles, and general consumer goods other 
than agricultural products follow. The EU is the main exporter to SADC 
countries and SADC imports from the EU grew 18.7% 2004-2005.525 
In general SADC countries import more agricultural products than they export; 
21% of total exports are agricultural goods (Botswana 3.2%, Namibia 17.2%).526 
Imports from SADC into EU accounted for 5,205.4 million US-$ and exports 
from EU to SADC 3,283.9 million US-$. The EU is the main exporter, with 32% 
of imports in 2002 followed by the US with 9%.527 Five products accounted for 
86% of exports to EU: diamonds and gold (47.3%), oil (19.1%), aluminium 
(10.4%) and fisheries products (10%). These primary goods entered without 
tariff preferences due to zero-rated tariffs except fisheries products and certain 
aluminium products. The main exports of the EU in 2003 have been transport 
materials (24.3%), food industry products and drinks (8%), non-precious metals 
(7.7%), and chemical products (6.8%). Thereby, Angola dominates (41% of total 
trade); followed by Botswana (22.5%); and Tanzania (13.7%).528  
SADC imports of agricultural products grew by 6% 2002, by 27% in 2003, and 
by 5% in 2004. These products were edible preparations, dairy products, eggs, 
honey, and edible animal products. In 2002 and 2003 the SADC region received 
significant trade in cereals from the EU (in response to food shortages caused 
by droughts). SADC agricultural exports to the EU (mainly vegetables, fruits, 
and nuts) are steadily increasing and account now for 6% of the value of 
exports to the EU. The quantity of beef exported to the EU declined since 2001 
despite the duty-free quotas (declining prices in EU due to the issue of 
subsidies).529 
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A closer look at Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, Swaziland, and Mozambique 
allows a more detailed trade analysis. 
Most exports from Botswana go to the EU (76.8% in 2005), mainly to the UK (in 
particular beef and diamonds). Other exports go to SADC countries (13.8% in 
2005), mostly to South Africa and Namibia. Botswana’s imports are mainly from 
SADC countries (87.6%), in particular, South Africa and the EU with 6.6% 
(mostly from UK, France, and Sweden).530 Most imports are mineral products, 
machinery, and vehicles; while most exports consist of precious stones and 
metal products.531 Agricultural imports include prepared foods and beverages 
mainly from SADC countries (7% from South Africa, 20% from the rest of 
SADC, and 6.5% from the rest of the world, as share of total imports).532 
Agricultural imports are still of importance because “Botswana’s semi-arid 
climate is not conducive to commercial agriculture”;533 therefore, “Botswana 
continues to rely on agricultural imports from SA, SADC and the RoW.”534 
Agricultural exports to South Africa only account for a small share of exports 
and include prepared foods and beverages (in 2005 6.1% as share of total 
exports) and live animals and animal products (in 2005 7.2% as share of total 
exports), while for the rest of SADC and the rest of the world the share has 
been relatively small.535 Hides and skins, leather products, and beef (under the 
beef trade protocol) benefit from preferential access to the European market.536 
73% of Botswana’s imports from SADC and 65% of Botswana’s total imports fall 
under a 0% tariff line because of the trade liberalisation processes. There are 
some higher tariffs (up to 30%) on 22.6% of total imports for Botswana for 
following goods: motor vehicles, tobacco, and prepared cereals.537 There are 
some import restrictions for agricultural products (e.g., maize, wheat, sorghum, 
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vegetables) to protect the infant horticultural industry and export restrictions 
(e.g., on beans, groundnuts, maize, millet) for food security reasons.538 
The analysis of Lesotho’s trade is somewhat restricted by a lack of data and a 
poor quality of existing trade data. The main imports come from SADC (82% of 
total imports in 2003), mostly South Africa; most exports go to NAFTA (79.1% of 
total exports in 2003); while SADC countries received 19.4% in 2003 and the 
EU 1.2%.539 
Lesotho imports mainly food items (from South Africa and the rest of the world), 
while the imports from SADC are relatively small and include mainly textiles and 
vegetables.540 The most important export product is clothing and textiles with 
82.2% of total exports in 2003 to the rest of the world (and 14.4% to South 
Africa).541 
With regard to agriculture, Lesotho exports prepared foodstuffs and beverages 
to South Africa (30.4% of total exports in 2003) and the rest of the world (5.9%) 
as well as vegetables (6.4% to South Africa, 1.2% to the rest of the world). 
Agricultural imports include vegetables from the rest of SADC (without South 
Africa) with 53.8% of total imports in 2003 and from the rest of the world (7.1%). 
Lesotho also imports prepared foods from South Africa (8.6% as share of total 
imports in 2003) and the rest of the world (7.1%).542 
The economic activities of Namibia are restricted to the extraction and 
processing of minerals, large-scale commercial livestock, and fishing; therefore, 
the economy is not largely diversified. For that reason, the government aims at 
export promotion and regional integration as well as diversification towards 
manufacturing and trade destinations.543 
For Namibia the SADC region is the most important source of imports and 
exports with South Africa being most important. 38.2% of exports (as share of 
total exports) go to the EU, 37.6% to SADC, and 10.3% to NAFTA. In 2004 
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imports come from the EU (7.1%), SADC (86.9%), and NAFTA (0.8%).544 The 
preferential access for beef and grapes is reflected in the trade destinations.545 
Fishing also depends on preferential access to the European market: 95% of 
fish is exported to EU and SAU markets.546 Main imports include machinery, 
vehicles, and chemical goods, while primary goods are exported. The most 
important agricultural imports are prepared foodstuff and beverages (11.2% 
from South Africa, 39.9% from the rest of SADC, and 10.8% from the rest of the 
world, as share of total imports in 2004). The most important agricultural exports 
are vegetables (34.6% to South Africa, 9.8% to the rest of SADC, and 20.7% to 
the rest of the world, as share of total exports in 2004).547 Moreover, processed 
fish and meat account for 60% of manufactured exports.548 
The most important trading partner for Swaziland is SADC, in particular, South 
Africa; most of the commodity imports come from SADC.549 91.46% of total 
imports come from SADC, about 7% from Asia, and 1.35% from the EU. SADC 
receives 75.4% of Swaziland’s exports, NAFTA 10.18%, and 1.75 the EU (as 
share of total exports in 2004).550 For Swaziland the most important import 
products are machinery, chemical products, mineral products, and vehicles.551 
While the most important export products are chemical products, textiles, paper 
products, and food and beverages.552 In their trade with the EU the most 
important products are beef and sugar under the trade protocols.553 More than 
92% of the sugar is exported: 50% to SACU, 30% to the EU, and 3% to the 
US.554 Moreover, the manufacturing sector is concentrated on sugar 
processing.555 Agricultural imports include vegetables and live animals from 
                                            
544 Kalaba, M.: Intra-SADC trade performance review 2006: Chapter 5: Namibia, 2006, p.108. 
545 Matomola/Dlamin: trade performance review: Namibia, 2005, p.113. 
546 WTO: Trade policy review: SACU: Namibia, 2003, p.188. 
547 Kalaba: Intra-SADC trade performance review: Namibia, 2006, p.111 et seq. 
548 WTO: Trade policy review: SACU: Namibia, 2003, p.186. 
549 Khumalo, V.: Intra-SADC trade performance review 2006: Chapter 7: Swaziland, 2007, 
p.164. 
550 Ibid., p.165. 
551 Ibid., p.169. 
552 Ibid., p.171. 
553 WTO: Trade policy review: SACU: Swaziland, 2003, p.318. 
554 Ibid., p.336. 
555 Ibid., p.340. 
 108
South Africa and the rest of SADC. Agricultural exports include mainly prepared 
foodstuff and beverages.556 
For Mozambique the most important trading partner is the SADC region, in 
particular, South Africa (electricity, gas), and the EU (aluminium, marine 
products). Most imports come from South Africa (43.3% of total imports in 
2005), while Mozambique receives foodstuff from Portugal and India. 
Mozambique exports aluminium to the Netherlands (59.7% of total exports in 
2005), and electricity and gas to South Africa (16.22%).557 Agricultural imports 
include prepared foodstuff and beverages from SADC (without South Africa 
18.7% of total imports in 2005) as well as live animals and animal products 
(23.7%). Agricultural exports include foodstuff and beverages exported to SADC 
(without South Africa 24.4% as share of total exports in 2005) and vegetables 
(20.3%).558 
In EU-ACP trade the most sensitive products have been regulated in special 
protocols since the 1970s. These protocols offer tariff-free market access, or 
other preferences, for certain quantities of sugar, bananas, beef and veal for 
ACP producers. 28 ACP countries have access to these protocols (Swaziland: 
sugar, Botswana/Namibia/Swaziland: beef), but due to the CAP reform prices 
decreased and competition increased. With regard to beef, health standards 
have reduced the volume of trade and increased costs: 
“The main point of concern here is that such standards will limit 
participation in the beef/veal industry of small scale farmers who will 
unlikely be able to effort the tagging costs.”559 
The EU tariff quota absorbs the entire supply capacity and often SADC 
countries fail to meet the quotas at all. Moreover, “protocols have rather caused 
increased dependence on a few export products to a few markets, and 
stimulated neither diversification nor supply to any significant extent.”560 
Small developing countries’ economies are often concentrated on export:  
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“This often forces them to open up their economies and participate in 
international trade on order to achieve economies of scale, but exports 
concentrated in one or two commodities make small countries vulnerable 
to price shocks.”561 
The ACP countries are also dependent on a few export products: in 21 of 51 
ACP countries four largest export products make more than 90% of total 
agricultural exports, but of course this differs between the ACP countries.562 
Farmers have the opportunity to improve traditional exports (to a better quality 
and niche markets) and to increase non-traditional exports. But, Hazell and 
Diao state that the “greatest potential for most African farmers still lies in 
domestic and regional markets for food staples”.563 “For Africa as a whole, the 
consumption of these foods accounts for about 70 percent of agricultural output 
[…] and is projected to double 2020.”564 
The diversification into high-value products is a opportunity but  
“A challenge for this ‘new’ high value agriculture is to make it pro-poor. Left 
to market forces alone, the major beneficiaries of the new high value 
agriculture will mostly be the larger and commercially oriented farms, and 
farms that are well connected to roads and markets.”565 
Smallholders are prevented from participating in higher-value markets because 
of: limited access to key resources, which inhibit investment and increased farm 
productivity; high transaction costs, which inhibit participation in alternative 
marketing channels; strict requirements that place smallholders at a competitive 
disadvantage relative to larger farmers; and complex transactions (within global 
value chains as well as agri-food standards).566 
Both at the supply side and at the demand side, family farming is confronted 
with constraints. At the supply side the weakness of support services, the weak 
farming infrastructure, and weak producer knowledge constrain smallholder 
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farmers. At the demand side there are constraints related to logistics and supply 
chain management (e.g., weak transport infrastructure, high transport costs for 
raw materials, etc.).567 Henson et al. state that it would be necessary to create 
“farmer knowledge about market opportunities and requirements and about 
effective and market acceptable production techniques” and the “division of 
public and private sector responsibilities consistent with the current ‘linking 
farmers to markets’ paradigm.”568 
More systematic constraints for family farming include insufficient assets, 
absent or incomplete markets, low productivity, a restricted access to land, and 
an insufficient infrastructure.569 Often, the farm sizes for family farming are too 
small to increase production, the degree of irrigation is too low, farmers depend 
on rain-fed agriculture, and many farmers are restricted to a single harvest per 
year. In many cases, arable land is unexplored. Moreover, low education levels 
and health dangers like Malaria and HIV/AIDS reduce the available work force 
and, together with low management skills, prevent smallholders from using 
more efficient production techniques. The fact that poor farmers often tend to 
use traditional techniques is caused by the high risks these farmers face. 
Environmental catastrophes, institutional threats (e.g., random acts of 
authority), weak relationships to other market participants, and the risk of 
fluctuating prices prevent farmers from increasing their productivity. The lack of 
a sufficient insurance market as well as incomplete markets with little 
(marketing) information contribute to the weak situation family farmers find 
themselves in. Moreover, small farmers often struggle with low productivity 
(e.g., due to the poor use of fertiliser) and the restricted access to land.  
The weak infrastructure increases the challenges for family farming due to a 
lack of road infrastructure; a weak marketing system; a lack of post-harvest 
storage systems and processing technologies; insecurity as a result of civil war; 
and finally insufficient government support.570  
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To adequately support agricultural production the following would be necessary: 
modernisation (of agricultural processing); agricultural-related development 
institutions to maintain research, risk management, and diversification; technical 
and financial assistance to meet adjustment costs; provision of credit for 
smallholders and processors; as well as an investment in infrastructure and 
education.571 
But Chiwandamira warns that “trade is not a goal in its own right; its objective to 
allow countries to enjoy a higher level of welfare than would be possible without 
it.”572 
Agriculture is restricted in BLNS countries and Mozambique in multiple ways as 
the following examples illustrate. For instance, Swaziland and Lesotho are 
constrained due to their geographical location as both countries are small, 
landlocked countries and Lesotho is characterised by a mountainous terrain.573 
Mozambique has to contend with climate conditions causing devastating 
flooding.574 The road system in Mozambique was destroyed after the civil war; 
and the transport infrastructure is weak in many other Southern African 
countries as well (e.g., Swaziland). Moreover, these countries struggle with poor 
physical infrastructure as far as electrical supply, telecommunications, water 
supply, and railways are concerned (as is in the case of Lesotho).575 Even more 
developed countries like Botswana struggle with limited irrigation though the 
potential for it is high.576 
This chapter showed that adjustment and liberalisation policies in Sub-Saharan 
Africa have not been successful and the economic outcome is weak. Although 
the international financial institutions improved their programmes, they only 
complemented adjustment policies rather than changing their approach. 
However, agriculture has changed in SSA since the 1980s as a result of internal 
factors (democratisation, end of wars, increased regional trade, HIV/AIDS, 
increased population pressure, and rapid urbanisation) and external factors like 
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preference erosion in trade with developed countries, a shift in supply chains 
with the emergence of supermarkets, the information revolution, and climate 
change.  
The debate about the role of agriculture in kick-starting economic growth and 
poverty reduction has shown that agriculture still plays an important role in SSA 
economies: the industrial sector is not ready to replace the importance of 
agriculture for economic development; small farms are crucial for efficient 
agricultural production and necessary to guarantee and improve the livelihoods 
of millions of family farmers in Southern Africa; the role of the public sector must 
not be underestimated in promoting agriculture as a driver of economic 
development.  
A simple transfer of the principles of the green revolution in Asia to the Southern 
African agriculture would not be recipe to promote agricultural production and 
economic development in SSA. Not only is there a the lack of adequate public 
support as well as weak institutions, but also restrictions due to environmental 
consequences of increasing agricultural production; decreasing world food 
prices; the higher agroecological diversity; the unequal distribution of water 
resources; old soils; and different geographical preconditions prevent SSA from 
a green revolution in the Asian style. The challenge to develop a more 
sustainable agriculture requires a more differentiated approach that focuses 
stronger on local knowledge and potential. This seems to be the most important 
task for the future. 
Regardless, agriculture plays an important role in the SADC countries although 
the share of agriculture in GDP varies between these countries. But agriculture 
is crucial to the high share of rural population in all SADC countries and the 
importance of agriculture for (informal) employment and food production. The 
SADC countries dispose of various farming systems and different geographical 
preconditions, but all are characterised by the dualism between large-scale 
commercial and small-scale agriculture that are both important, either for trade 
or for own food consumption. Agriculture in Southern Africa struggles with 
various constraints restricting the trade potential and the maintenance of 
livelihoods for family farmers.  
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Despite growing South-South trade the EU is still one of the most important 
trading partners for SSA and SADC countries in particular. Market access to the 
EU is crucial for SADC countries, in particular, the preferential access for 
agricultural goods though food industry and other agricultural imports from the 
EU are important as well. Trade between SADC countries and EU is still 
characterised by SADC countries exporting unprocessed goods and receiving 
manufactured products from the EU. 
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5 Agriculture in EPA Negotiations 
In general, the interim EPAs (IEPAs) were agreed upon at the end of 2007. 
However, in African ACP countries the negotiations towards comprehensive 
EPAs continued into 2008 and 2009. 
There still are many contentious issues and it is unclear if a renegotiation of 
IEPAs, which are yet to be signed, will take place or if these contentious issues 
will be renegotiated towards comprehensive EPAs. Therefore, some details that 
will be analysed in the following section may change during further negotiations 
and their implications on agriculture may change accordingly. Due to a low 
degree of transparency in the EPA negotiations the state of play regarding 
specific provisions is not publicly known.  
But the outcome of the IEPAs at the end of 2007, including a few direct and 
many rather indirect provisions, will determine the potential impact on 
agriculture and show the degree of importance agriculture has played in the 
negotiations.  
First of all the negotiating process of ACP countries and the SADC IEPA group 
in particular will be illustrated (chapter 5.1 and 5.2). In a next step the market 
access of the ACP countries to the European market will be analysed (5.3.1.). 
Then, the provisions that affect the market opening of SADC IEPA countries 
(5.3.2) followed by consequences for regional integration (5.3.3), government 
revenue (5.3.4), and services (5.3.5) are ascertained. In a last step the analysis 
of the outcome of EPA negotiations will be provided (5.4).  
5.1 Negotiating Process in General 
During the 1990s the Lomé incompatibility with the WTO regulations became 
more and more an important issue. Furthermore, the developmental 
effectiveness of the Lomé framework has been questioned: the ACP countries 
were still dependent on the export of a few raw materials and the share of 
imports from ACP countries in total European imports declined constantly.577 In 
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1994 the European Commission initialled the debate about the ACP-EU (trade) 
relations when discussing the funding for Lomé IV and introduced political and 
economic conditionalisation.578 Kappel states that Europe has signalled the 
intention to change the relationship while the ACP countries did not envisage 
substantial changes in the relations with Europe. In 1996 the European 
Commission published the “Green Paper on relations between the EU and the 
ACP countries on the eve of the 21st century”579 and proceeded with the debate 
about a reform of the EU-ACP partnership. The EU considered four options: the 
status quo with some changes, the integration into GSP, a uniform reciprocity 
(e.g., ACP EU FTA), or differentiated reciprocity (various FTAs with ACP 
regions).580 The European Commission preferred the introduction of reciprocity, 
preferably within the fourth option to accommodate the different development 
needs of the ACP group. Reciprocity became the most important principle within 
the EPA negotiations though the European Commission introduced the principle 
of asymmetry to meet the development needs of the ACP countries. The ACP 
countries opposed the introduction of reciprocity and, for instance, in the 
Libreville Declaration, called for the maintenance of non-reciprocal trade 
preferences and market access as well as the maintenance of the preferential 
commodity protocols. 
The European side prevailed. Faber and Orbie list several reasons for the 
outcome: the “asymmetric power relationship”581 between Europe and the ACP 
countries, the hope of ACP countries to weaken the principle of reciprocity 
through the introduction of a strong asymmetry, to receive development aid, and 
a desire for deeper regional integration.582 In 2000 the Cotonou Partnership 
Agreement came to a compromise with regard to the introduction of reciprocity. 
During the negotiations towards reciprocal trade agreements a waiver – a 
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permission to diverge from WTO rules for a certain period of time – allowed the 
continuation of preferential trade relations until the end of 2007. 
The Cotonou Partnership Agreement is based on five pillars: the introduction of 
the political dimension, the involvement of civil society and private sector, 
poverty reduction, the rationalisation of financial instruments, and a new 
economic and trade agreement. Since the beginning of the negotiations on 
these new economic and trade agreements, that is the Economic Partnership 
Agreements (EPAs), the focus of EU-ACP cooperation focused almost solely on 
the trade pillar.  
 
Table 6: EPAs in Cotonou Partnership Agreement583 
Cotonou Partnership 
Agreement Articles 
Cotonou Partnership Agreement – Provisions on 
EPAs 
1 Objectives: eradication of poverty, sustainable development, integration into world economy 
2 Fundamental principles: equality/ownership, participation, dialogue, differentiation/regionalisation 
28 General approach: regional integration  
34:1 Objectives of trade cooperation: integration into world economy, regional integration, diversification 
36:1 Agreement of parties to arrange FTA 
36:2 Gradually introduction with a preparatory period 
36:3 Non-reciprocal trade preferences persist during preparatory period 
36:4 Review in context of WTO compatibility, benefits, sugar protocol 
37:1 Non-reciprocal trade preferences persist no longer than December 2007 
37:3 Capacity-building during preparatory period 
37:5 ACP position as time base for negotiations 
37:6 Alternatives to EPAs 
37:7 Asymmetric trade liberalisation with regard to development needs 
37:8 Cooperation with WTO 
 
In 2002 the phasing of negotiations proposed a first negotiating phase until 
September 2003, which would have been conducted at all-ACP levels and 
subsequent negotiations at regional levels. In the first EU-ACP meeting in 
October 2002 various contentious issues emerged. From the outset the ACP 
                                            
583 These articles of the Cotonou Partnership Agreement can be found in the Annex (Chapter 8). 
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countries criticised the lack of additional funding584 and there has been a debate 
about the development dimension of the trade agreements: according to the 
European Commission the Cotonou Partnership Agreement deals with 
development issues while EPAs are limited to the trade pillar of the EU-ACP 
relations.585 According to the ACP countries trade liberalisation and regional 
integration are necessary; however EPAs lack sufficient conditions to achieve 
regional integration, the integration into the world market, and the eradication of 
poverty. According to them EPAs would have to address supply-side constraints 
and provide additional financial support to deal with adjustment challenges and 
revenue losses.586 
Another contentious issue has been the meaning and breadth of the first phase 
of negotiations. There were several definitions given: the first phase as time to 
prepare for substantial negotiations or as a period of time to await the WTO 
negotiations outcome. In the eyes of the European Commission the first phase 
should be short in order to have a quick start into regional negotiations. 
According to the ACP countries the first phase was meant to define principles 
and objectives as well as issues of common interest. ACP countries preferred a 
legally binding agreement at the end of phase 1 to dispose of guidelines for the 
second negotiating phase while for the European Commission the Cotonou 
Partnership Agreement has been a sufficient legal basis for the regional 
negotiations. A compromise between ACP and EU has been found in a joint 
declaration in October 2003 that stated that the joint report would “serve as a 
point of reference, and provide guidance for the negotiations to be conducted at 
regional level.”587 The report listed in detail the convergences and divergences 
of the previous negotiations and defined the modalities for further discussions 
on contentious issues. 
Regarding agriculture it stated: 
“crucial importance of agriculture in pursuing the objectives laid down in 
the Cotonou Agreement, of contributing to foster the smooth and gradual 
                                            
584 Bilal/Julian: EPA negotiations update, in: TNI, Vol.2, No.1, 2003, p.3. 
585 Van Hove/Julian: EPA negotiations update, in: TNI, Vol.2, No.2, 2003, p.6. 
586 Bilal: EPAs process: Key issues and development perspective, 2006, p.22. 
587 ACP Council of Ministers/European Commission: Joint declaration of the second ACP-EC 
meeting at ministerial level, 2003. 
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integration of the ACP States into the world economy, with due regard for 
their political choices and development priorities, thereby promoting their 
sustainable development and contributing to poverty eradication in the 
ACP countries.“, and address diversification, rural development, 
environment, SPS, commodity protocols, divergence concerning 
sequencing of liberalisation.”588 
In general, the negotiations began slowly at the end of 2002 and in April 2003 a 
lack of progress could be stated. Bilal and Julian claim that  
“Of the progress made during the first phase of negotiations, and its 
outcomes, will depend not only the nature of the second phase of the 
negotiations and ultimately the format of EPAs, but also the ability the ACP 
group to address issues of common interests and to preserve the ACP 
cohesion.”589 
Besides the already mentioned contentious issues the lack of the negotiating 
capacity of the ACP countries has been a serious problem and van Hove and 
Julian reiterates the fact that often trade policy has not been a priority in some 
ACP countries.590 
Despite the continuation of negotiations at different levels until mid-2003 ACP 
Ministers raised concern over the slow progress of the negotiations. With regard 
to the debate about additional funding the ACP National and Regional 
Authorising Officers called in the so-called Brussels Declaration for 
improvements in the disbursement of EDF resources and an improved 
participation in EDF funds discussions.591 A further controversial issue has been 
the debate about WTO regulations. ACP countries requested for a revision of 
Article XXIV stating that it should take into account SDT, the different 
development levels of the ACP countries in the definition of “substantially all the 
trade” , the time frame as well as the concept of reciprocity in general.592  
Also under debate is whether agriculture should be negotiated under the market 
access offer – the EC position – or if discussions on agriculture should go 
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592 Julian/Van Hove: EPA negotiations update, in: TNI, Vol.2, No.4, 2003, p.6. 
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beyond market access and deal with issues like production, supply capacity, 
and diversification.593 
Despite the slow progress at all-ACP level, the Central African and the West 
African regions launched negotiations in October 2003 which created tensions 
among ACP countries because other states feared negative consequences for 
the all-ACP level. West and Central African representatives contrariwise feared 
that all-ACP conditions might negatively influence the regional negotiations.594 
The European Commission proposed that contentious issues – addressing ACP 
supply-side constraints, measures necessary to support regional integration, 
and the question of additional resources to allow ACP countries to benefit from 
market access – should be discussed in the regional EPA negotiations.595 
At the beginning of the EPA negotiating process in 2002/2003 many contentious 
issues became evident though it has not been clear if these controversial 
debates were rhetoric or serious. With regard to Bilals and Julians statement 
one could say that the ACP countries have not been successful in making their 
point. Not only their weak negotiating capacity but also the heterogeneity 
among the large group of ACP countries contributed to their relatively weak 
performance in this first phase of negotiations. Moreover, it is remarkable that 
many of the contentious issues of this early stage remained contentious up to 
now, for instance, the question of additional support. 
A significant delay in negotiations emerged at this early stage and the first 
phase could not have been concluded as foreseen in September 2003. A new 
timetable extended the first phase until August 2004 and from September 2004 
until December 2005 substantial negotiations should have taken place with 
2007 as the year to finalise the negotiations.  
In 2004 the negotiating process continued at all-ACP level (with meetings of the 
so-called ACP Technical Follow-up Group) and at regional levels. In the Central 
and West African region since October 2003 and in the remaining ACP regions 
the launch of regional negotiations occurred in the course of 2004. Technical 
negotiations started in the first half of 2005 and this phase of negotiations has 
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been seen as critical with regard to the question of how the European 
Commission will deal with the ACP proposals.596 
In January 2004 the Joint Parliamentary Assembly (JPA) of European and ACP 
Parliamentarians discussed the inclusion of the so-called Singapore issues but 
did not come to an agreement.597 Discussions about the support for regional 
integration, the question of additional funding and simplified implementation 
procedures continued. While the ACP countries requested again for additional 
financial support the European Commission answered that ACP countries 
overestimate the question of additional funding and that EPAs will improve the 
economic environment and create private investment; thus, providing increased 
funding.598 Among EU member states the UK pushed for a more development-
friendly approach in March 2005 but observers argued that “the paper was 
intended more for domestic use to appease NGOs during the recent UK 
elections.”599 
The new trade Commissioner Mandelson tried to convince EU member states 
to at least maintain the level of funding in the next envelope (2007-13). But due 
to disagreement on the overall EU budget the EU has not been able to offer the 
next EDF for ACP countries.600 The possible gap in financial support at a critical 
moment of the negotiations and against the background of the ACP’s insistence 
on additional financial resources did not move the negotiations forward. 
The ACP countries’ declaration of the Council of Ministers meeting in Brussels 
in June 2005 expressed  
“grave concern that the negotiations have not proceeded in a satisfactory 
manner having failed to start addressing most issues of interest and 
concern to the ACP regions, in particular the development dimension and 
regional integration priorities”.601 
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Other critical points were: the necessary modification of WTO rules, the 
definition of the development dimension and additional resources “to address 
supply side constraints and consider how anticipated revenue losses incurred 
as a result of liberalization.”602 The ACP countries observed a “disconnect 
between the public statements of the Commissioners of Trade and 
Development on the development aspect of EPAs and the actual position 
adopted during EPA negotiating sessions”603 and requested for increased 
coherence of trade and development policies. 
Within the EU there has been an increased awareness of the ACP concerns: 
EU member states – UK and other like-minded states – discussed GATT Article 
XXIV, regional integration, rules of origin, and asymmetric reciprocity. It was 
concluded to provide a bimonthly update to the Article 133 Committee and 
member states’ officials when meetings will take place.604  
In December 2005 ACP countries became “increasingly vocal about their 
dissatisfaction with the EC’s capacity to respond to their concerns on EPA 
development issues.”605 Moreover, a Commonwealth study put the adjustment 
costs at 9.1 billion Euro over ten years.606 
In the first half of 2006 the debate about the contentious issues continued; the 
timing and pace of the liberalisation process has been controversial, the 
approach for tariff liberalisation and market access, an effective funding 
mechanism, and the already mentioned development dimension. In a speech to 
the ACP-EU Joint Ministerial Trade Committee Mandelson highlighted that the 
European Commission aims at “carefully programming the liberalisation”,607 to 
address non-tariff barriers, deliver better services, introduce competition policy 
and deeper regional integration. With regard to imminent fiscal losses he stated 
that “most studies are highly theoretical. They assume immediate and complete 
liberalisation, and ignore the economic benefits of reform.” Moreover, we “can 
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ensure there is no sharp drop in Government income by timing and phasing 
tariff reductions.”608 As far as the financial support is concerned Mandelson 
explained that  
“It is not possible to contractualise finance into an EPA with no end date. 
[..] The way forward is to identify the commitments you will make in the 
EPAs, and the financial needs. I believe the money is there.”609 
In October 2006 the EU Trade and Development Ministers concluded to link 
EPAs with the Aid for Trade (AfT) strategy; additional resources could be 
provided for trade development but not to address the development 
dimension.610 The AfT funding includes the commitment to increase collective 
EU trade related assistance to 2 billion Euro annually by 2010 with 1 billion Euro 
from the Community and 1 billion Euro from the member states; 50% of these 
resources will be available for ACP countries. 
Throughout 2005/2006 there has been a discussion about the review of the 
EPA negotiations. In January Mandelson proposed a review mechanism and 
the Cotonou Partnership Agreement states in Article 37.4 that a comprehensive 
review of the EPAs is necessary in 2006.611 This review could have been an 
opportunity to provide alternatives to EPAs to the ACP states as Article 37.6 of 
the Cotonou Partnership Agreement foresees. These alternatives must be WTO 
compatible and must not leave the countries no worse off than the current 
situation under the Cotonou Partnership Agreement. In the light of the previous 
negotiations the review should not have only focused on trade issues but also 
on the development dimension.612 The review process was launched in July 
2006 in each EPA region and included “structure, process and substance of the 
negotiations”; it was foreseen to be concluded at the end of 2006 and should 
have been considered in mid-2007.613 The European Commission did not offer 
any alternatives. Mandelson stated repeatedly that  
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“If we have no new trade regime in place by the end of this year in each of 
the regions – and that means effectively initialling an agreement by around 
the end of October – the Commission has no legal option but to offer the 
region concerned GSP preferences.”614  
This option would not leave ACP countries no worse off than under the Cotonou 
Partnership agreement. 
Moreover, Mandelson stated that  
“There is certainly no Plan B that offers either the same development 
benefits or can improve on ACP market access to Europe. The WTO 
waiver covering the Cotonou preferences expires at the end of the year 
and the EU can no longer continue these trade arrangements. In theory we 
could fall back on the GSP system, but this would be a big step backwards 
in terms of preferential access and lost opportunities for regional 
integration for almost all ACP countries. That’s why there is such a clear 
commitment to get an EPA system in place by the start of 2008.”615 
Admittedly, ACP countries did not request for the provision of alternatives 
officially until the end of 2007.  
2005 and 2006 were affected by the divergence on substantial issues between 
the negotiating partners and at the end of 2006 many issues had not been 
resolved. But the deadline – the expiry of the waiver at the end of 2007 – was 
looming and pressure on EU and ACP countries was increasing. In 2007 it 
became necessary to achieve significant progress in the trade negotiations and 
to clarify the controversial issues.  
In the beginning of 2007 at an ACP-EU Joint Ministerial Trade Committee 
(JMTC) meeting ACP Ministers again requested for the inclusion of measures to 
support capacity building and competitiveness as well as binding financial 
commitments of the EU and a rapid disbursement mechanism. Development 
Commissioner Michel and former Trade Commissioner Mandelson indicated 
that additional funds could be discussed in conjunction with the commitments of 
ACP countries with regard to trade liberalisation and trade-related issues. ACP 
Ministers also called for a notification of the delay of the negotiations at the 
WTO so that the disruption of trade with the expiring of the waiver could be 
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prevented.616 But ACP Ministers emphasised that they remained committed to 
the EPA negotiations.617 
In April 2007 the European Commission offered a duty-free, quota-free market 
access for all goods (including agricultural goods except of rice and sugar for 
which it offered transition periods) from the ACP countries. The DFQF access 
was foreseen to be applied as soon as the EPAs were signed.618 In May the 
GAERC (General Affairs and External Relations Council, Council of the EU) 
meeting endorsed the DFQF offer of the European Commission.619 
The ACP countries considered the EC market access offer and in general 
welcomed this offer. But many countries were concerned with regard to certain 
products (sugar, banana, and rice); they raised questions on the length of 
transition periods, the product coverage, exclusions for sensitive products, and 
rules of origin. The Commission answered that these concerns would only be 
discussed if ACP countries have made a liberalisation offer.620 
In the autumn of 2007 the situation became more and more critical. The 
deadline approached and negotiations were still far from finalised. In a speech 
Mandelson warned that negotiations were at a turning point: “We stand in these 
negotiations on the edge – and whether this is the edge of a cliff or of success 
the next few weeks will tell.”621 If ACP countries would not agree on an EPA 
they would fall back on GSP which is less favourable with regard to the market 
access to the EU than the Cotonou Partnership Agreement (LDCs would be 
able to join the EBA initiative with much better conditions). 
Mandelson highlighted that 
“This deadline is not a bluff or some negotiating tactic invented in Brussels. 
It is an external reality created in the WTO in Geneva. We have given a 
binding multilateral commitment that was set and agreed seven years 
ago.”622 
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In September ACP countries requested for transitional measures to avoid trade 
disruption.623 
While EU and Caribbean had agreed on two thirds of the text the situation in the 
Pacific region was different (but less urgent due to the limited trade between EU 
and the Pacific region). The African regions had not made marked progress and 
at the end of September it still was not clear if they were going to conclude an 
EPA on time. 
In November 2007 the European Commission offered a two-step approach to 
the ACP countries. Still aiming at comprehensive EPAs the European 
Commission accepted that not all of the EPA regions were able to conclude full 
EPAs until the end of 2007. Therefore, the Commission offered these regions 
WTO-compatible market access arrangements to avoid trade disruptions as a 
result of the expiring of the waiver from the first January 2008. Though regional 
integration was still a central goal in the EPA negotiations the European 
Commission further adumbrated that arrangements with sub-regions or even 
single countries could have been concluded. These arrangements were seen as 
“stepping stone to a full EPA”.624 The DFQF offer made by the Commission in 
April would be in force for those countries that concluded an Interim EPA 
(IEPA).625 Countries that were not able or willing to initial comprehensive or 
Interim EPAs would fall back on GSP or, in case of the 42 LDCs, the EBA 
initiative that allows a preferential market access to the EU (but in case of the 
GSP on less favourable conditions).626  
Until the end of 2007 only the Caribbean region initialled a comprehensive EPA 
including services and trade-related issues. In the Pacific region, only Papua 
New Guinea and Fiji initialled a goods-only agreement.  
In SSA the regions were relatively fragmented at the end of 2007. In the West 
African region only Cote d’Ivoire and Ghana initialled agreements in December 
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2007. The only other non-LDC, Nigeria, did not initial an IEPA and has asked to 
be included in the GSP plus scheme but the Commission refused to do so. The 
LDCs in the region opted to join the EBA initiative.  
In Central Africa only Cameroon (as non-LDC) initialled an IEPA in December 
2007, Gabon and Congo-Brazzaville (the other non-LDCs) were expected to 
follow.  
In Eastern Africa a sub-region, the East African Community (EAC), comprising 
of Burundi, Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania, and Uganda, concluded a goods-only 
agreement, among them are LDCs like Burundi, Rwanda, Tanzania, and 
Uganda. Other East African countries initialled an IEPA individually: Seychelles 
and Zimbabwe in November 2007, Mauritius, Comoros and Madagascar in 
December 2007 and Zambia followed in October 2008.  
The Southern African region has IEPAs with different market access schedules: 
Mozambique has a separate market access schedule while Botswana, Lesotho, 
and Swaziland offered a common one (in November 2007); and Namibia 
initialled the IEPA (in December 2007) but has not offered a market access 
schedule yet. Once again, some LDCs opted to join the IEPA agreement 
(Lesotho and Mozambique). South Africa opposed the IEPA but has a secured 
market access to the European market within its own trade agreement with the 
EU, the TDCA (Trade, Development and Cooperation Agreement). 
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Table 7: State of play EPA Regions (as of April 2009) 
Central 
Africa 
Eastern 
African 
Community 
(EAC) 
Eastern 
and 
Southern 
Africa 
Southern 
Africa 
West 
Africa Caribbean° Pacific 
Cameroon Burundi* Comoros* Angola* Benin* Antigua & Barbuda 
Cook 
Islands 
Central 
African 
Republic* 
Kenya Djibouti* Botswana Burkina Faso* 
The 
Bahamas Fiji Islands 
Chad* Rwanda* Eritrea* Lesotho* Cape Verde (x) Barbados Kiribati* 
Congo 
Brazaville Uganda* Ethiopia* Mozambique* 
Cote 
d'Ivoire Belize 
Marshall 
Islands 
Equatorial 
Guinea* Tanzania* Malawi* Namibia Gambia* Dominica 
Federated 
States of 
Micronesia 
Gabon  Mauritius South Africa Ghana Dominican Republic Nauru 
Sao Tomé 
& Principé*  Madagascar* Swaziland Guinea* Grenada Niue 
DR 
Congo*  Seychelles  
Guinea 
Bissau* Guyana Palau 
  Sudan*  Liberia* Haiti* Papua New Guinea 
  Zambia*  Mali* Jamaica Samoa* 
  Zimbabwe  Mauritania* Montserrat Solomon Islands* 
    Niger* Saint Lucia  Timor Leste* 
    Nigeria 
St. 
Christopher 
& Nevis 
Tonga 
    Senegal* 
St. Vincent 
& 
Grenadines 
Tuvalu* 
    Sierra Leone* Suriname Vanuatu* 
    Togo* Trinidad & Tobago   
bold = IEPA/EPA initialled 
bold/underlined = IEPA/EPA signed 
* LDC 
(x) Cap Verde is no LDC anymore but is allowed to export under EBA for a transition period of 3 years 
° only region with comprehensive EPA, all other agreements interim EPAs 
 
The question why some LDC countries in Eastern and Southern Africa joined 
the IEPAs though they have the option to choose the EBA initiative for their 
market access into the EU might have different answers. One reason might be 
the attempt to maintain already existing regional integration efforts like within 
EAC. Another factor might be the hope to receive funds from the EDF and 
additional resources – for a long time it had been unclear if the EDF and 
additional funding is only granted to countries with IEPAs/EPAs. Moreover, the 
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stricter rules of origin in the EBA initiative could have motivated some LDCs to 
join the IEPA. At last, the preferences in the EBA initiative are unilaterally 
granted and not negotiated; therefore, they could be withdrawn anytime. 
Internationally and Europe-wide NGOs criticised that EPAs were no instrument 
to foster development and regional integration but rather FTAs pushing for 
European interests. Many NGOs blamed the European Commission for 
applying inappropriate pressure on ACP countries to sign the agreements. 
Contrariwise, Mandelson blamed the NGOs for an aggressive campaign.627 But 
aside from the quality of NGO campaigning Stevens et al. list plenty of ACP 
representatives’ statements that complain of the harsh European Commission 
approach and how it was contrary to the spirit of partnership. For instance, Sir 
John Kaputin, Secretary General of the ACP Group, stated:  
“The decisions of ACP States were driven by sovereign national trade 
interests. Unfortunately, in some cases, their position was at variance with 
the regional approach and compromised the solidarity of the region. 
Therefore, I can describe the process towards the initialling as one fraught 
with panic, confusion and disagreements at the national and regional 
level.”628 
Several examples from the Pacific region, the West African negotiations, and 
the Caribbean negotiating process show that the European Commission 
exerted pressure to conclude the EPAs: it is stated that in Western African 
negotiations in October 2007 the Commission threatened to suspend or delay 
EDF programming and increase tariffs to GSP level.629 Kenyan civil society 
organisations blame the Commission for excluding NGOs from the negotiations 
and providing information on meetings at the last minute; thereby, making 
participation difficult.630 
Moreover, the pressure of the European Commission has not only been 
enormous but the agreement on the IEPAs took place in haste. It is reported 
that end of 2007 Ghana, Cameroon, and Cote d’Ivoire have agreed on the basis 
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of draft texts that the Commission proposed at the last minute. Stevens et al. 
state that  
“Some interim agreements reportedly have never been checked by ACP 
technical experts and were agreed on only at political level. This saved 
time and in some countries it may have been the only way to conclude an 
agreement in time. Yet in some cases this has led to a severe lack of 
ownership of both the negotiation process and its outcome.”631 
In January 2008 the IEPAs and the Caribbean comprehensive EPA were 
applied provisionally, their signing was scheduled for 2008 as well as the 
notification at the WTO. Moreover, the ACP countries committed themselves 
within the IEPAs to conclude comprehensive EPAs in 2008 (the so-called 
rendezvous clause with a concrete date for the finalisation of negotiations can 
be found in all IEPAs except of the EAC and ESA IEPA). Barroso, President of 
the European Commission, promised the ACP countries at the EU-Africa 
summit in December 2007 to initial a high-level meeting to discuss EPA 
implications and the option of renegotiation of contentious issues.632 But this 
meeting has not been scheduled at all. The debate about the opportunity to 
renegotiate the IEPAs continued. The European Commission’s view was that 
there would not be any renegotiation of the IEPAs: “any suggestion of 
renegotiation of these agreements will bring a renewed threat of legal 
uncertainty and risk unravelling everything we have achieved.”633  
On the contrary, the European Parliament stated that 
“nothing in those agreements prohibits the parties from renegotiating 
certain elements already agreed to in the interim agreement during the on-
going negotiations for a final EPA”.634 
The ACP Ministers from Africa have called for a renegotiation of contentious 
issues like the definition of “substantially all the trade”, transition periods, export 
taxes and other issues within the negotiation towards a comprehensive EPA.635 
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The GAERC meeting in May 2008 stated that the key objectives still were 
“EPAs with comprehensive regional coverage and wide scope” but that there is 
a “need for a flexible approach” and “that ACP countries and regions that so 
wish could draw, if appropriate, on provisions agreed by others in their EPA 
negotiation.”636 The GAERC statement added that not only AfT funding will be 
available but also regionally-owned funds should be explored if ACP countries 
were interested.637 The ACP-EU Council of Ministers meeting in June repeated 
this call; the Commission answered that it will make the effort to change issues 
of concern in the comprehensive EPAs but could not guarantee all ACP 
demands.638 
Furthermore, a rapid signing of the agreements has still not been possible due 
to delays in the European Union to translate the agreements in all 23 EU 
languages. Signing has been postponed and scheduled for the end of 2008 or 
the beginning of 2009.639  
In September 2008 the global circumstances changed and caused a change in 
the mood of ACP countries. In the face of the emerging financial and economic 
crisis countries tend to avoid economic and political instability. Julian et al. 
analyse that rising prices have made it difficult for governments to provide social 
provisions. Moreover, the ACP countries “also fear it will be difficult to increase 
competitiveness in order to benefit from greater trade liberalisation.”640 The lack 
of signing can be accredited to the translation problems in the EU641 but also 
the reluctance of ACP governments that fear to loose policy space with the 
hastily concluded IEPAs. However, the EU still is able to apply pressure due to 
the opportunity to withdraw provisions of the IEPAs unilaterally so it would be 
likely that ACP countries will further negotiate towards a full EPA.642 
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In October 2008 the ACP countries listed the controversial issues in view of the 
upcoming ACP summit which still included definitions of “substantially all the 
trade”, financial integration, and some more specific provisions like safeguard 
clauses and rules of origin.643 It is rumoured that significant changes have been 
made with regard to key provisions but up to now nothing is notified publicly.644 
In October 2008 Mandelson was replaced by Catherine Ashton (Mandelson 
joined the UK government); Julian analyses that  
“Though EU trade policy remains unchanged, the new Commissioner 
raises hope in the ACP and the European Parliament that she will be more 
transparent, inclusive and receptive to their views than her 
predecessor.”645 
The first meeting between Ashton and ACP Ambassadors produced a positive 
response but concrete effects remain to be seen:646 Moreover, 
“ACP Ministers stressed that the Commissioner’s political will must to be 
translated into action in EPA technical level negotiations. All participants 
agreed on the need to monitor EPA implementation.”647 
At the ACP Heads of State and Government summit in Accra in October a high-
level meeting with EU member states was envisaged, the date remained to be 
scheduled.648  
While EU member states called again for more flexibility of the European 
Commission the ACP countries repeated their commitment to conclude 
comprehensive EPAs provided that controversial issues will be addressed.649 
As before, the year 2008 ended with huge delays in the EPA negotiating 
process. Only the Caribbean agreement and the agreement of Cote d’Ivoire 
were signed in October and November 2008 respectively. The other IEPAs 
were still waiting for their translation. Many contentious issues remained 
unsolved though now controversial issues were more concrete and related to 
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concrete provisions in the IEPAs. But many controversial issues remained 
constant – the amount of liberalisation commitments and financial assistance as 
well as services and trade-related issues. In 2009 the signing of the IEPAs is 
expected and, after signing, the ratification process in ACP countries as well as 
in Europe. In March the European Parliament discussed the ratification of 
Caribbean EPA; the parliamentarians gave the green light to the new trade deal 
but insisted on the granting of aid for trade (AfT) and the inclusion of a review 
clause.650 In 2009 the negotiations towards comprehensive EPAs should be 
concluded according to the trading partners. Meanwhile, the IEPAs are applied 
provisionally. 
In January 2009 Cameroon signed its IEPA while negotiations in the Western 
African region continued. While the list of sensitive products exempted from 
liberalisation is progressing and the provisions on trade in goods are near 
completion there are still negotiations on rules of origin, trade in services, and 
trade-related issues.651 In the Eastern African region the signing of the ESA 
countries is expected for April 2009; open issues are questions concerning 
trade in goods, services, trade related issues and the development matrix. EAC 
is still negotiating outstanding issues, among others: trade related issues, 
development cooperation, and services. The Caribbean is dealing with the 
ratification process and is preparing an implementation road map.652  
 
Table 8: Timetable Launch of Negotiations and Signing of EPAs (as of 
April 2009) 
Regions Negotiations launched 
Agreements 
initialled 
Agreements 
signed 
All-ACP level 27 Sept. 2002 - - 
West African region 
- Cote d’Ivoire 
- Ghana 
6 Oct. 2003  
7 Dec. 2007 
13 Dec. 2007 
 
26 Nov. 2008 
 
                                            
650 European Parliament resolution the Economic Partnership Agreement between the 
Cariforum States, of the one part, and the European Community and its Member States, of the 
other part. 2009. 
651 ECDPM: State of EPA negotiations in January 2009. Briefing note, 2009, p.4. 
652 Ibid., p.6. 
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East African region 
- EAC653 
- ESA: 
 Seychelles, Zimbabwe 
 Mauritius 
 Comoros, Madagascar 
 Zambia654 
7 Feb. 2004  
27 Nov. 2007 
 
28 Nov. 2007 
4 Dec. 2007 
11 Dec. 2007 
30 Oct. 2008 
 
Southern African region 
- Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland, 
Mozambique 
- Namibia 
8 July 2004  
23 Nov. 2007 
 
11 Dec. 2007 
 
Central African region 
- Cameroon 
4 Oct. 2003  
17 Dec. 2007 
 
15 Jan. 2009 
Pacific region 
- Papua New Guinea, Fiji 
10 Sept. 2004  
29 Nov. 2007 
 
Caribbean region 16 April 2004 16 Dec. 2007 15 Jan. 2008 
 
5.2 Negotiating Process SADC 
Within the SADC EPA configuration Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, 
Mozambique, Swaziland, and Tanzania negotiated at the beginning while South 
Africa had an observer status.655 Five countries are SACU members: Botswana, 
Lesotho, Namibia, Swaziland, and South Africa. It is important to note that 
Angola, Mozambique, and Tanzania are not SACU members. Other SADC 
countries negotiated in the ESA (Eastern and Southern Africa) configuration, 
namely, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. The 
Democratic Republic of Congo negotiated with the Central African group. 
Tanzania negotiated both under the Southern African and the Eastern African 
negotiating configuration and decided at the end of 2007 to conclude an IEPA 
with the EAC (East African Community: Burundi, Kenya, Uganda, Rwanda, and 
Tanzania).656  
The regional preparations already began in the all-ACP phase for SADC, 
COMESA, and ECOWAS. In August 2003 before SADC countries agreed on a 
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negotiating approach they ordered studies on services, Sanitary and 
Phytosanitary Measures (SPS), and standards. In November the SADC Trade 
Ministers agreed to develop a roadmap for negotiations and guidelines for 
negotiations; they intended to launch SADC regional negotiations in March 
2004. The guidelines stated EPAs should support rather than replace the 
existing regional integration efforts.657 
Due to the lack of experience in trade negotiations – for most countries trade 
has not been a political priority – and the weak resource base of the responsible 
ministries, the SADC Secretariat in March 2004 requested for additional staff to 
coordinate the negotiations. But low capacity in the SADC member states and 
high costs, for instance, travelling, remained a serious problem.658 
During the summer 2004 the negotiations on the roadmap continued, in July 
2004 the roadmap was agreed upon and the negotiations were launched. The 
roadmap defines the objectives of the trade cooperation by stating: 
“sustainable development of SADC countries, their smooth and gradual 
integration into the global economy, and to contribute to the eradication of 
poverty. More specifically, the SADC – EC EPA will promote sustained 
growth, contribute to enhancing the production and supply capacity of the 
SADC countries, foster the structural transformation of the SADC 
economies and their diversification and support regional integration 
initiatives in the SADC region.“659 
Several principles have been defined: the development orientation, the effort to 
strengthen regional integration, the compliance with WTO rules, SDT, 
sustainability, legitimacy and transparency, and adjustment. Furthermore, these 
negotiations will “preserve and improve the current ACP and EBA preferences 
into the EU market for SADC exports, and all SADC EPA Member States 
should be better off following EPA negotiations.“660 
The institutional setting with a three-layer structure was agreed upon. The first 
is the Ministerial level, the second level consists of Senior Officials and 
Brussels-based Ambassadors, and the third level is the SADC Trade 
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Negotiation Forum (TNF) whose members are member states’ officials from 
trade/industry departments, representatives of the private sector and other civil 
society actors. Chief negotiators (at the Ministerial level, Botswana’s Minister of 
Trade and Industry) will lead negotiations.661 
In October 2004 SADC countries discussed priority areas of the negotiations 
that should be clarified at a meeting in December. The December meeting 
between SADC Ambassadors and EU Senior Officials agreed on a framework 
document, a work plan, and negotiating groups along certain lines.662 
A second meeting in April 2005 discussed overlapping memberships, the 
question of reciprocity, and SDT. Moreover, the inclusion of rules of origin, trade 
facilitation, and customs cooperation was up for debate with the result that 
negotiations should be open for the inclusion of these issues.663 
In July the trading partners agreed on the inclusion of the following issues: 
development dimension, regional integration, SPS and TBT, market access 
(agriculture, fisheries, non-agricultural goods), rules of origin, trade facilitation 
and customs cooperation, trade remedies (safeguards, anti-dumping, 
countervailing measures), IPR, services, institutional arrangements, and 
implementation modalities. The focus has been on SPS and TBT, regional 
integration efforts and the question of longer implementation timeframes for 
capacity development regarding SPS and TBT in order to meet European 
regulations.664 
Among SADC countries the discussion emerged about the inclusion of issues 
that had not yet been negotiated at the WTO, for instance, investment and 
government procurement. Meanwhile, the European Commission discussed 
that the role of South Africa should be strengthened in the EPA negotiations as 
well as the SADC CET should be reached in 2008. The internal timeframe of 
SADC envisaged the CET for 1010. An early CET would ease the trade 
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relations with the EU but this is doubtful in the view of the relatively hesitant 
integration process within SADC.665 
The negotiations in 2004 and 2005 were characterised by delays in the 
negotiating process (for instance, the delay with regard to the launch of 
negotiations) and the difficulty within the SADC region to define issues of 
common interest. 2006 should have been a crucial year with substantial 
negotiations while in 2007 the negotiations should have been finalised.  
2006 began with a SADC proposal of a framework document (“A framework for 
the EPA negotiations between SADC and the EU”). It called for the involvement 
of the SACU countries in the TDCA review as these countries were involved in 
the South Africa – EU trade indirectly due to their close trade relations with 
South Africa in the SACU. Moreover, the EPA market access provisions should 
be based on TDCA provisions and take into account BLNS sensitive products. 
In addition, the framework called for market access equivalent to EBA access 
for all SADC members beginning in 2008 (though they are not LDCs) and the 
exemption of LDCs (Angola, Mozambique, and Tanzania) from reciprocity in the 
trade with the EU. Furthermore, the framework calls for better rules of origin (full 
cumulation in SADC and ACP countries) to enhance the access to the 
European market. The framework contains a call for more financial support for 
BLNS to meet supply-side constraints and revenue losses as well as 
requirements with regard to SPS and TBT. At last, the framework called for the 
exclusion of all new generation trade issues.666 In contrast, the European 
Commission requested for a greater involvement of South Africa in the SADC 
EPA negotiations and the achievement of the SADC Customs Union (CU) at 
2008 rather than 2010. The debate about the timeframe for the achievement of 
a CU and the involvement of trade-related issues in the EPA – which the EU 
recommended but the SADC countries opposed – were the most contentious 
issues at that point.667 
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In February 2006 the SADC Trade Ministers adopted the framework and in 
March SADC presented it to the European Commission. The first reaction of the 
European Commission indicated that though the proposal has been WTO 
compatible it raised difficulties with regard to the necessary reforms of the 
TDCA (lowering tariffs to accommodate BLNS) and LDC treatment. Moreover, 
the refusal to negotiate trade-related issues would fall short of the development 
dimension according to the European Commission.668 Since March 2006 
technical negotiations were on hold since the European Commission 
considered the SADC proposal and the SADC refused to continue negotiations 
at the technical level while waiting for an EU response. SADC continued internal 
discussions on tariff liberalisation transition periods, agriculture, fisheries, WTO 
requirements, trade-related issues, and the development dimension. SADC 
Heads of State and Government concluded at a meeting in August 2006 that 
they aim at a FTA in 2008 and a CU in 2010.669 
The delay in the answer of the European Commission might have been related 
to the fact that the Commission had been cautious about agreeing to the 
framework proposal since this would be a precedent for the other EPA regions. 
Another point might have been the necessity to change the negotiating mandate 
in the case of the inclusion of South Africa. In an unofficial response from the 
European Commission in December 2006 configuration issues and the 
inclusion of South Africa were seen as responsible for the delay. The answer of 
the Commission narrowed the SADC framework proposal: South Africa would 
be included but presented a different market access offer. Moreover, the 
proposal to provide EBA equivalent access to SADC non-LDCs was not WTO 
compatible; therefore, it was rejected. The LDCs (Angola, Mozambique, and 
Tanzania) would be able to join the EBA initiative and would be associated only 
on the basis of non-tariff provisions with the option to join later. The European 
Commission requested for a control system with regard to rules of origin and a 
safeguard mechanism to allow the protection of the European market in case of 
import surges. Moreover, the European Commission insisted on the inclusion of 
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trade-related issues since they were necessary to achieve a development-
friendly outcome.670  
After EU member states agreed the European Commission presented its 
response in March 2007. The official response stated that a non-reciprocal 
approach was not in line with WTO compatibility requirements and that a 
separate agreement with the LDCs would split the region.671 
In 2006 no substantial negotiations had taken place and the SADC EPA region 
was confronted with a serious delay in negotiations at the beginning of 2007. 
South Africa was not satisfied with the EC response with regard to different 
market access offers and most SADC countries still did not want an inclusion of 
trade-related issues due to their lack of negotiating capacity and the priority to 
harmonise regional trade.672 Therefore, the official EC response was opposed 
by the SADC countries while the deadline approached faster. 
In March 2007 both parties concluded that a re-launch of the roadmap was 
necessary with regard to trade in goods, services, and new generation issues. 
The SADC EPA group called for the inclusion of a development chapter in the 
agreement and additional funding; the European Commission repeated that the 
amount of support depends on the commitments taken in the EPA.673 
In April the negotiations continued with meetings at senior and ministerial level 
and discussed the market access offer as well as the new generation issues. As 
far as the market access offer is concerned SADC IEPA countries proposed 
that BLNS could liberalise their tariffs on the basis of the TDCA because the 
TDCA is de facto already applied due to their SACU membership; however, the 
status of Lesotho as LDC must be considered. Angola, Mozambique, and 
Tanzania should make individual market access offers that take into account 
their individual needs.674 With regard to new generation issues SADC countries 
(with the exception of South Africa) were open to discuss the matter of services. 
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As far as additional funding is concerned the SADC group proposed the 
creation of a regional fund.675 
In July 2007 the debates intensified. It was still unclear how to go about 
“accommodating the sensitivities of Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia and 
Swaziland (BLNS) in an offer which is influenced by South Africa’s existing 
free-trade agreement (TDCA) with the EU.”676 
With regard to trade-related issues the SADC proposal to exclude legally 
binding commitments became unhinged – some SADC IEPA countries seemed 
to be willing to conclude binding commitments in the face of the approaching 
deadline.677 
By virtue of four different market access offers – BLNS, Angola, Mozambique 
and Tanzania – and the approaching deadline discussions emerged only to 
conclude a framework agreement with a liberalisation commitment. LDCs would 
be allowed to come to a decision without pressure; up until then they tended to 
the EPA rather than the EBA against the background of regional integration and 
development funding issues.678 Regional integration is challenged by the four 
different market access offers that precluded the introduction of a CU 2010 
“given that members of the same customs union cannot offer different sets of 
market access arrangements to different trade partners.”679 
Bertelsmann-Scott refers to the fact that after ten years of discussion between 
EU and SADC IEPA countries there did not emerge a better understanding of 
the development dimension issue. The EU emphasised that funding aspects fall 
under the Cotonou Partnership Agreement and EPAs deal with other 
developmental issues. SADC wanted a specific chapter in their agreement with 
binding commitments of the EU. Moreover, for the EU the development 
dimension is represented by the asymmetry (EU assumes larger liberalisation 
commitment) and the new generation issues. For the SADC EPA group the 
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development dimension should be characterised by a clear link to AfT and a 
proper sequencing of liberalisation at national and regional level.680 
With regard to services BLNS and South Africa had different opinions: South 
Africa refused to include services while BLNS in general were willing to 
negotiate this issue although the request for services goes beyond any WTO 
commitment and is not necessary to meet WTO compatibility requirements. 
Moreover, Bertelsmann-Scott states that there will be no automatic gains from 
services liberalisation if the pre-requisites are not given. For instance, up to now 
there is nearly no services liberalisation at the regional level.681  
In July 2007 the SADC EPA configuration attempted to include civil society 
actors better but “the move comes at a late stage.”682 
In September the situation became more and more demanding due to the fact 
that SADC EPA countries did not agree about the services treatment: should 
there be a cooperative approach without binding commitments or legal 
provisions to negotiate trade in services at a later time? Moreover, there was 
rumour that Tanzania might leave the negotiating configuration to initial an 
agreement with the ESA group.683 Also in September EC and SADC exchanged 
market access offers and schedules for tariff liberalisation; SADC seemed to 
push for an increased market access for agricultural goods and processed 
products in return for better market access for the EU fish and other products.684 
In October, after the two-step offer of the European Commission, the SADC 
negotiating group aimed at a goods-only agreement to be concluded in 
November 2007. It became obvious that BLNS would make a common market 
access offer and Mozambique a separate one while Tanzania joined the ESA 
group and Angola would not make an offer until the end of the year. 
“Agricultural products remain the most difficult tariff area in negotiations and 
sources indicate unexpected divergences have now surfaced on fisheries.” 
Similarly, services have been another sticking point as well.685 Regarding 
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services, BLNS had little offensive interests but in case of no agreement would 
have lost their preferential access to the European market while South Africa – 
that opposed the inclusion of services – has its own access under the TDCA.686 
In November Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland initialled a goods-only 
agreement with the EU, Mozambique initialled an individual agreement, and 
Angola did not conclude an agreement. At first Namibia did not initial an 
agreement “to the great dismay of its agricultural sector.” However, in the face 
of losses of 45 million Euro in beef, grapes, and fish exports it negotiated an 
eleventh hour agreement687 and concluded the goods-only agreement in 
December 2007.  
In January 2008 the EPA negotiations continued for SADC IEPA countries with 
the problem that SACU countries have initialled interim agreements but South 
Africa had not.688 Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland repeated their attempt to 
conclude comprehensive EPAs while Namibia and South Africa were more 
critical with regard to the development dimension, regional integration, and 
policy space. Mandelson warned:  
"South Africa has said it would not stand in the way of other SADC 
members, which had initialled an interim economic partnership agreement 
at the end of last year. […]I assume the comment was sincerely made and 
that the other countries will not be obstructed.”689 
Mandelson indicates that there “is no way of re-opening the process that has 
already been negotiated. There is earnest desire and commitment to eradicate 
poverty in this continent”.690 Concerns of South Africa and Namibia will be dealt 
within the negotiations towards a comprehensive EPA.691 
In May 2008 at a meeting between EC and SADC officials the representatives 
highlighted the option of signing a regional SADC EPA in 2008. Angola and 
South Africa should have the opportunity to join the EPA later this year. The 
launch of negotiations towards services and investment as well as the timeline 
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for signature, ratification, and WTO notification of the IEPA were discussed. 
Moreover, contentious issues that should be dealt with in the negotiations 
towards the comprehensive EPA were determined. SACU seems to be split in 
Botswana, Lesotho, and Swaziland on the one side and South Africa and 
Namibia on the other.692  
At a meeting in July the EC has presented a draft on the liberalisation of 
services and investment. SADC EPA countries would offer one services sector 
liberalisation commitment and a standstill clause to negotiate the other sectors 
within three years.693 Officials agreed to include a review clause and safeguard 
provisions; while the MFN clause, standstill clauses and an emergency 
safeguard mechanism still were contentious.694 Talks on the market access 
offer continued but sources indicated that agriculture was still contentious due 
to the EU offering less than SADC expected.  
In August 2008, 12 of the 15 SADC countries launched a FTA with 85% of trade 
moving free; Angola, Democratic Republic of Congo, and Malawi would join 
later.695 
Angola, Namibia, and South Africa listed their concerns with the IEPA: they 
were aware of the potential threat to regional integration and the free circulation 
of goods with non-SADC countries. Moreover, they feared that their policy 
space could be restricted (for instance, the protection of infant industry) and 
they were concerned about restrictive rules of origin and the inclusion of the 
MFN clause. The European Commission continued to discuss with Angola, 
Namibia, and South Africa about these concerns.696 
In November Botswana, Lesotho, and Swaziland pushed for the signing of the 
IEPA in fear of loosing preferential access to the EU market while Namibia still 
had its concerns. South Africa and Angola are concerned that the signing of the 
other SADC EPA group members could have a negative effect on their own 
positions and the concerns they have raised.697 
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In December 2008 the IEPA had not been signed and the comprehensive EPA 
not finalised. The market access offer was still contentious as were the rules of 
origin and sustainable development topics; South Africa, Angola, and Namibia 
were still concerned that their policy space might be restricted.698 
In January 2009 the European Commission presented a non-paper to preserve 
the tariff coherence of SACU. In it South Africa should align its tariffs to the 
commitments of BLNS under the IEPA in return for improved market access to 
the European market and other market access concessions. Angola, Namibia, 
and South Africa welcomed the non-paper as a move towards a comprehensive 
approach. The new Trade Commissioner Ashton visited Southern Africa in 
February 2009.699 
Ashton agreed to put the signing of the SADC IEPA on hold after a meeting with 
SADC officials but emphasised that there is the need to conclude as soon as 
possible since the current status could be challenged at the WTO – Botswana, 
Lesotho, and Swaziland were eager to sign.700 
5.3 Direct and Indirect Agricultural Provisions in SADC 
IEPA 
This chapter lists the direct and indirect provisions of the IEPA that might 
influence the agricultural sector in SADC IEPA countries. Due to the fact that 
negotiations still continue, provisions might change in the course of the 
negotiating process. 
5.3.1 EU Market Access for ACP Countries 
In general, ACP countries benefit from the general reductions in customs duties 
within the WTO reduction processes (for instance, the AoA). Moreover, many 
developed countries offer Generalised System of Preferences (GSP) to 
developing countries, for instance, US, Canada, and Japan. Despite these GSP 
and reduced tariffs, many ACP countries still face relatively high tariffs for 
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products that are very important for their export economies due to the fact that 
many GSP exclude sensitive products from market opening. According to Alpha 
et al. Canada, for example, excludes important agricultural products from 
liberalisation, e.g., poultry, fish, and vegetables or imposes tariff quotas on dairy 
products and cereals.  
The ACP access to the European market is different because ACP countries 
not only benefit from a GSP but from the Cotonou preferences. In general, 
almost 97% of ACP exports to the EU enter the market duty-free.701 Between 
the countries there is a large variation between the share of the export covered 
under Cotonou: only 8% of Fiji’s exports benefited from preferences but in the 
case of Botswana and Namibia no exports were excluded.702  
Alpha et al. state that nearly 7% of agricultural products were still taxed under 
the Cotonou regime. These residual tariff barriers can either be ad valorem703 or 
specific704 duties and though some products benefit from a total reduction of ad 
valorem duties they can be imposed specific duties. These tariffs were imposed 
on products that competed with European products, for instance, cereals, milk, 
beef, bananas, rum, and sugar. For some of these products (beef and veal, 
sugar, bananas) several commodity protocols were applied. These protocols 
guaranteed specific quantities (quotas) and prices that were higher than the 
world market prices and have been successful e.g., in the case of beef exports 
in Southern Africa.705 The Cotonou Partnership Agreement contains a clause on 
a review of these protocols:  
“the Parties reaffirm the importance of the commodity protocols[…]. They 
agree on the need to review them in the context of the new trading 
arrangements, in particular as regards their compatibility with WTO rules, 
with a view to safeguarding the benefits derived therefrom”.706 
                                            
701 South Centre: The value of EU preferences for the ACP and EPA contribution to market 
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South Centre states that not only the EPA negotiations contribute to the erosion 
of preferences but preference erosion had already begun, for instance, with the 
reform of the sugar protocol and the cut of prices.707  
Furthermore, the Cotonou regime offered a compensatory finance scheme to 
stabilise export earnings for products that did not compete with European 
agricultural goods, for instance, cocoa, peanuts, and tea.708 
Customs duties were imposed on dairy products, eggs, fresh and frozen 
vegetables, oleaginous fruit, bananas, other fresh and dried fruits, cereals, 
starches, animal fats, sugar, chocolate, fruit juices, and animal food. Alpha et al. 
state that the average level of residual tariff barriers for exports from ACP to 
European market has been 5.3% on 98.1% of imports receiving a preferential 
treatment. They compare these figures with the GSP data – 17.9% of protection 
on average on 19.8% of imports covered by preferences system – and come to 
the conclusion that  
“Although the residual tariff barriers for non-LDC ACP countries are 
therefore far lower than for other countries, the issue is still important for 
certain ACP products for which access to the European market could be 
improved considerably.”709 
Other trade barriers have been tax-free quotas, import ceilings, seasonal duties 
for agricultural exports, and the already mentioned commodity protocols.710 
Moreover, Alpha et al. describe the problem of customs duties escalation: while 
raw materials or semi-processed agricultural products enter the European 
market duty-free, on processed products with high added value, high tariffs 
have been applied. This tariff policy thwarted the aim of supporting African ACP 
countries to diversify their production into higher value products.711  
LDCs had the opportunity to export into the EU either under the Cotonou regime 
or under the EBA initiative. LDCs often chose the Cotonou regime due to 
several facts. The first point is the loss of the commodity regimes under the 
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EBA initiative and the second point is the more restrictive rules of origin. While 
Cotonou allows full cumulation (the ACP export qualifies for any processing that 
has been carried out in any country that is party to the agreement), the EBA 
initiative only allows bilateral cumulation (for instance, between EU and 
recipient country).712 The minimum processing rules are much stricter in EBA 
than in the Cotonou Partnership agreement. To illustrate, “Cotonou allows non-
originating inputs to be used so long as their value does not exceed 15% of the 
ex-works price of the product”713 while EBA only allows 10%. At last, LDCs 
might fear the adjustment costs of switching between both regimes that require 
large administrative procedures.714 
Preferences can be seen as an “incentive to engage in international trade”715 for 
developing countries that struggle with supply-side constraints and domestic 
competitiveness problems. On the contrary, preferences can increase the 
developing countries’ dependence on a limited number of markets and the 
misallocation of resources towards activities that receive preferences. For the 
ACP countries in general the share of non-oil exports in EU imports declined 
from 1975’s rate of 6.1% to 1992’s rate of 2.9%. But ACP countries account for 
one eight of all EU imports of agricultural products.716 Alpha et al. state:  
“Although ACP agricultural exports (excluding Protocols) grew by 43% 
during the period from 1988 to 2000, the sectors benefiting from a 
preferential margin of more than 3% increased their exports by 60%. 
Growth rates are particularly strong for the following non-traditional 
products: flowers (+230%), vegetables (+132%), prepared fish (+110%), 
tobacco (+83%) and prepared vegetables and fruits (+70%).”717 
For ACP countries the CAP provided benefits under the preferential system: 
“paradoxically, Cotonou agricultural preferences are most commercially 
valuable on the products that seem most restricted […] because they allow 
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the favoured ACP countries to benefit from the artificially high prices 
created on the European market by CAP barriers.”718 
The WTO negotiations take into account the outstanding role of preferences for 
developing countries with regard to agriculture: “The importance of long-
standing preferences is fully recognised. The issue of preference erosion will be 
addressed.”719 Regarding non-agricultural goods  
“We recognize the challenges that may be faced by non-reciprocal 
preference beneficiary Members and those Members that are at present 
highly dependent on tariff revenue as a result of these negotiations on 
non-agricultural products.”720  
In the EPA negotiations the ACP countries tried to maintain their trade 
preferences (favourable access to the European market through provision of 
lower tariffs and lower quantity restrictions on ACP goods) while the 
consequences would have been different for LDCs and non-LDCs. Alpha et al. 
show that in the case of LDCs joining the EBA initiative and non-LDCs signing 
an EPA, primarily the LDCs would loose preferences in relation to non-LDCs in 
case of a total liberalisation of the European market. In the case of both LDCs 
and non-LDCs signing an EPA, both would loose preferences compared to non-
ACP countries. Alpha et al. state that an aggressive position in the WTO with 
regard to the reduction of customs duties might undermine the ACP position in 
the EPA negotiations that is aimed at the maintenance of preferences.721 
There are several reasons for the erosion of preferences that is currently taking 
place. First of all the expiry of the waiver marks the end of the preferential Lomé 
and Cotonou systems that the ACP countries benefited from. But secondly, 
ACP countries loose trade preferences compared to other developing countries 
as a result of multilateral trade liberalisation. Moreover, changes occur to the 
European market, which influence ACP access to Europe: the enlargement of 
the EU as well as the CAP reform that systematically reduces EU internal 
prices. Fourthly, the EBA initiative and the new GSP as well as bilateral 
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agreements between the EU and other developing countries and their inherent 
tariff reductions reduce the preferences of the ACP countries compared to these 
countries. Another reason for preference erosion is the increasing demand of 
trade rules with regard to SPS regulations, for example, in the case of 
regulations for beef.722 
In April 2007 the European Union offered a duty-free, quota-free market access 
to the ACP countries that should enter into force as soon as the EPAs were 
signed. The offer promised to “Eliminate all tariffs and import quotas for all ACP 
countries” but the offer will “not be tied to the requirement of equivalent 
openness from the ACP countries.”723 The reasoning is that the “EPAs are not 
free trade agreements in the classic sense”:724ACP countries will be granted 
liberalisation obligations over many years and will be able to protect sensitive 
products. The only exception is a transition period for sugar and rice.725  
In the IEPA of EU and SADC Annex 2 “Customs duties on products originating 
in SADC EPA states” the market access and, in particular, the exceptions are 
defined more precisely.726 Similar to the EBA initiative the IEPA eliminates all 
customs duties except for arms and ammunition. Rice and sugar are exempted 
from liberalisation until the end of 2009 and September 2015 respectively. The 
sugar protocol will be applied until September 2009; for Mozambique and 
Swaziland additional quotas are allowed for 2008 and 2009 (30 000 and 20 000 
tonnes). Between 2009 and 2015 a safeguard is applied: ACP sugar exports of 
3.5 million tonnes and 1.38 million tonnes from non-ACP countries increasing to 
1.6 million tonnes are allowed to enter. From October 2015 there will be a 
DFQF access of sugar but the European Union applies safeguards. In the case 
of disturbances in the sugar market a safeguard will be applied 
“in situations where the European Community market price of white sugar 
falls during two consecutive months below 80 percent of the European 
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Community market price for white sugar prevailing during the previous 
marketing year.”727 
A “special surveillance mechanism” is applicable for certain products from 
SADC countries (sugar syrup, sugar confectionary, sweetened cocoa powder, 
and certain food preparations with sugar) if “more than 20 percent in volume 
during a period of 12 consecutive months compared to the average of the yearly 
imports over the three previous 12 month periods”728 enter the European 
market. In that event  
“the EC Party shall analyse the pattern of trade, the economic justification 
and the sugar content of such imports and, if it considers that such imports 
are used to circumvent the arrangements provided for in paragraphs 4 and 
5, it may suspend the preferential treatment and introduce the specific 
MFN duty applied to imports pursuant to the European Community 
Common Customs Tariff”729. 
The provisions on rules of origin will be crucial for the SADC countries: 
improved rules of origin would allow a “greater use of South African inputs in 
BLNS goods destined for export to the EU market”730 but “improvements have 
not been secured”.731 Agritrade states that there is a request for more flexibility 
“on the use of non-originating content in those countries which face serious 
constraints on agricultural production” but there seems to be “little movement on 
this issue on the European Commission side”.732 
Rules of origin and other non-tariff barriers like SPS and TBT are one reason for 
the poor performance of the ACP economies since they hinder ACP countries to 
increase their export growth. Under the Cotonou Partnership Agreement the 
rules of origin have been less strict than under GSP and EBA – a reason why 
many ACP countries decided to export under Cotonou rather than under the 
other regimes. Rules of origin guarantee that a traded product is “wholly 
obtained” or “sufficiently processed” within the FTA. “These rules ensure that 
the preferences granted to a certain market can only be used by countries that 
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are entitled to these preferences.”733 Due to the cumulation rules originating 
materials that are base for manufacturing do not need to be processed – the 
rules of cumulation define to what extent raw materials from various countries 
can be manufactured and keep their originating status. Kasteng states that 
though production structures have significantly changed since the 1970s the 
regulations on rules of origin have not.734 
The IEPA contains an article on rules of origin and protocol 1 that sets out the 
provisions on rules of origin in detail. Article 21 of the IEPA only states that 
within the first three years of application of the agreement a review should take 
place aimed at further simplification of the rules of origin. Protocol 1 defines the 
general requirements, the cumulation rules, territorial requirements, 
administrative cooperation and in annex 2 a list of working/processing that is 
required for a product to obtain origin status. 
Alpha et al. state that  
“Notifications of technical measure (different types of standards, technical 
obstacles to trade) as conditions of access to markets increased from 300 
in 1980 to 3000 twenty years later, while at the same time customs duties 
were reduced regularly.”735 
Moreover, according to them EU standards are much stricter than international 
ones and new regulations require the creation of adequate institutions in 
developing countries – a challenge when facing of a lack of public institutions 
with adequate resources.736 
Hope has been raised that the EPA provisions might improve the capacity of 
ACP countries to meet the European requirements through the provisions on 
Technical Barriers to Trade and Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures. 
The IEPA deals with Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) in chapter 8. The 
agreement aims at the facilitation and increase of trade by identifying and 
eliminating unnecessary barriers to trade (technical regulations, standards, and 
conformity assessment procedures) (Article 49, 50). Therefore, the regional 
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SADC cooperation should be strengthened and their technical capacity 
increased (Article 49). Measures to achieve the elimination of TBT include: 
• intensification of collaboration to facilitate the “access to their respective 
markets, by increasing the mutual knowledge and understanding of their 
respective systems in the field of technical regulations, standards, 
metrology, accreditation and conformity assessment”; 
• exchange of information and implementation of appropriate mechanisms; 
• “interventions on technical regulations and conformity assessment”; 
• development of common views on technical regulatory practises; 
• harmonisation towards international standards; 
• negotiation of mutual recognition agreements; 
• participation of SADC countries in international standard setting bodies 
(Article 53).737 
Chapter 9 in the IEPA deals with Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS). It 
aims at the facilitation of trade; measures should “apply only to the extent 
necessary to protect human, animal or plant health or life in accordance with the 
provisions of the [WTO, K.B.] SPS Agreement” (Article 57). The IEPA should 
strengthen the regional integration attempts including effective consultation 
mechanisms and enhanced cooperation between SADC countries as well as 
between SADC and Europe (Article 57, 60, 64). The technical capacity of SADC 
states should be improved and competent authorities developed (Article 57, 59). 
Furthermore, consultations and information should be exchanged between 
SADC and Europe on “any changes in its sanitary and phytosanitary import 
requirements that may affect trade” (Article 60). An early warning system should 
be installed as well as an “epidemiological surveillance network on animal 
disease” and plant health (Article 61). If a measure affects the market access of 
SADC countries consultations will be held to find a solution (Article 63).738  
Agritrade criticises that the IEPA provisions on SPS and TBT are more general 
and do not contain any provisions on how to operationalise these requirements. 
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Moreover, no clear procedures were defined in the case of disputes. Capacity 
building is mentioned but there is no commitment on concrete financial 
support.739 
In general, ACP countries already had nearly free market access to the EU so 
that any improvement is relatively marginal. The improvements will be important 
with regard to the liberalisation of tariff lines that have be excluded under the 
Cotonou Partnership Agreement, in a substantial liberalisation of the rules of 
origin, and a more predictable and secured market access.740  
Although the improvement of the DFQF offer is rather marginal compared to the 
Cotonou preferences the maintenance of the market access to the European 
market for ACP states, in particular, SADC IEPA countries, has been one of the 
most important points in the EPA negotiations. The risk of fall back to GSP 
access has been the most important incentive for non-LDC ACP countries to 
initiate the IEPAs.  
Braude and Sekolokwane demonstrate that fall back to GSP would entail many 
relatively small tariff increases but also larger ones:  
 “267 of the goods they export will experience a tariff jump of at least ten 
per cent ad valorem and/or the imposition of new or increased specific or 
compound duties, some of which are very high. Nearly two-thirds of non-
LDC ACP states would see tariffs increase over 25 per cent by value of 
their current exports to the EU; for just one quarter the proportion affected 
will be over 50 per cent.”741 
They state that among other countries Namibia and Swaziland would suffer 
most. 
The insistence of the European Commission that there were no alternatives to 
the EPAs except of GSP (for non-LDCs) and EBA (for LDCs) along with the 
expiring waiver at the end of 2007 has been the most effective instrument to 
apply pressure on ACP countries. While the EC argues that this stance has not 
been a threat to ACP countries but the WTO requirements have left no room for 
any alternatives; NGOs and scientists oppose this point of view and discuss 
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other legal options.742 Either way, none of the ACP countries demanded the 
provision of alternatives from the EU; the late request of Nigeria and Gabon to 
join the GSP plus – which is a more generous preferential system for few 
countries achieving certain requirements743 – has been rejected by the 
European Commission.744  
The impact of the improved DFQF for SADC IEPA countries varies according to 
products and countries. In principle, SADC countries will benefit from an 
improved access in the meat as well as the fruits and vegetables sector. 
Botswana and Namibia will benefit from the new market access provisions 
regarding beef and Namibia will benefit from the improved access for grapes.745 
The export of fruits and vegetables might profit from the enhanced access but 
Agritrade indicates that the SPS and food safety provisions might limit the 
positive impact due to supply-side constraints in meeting the increasing 
demands of the European market.746 Agritrade also raises concern that the 
safeguard provisions in the TDCA could be too weak and, due to the SACU 
membership, affect the Swaziland sugar sector negatively.747  
Braun-Munziger et al. state that  
“It is also broadly accepted that many ACP countries and especially least 
developed countries among them have not been able to fully benefit from 
enhanced market access opportunities because of noncompetitive 
production capacities, a lack of infrastructure, inability to meet prevailing 
standards in high value export markets and being crowded-out of some 
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markets by the domestic support and export subsidies of the developed 
countries.”748 
Therefore, it would be necessary to increase the competitiveness of SADC 
countries to allow them to target luxury-purchase markets in Europe but the 
provision in the SADC IEPA remains vague. Article 11 on “Cooperation in 
supply-side competitiveness” states that it is necessary “to increase the 
competitiveness of the SADC EPA States and remove supply side constraints 
at national, institutional and, in particular, at company level.”749 In the fields of  
“production, technology development and innovation, marketing, financing, 
distribution, transport, diversification of economic base, as well as 
development of the private sector, improvement of the trade and business 
environment and support to small and medium enterprises in the field of 
agriculture, fisheries, industry and services.”750 
In the IEPA there are no provisions on financial and technical assistance to 
support SADC countries to improve their competitiveness.  
SADC IEPA countries maintained and slightly improved their market access to 
the European Union. They have few offensive interests, e.g., meat, fruits and 
vegetables; therefore, addressing supply-side constraints and issues like more 
comfortable rules of origin, increased capability to meet SPS requirements, and 
the abolition of unnecessary barriers to trade (TBT) were more important for 
BLNS agricultural exports. Meanwhile, market access was one of the most 
important issues in late 2007 with the impending expiry of the WTO waiver 
causing increased tariffs under GSP for non-LDCs or worse rules of origin 
under EBA (LDCs), as well as a threat to regional integration efforts by splitting 
the region in the case of no EPA. The threat to fall back to GSP can not be 
underestimated with regard to the negotiations between EU and ACP countries.  
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5.3.2 ACP Market Opening to EU  
The trade liberalisation commitments of SADC IEPA countries and more 
specific provisions on trade in goods will be analysed in this section. 
5.3.2.1 Market Opening in General and Liberalisation 
Commitments  
For the EU the introduction of reciprocity, albeit asymmetry in the market 
opening commitments of the trading partners, has been central. The ACP 
countries tried to avoid the introduction of reciprocity or, at a later stage of 
negotiations, to attenuate the scope and pacing of their commitments. This 
issue has been one of the most contentious issues during the negotiations. It is 
closely connected to the problem of WTO compliance and the definition of 
“substantially all the trade” in a “reasonable length of time” in the FTA provisions 
of the WTO. Because these issues are not fully defined in the WTO rules they 
are open to interpretation – stricter by the EU (averaged 90% of trade 
value/tariff lines; 80% for ACP states in 15 years) and more flexible by the ACP 
countries (the ACP countries proposed that no more than 60-70% should be 
liberalised with an implementation period of more than 20 years751). 
Stevens and Kennan declare that reciprocity “is the critical element in the EU 
Commission’s mandate”752 in three senses: firstly, “it underpins WTO 
justification for EPAs”;753 secondly it induces large implications for the 
production structure and the government revenue of the ACP countries; and 
lastly the impact can be quantified and scenarios can be developed.754 
Stevens et al. state that only in mid-2007 was the market access issue 
addressed when the EC presented a liberalisation schedule. The ACP countries 
had difficulties identifying their exclusion baskets at national and regional level 
and did not meet the EC demand for WTO compatibility.755 
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It is criticised by NGOs and ACP countries that many provisions in the goods-
only agreement (and beyond it in the comprehensive EPA with the inclusion of 
services, investment and government procurement) are not necessary to fulfil 
WTO compatibility.756 Aside from the need to eliminate customs duties and 
other forms of taxes and surcharges on products, there is no need to include 
standstill clauses, restrictions on export taxes, regulations on SPS and TBT, 
and MFN clauses. 757 
It is difficult to assess the impact of changing trade relations immediately after 
they entered into force. But it is even more difficult to evaluate the impact of a 
new trade agreement even before it goes into effect. Nevertheless, it is 
necessary to evaluate these impacts so that the negotiating parties can come to 
a reasonable decision.  
In the run-up to the finalisation of agreements several studies on the potential 
impact of EPAs have been conducted. Babula and Baltzer summarise the 
different studies. They discuss the challenge to compare studies 
“Because of the difference in ACP coverage by EPAs, the difference in 
quantitative approaches, the difference in the degree that studies are 
partial and general equilibrium in nature, ‘EPA-induced effects’ are difficult 
to characterize and often incomparable across studies, even at the nation-
specific level.”758  
Moreover, the different studies have “chosen different subsets of economic 
variables”759 which makes it more difficult to compare these studies.  
For SSA a study ascertains negative effects if all EPAs are implemented while 
another, but rather incomplete, study detects rather positive implications.760 But 
most studies agree 
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 “on how the African trade patterns mix will be altered through EPA 
implementation. EPA agreements will likely lead to increases in African 
imports of EU and ROW manufactured goods (light and heavy), while 
African exports of processed food and some farm and natural resource 
products would modestly increase.”761 
According to Perez the level of reciprocity is crucial for determining the impact 
on SSA countries – 50% reciprocity has less negative effects than 80% 
reciprocity.762 
Several studies have a closer look at Southern Africa; a study on SACU and the 
effects on South Africa concludes that 
“EPAs would likely have noticeably adverse consequences on SACU 
revenue collections: the EPA could elicit a 30 percent decline in the SACU 
revenue pool from pre-EPA levels, and in turn, imply severe budget 
revenue declines for such nations as Lesotho and Swaziland that heavily 
rely on the pool.”763  
Keck and Piermartini detect positive welfare effects for the SADC economies 
but descry losses in the case of preference erosion due to other trade 
agreements between EU and developing countries (e.g. MERCOSUR).764 
According to Babula and Baltzer they conclude 
“that the African countries will export more agricultural, textile, processed 
food, and natural resource products at the expense of manufactured 
goods. African imports will surge for Malawi and Zimbabwe. Over-all, EPA-
elicited welfare changes were generally positive.”765  
A study of the European Commission detects rather positive implications of 
EPAs and expects for instance increasing exports to the EU, in particular of 
vegetable products and textiles (about 40%). In the case of ACP imports from 
the EU there will be a “concentration in industrial goods (particularly textiles) 
and primary products. The increase is negligible in agriculture.”766 
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Despite the necessity to assess the outcome of the EPAs Babula and Baltzer 
have shown that the different studies with their different approaches are difficult 
to compare. All these studies had to assume certain scenarios since the 
outcome of the EPAs has been unclear until the end of 2007 and beyond. 
Moreover, their significance is rather low since they have to deal with numerous 
heterogeneous countries, a variety of economic sectors and variables, and a 
potential future development that does not only depend on EU-ACP trade 
relations but is affected by other economic implications, too.  
NGOs and other opponents on one side, the European Commission on the 
other side, both made use of the different studies and exploited the outcomes to 
fortify their position, i.e., the NGOs to show that these agreements will have 
devastating effects on ACP countries and the Commission to prove that ACP 
states will benefit from the agreements.  
The debate about reciprocity as well as scope and pacing of the liberalisation 
process again shows the fundamental differences between European 
Commission and NGOs as well as many ACP countries. While the European 
Commission highlights the benefits from liberalisation, NGOs and other critics 
emphasise the risks and challenges for the ACP countries. They fear the 
competition from European imports into the ACP domestic markets.  
Alpha et al. refer to unfair competition from European and US imports that have 
more comparative advantages; moreover, imports could have a trade-distorting 
impact if they are subsidised and sold under their production price. 
Furthermore, many ACP countries have reduced their tariffs in the structural 
adjustment processes during the 1980s and 1990s; a further reduction of tariffs 
might increase negative effects of imported products, e.g., for domestic food 
processing industries.767 In theory domestic producers might benefit from further 
trade liberalisation: if firms are able to increase their quality “and adapt rapidly 
to increased competition and to out-compete EU producers”. In this way they 
could expand their markets and sectors that depend on imports of capital goods 
will benefit from lowered prices. But liberalisation might have negative effects: if 
ACP enterprises are unable to access inputs at cheaper costs than EU firms, if 
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the EU producers are subsidised, and if ACP enterprises are less able to 
upgrade their production facilities and technology to compete with European 
products. South Centre judges that in the case of a combination of direct 
competition and supply-side constraints ACP producers will be unable to 
compete.768  
The outcome of the liberalisation commitments in the IEPAs varies between the 
EPA regions and countries and Stevens et al. state that  
“No clear pattern can be identified that the poorer countries have longer to 
adjust than the richer ones or of the EPAs being tailored to development 
needs (however defined). Some of the richer countries among the list have 
to adjust quickly – but so do some of the poorest. The picture that emerges 
is entirely consistent with the hypothesis that countries have a deal that 
reflects their negotiating skills: that countries able to negotiate hard, 
knowing their interests, have obtained a better deal than those lacking 
these characteristics.”769 
A look at the SADC IEPA supports this analysis as will be shown in the 
comparison between the BLNS and the Mozambique offer in this chapter. 
The IEPA itself defines one area of cooperation, the “Cooperation in trade in 
goods” (Article 10). In it the article lists the measures taken: the elimination of 
customs duties770 and tariffs, the implementation of rules of origin, trade 
defence instruments, non-tariff measures, customs cooperation, and trade 
facilitation.771 Article 19 of the SADC IEPA declares the establishment of a FTA 
in accordance with the WTO requirements and highlights the principle of 
asymmetry in the trade negotiations when it states, “commensurate to the 
specific needs and capacity constraints of the SADC EPA States, in terms of 
levels and timing for commitments under this Agreement.”772 Article 35 prohibits 
the use of quantitative restrictions like quotas, import and export licenses, and 
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does not allow the introduction of such measures.773 The liberalisation of market 
access towards products originating in Europe is defined in annex 3 (BLNS) and 
annex 4 (Mozambique).774 
The liberalisation commitments of BLNS and Mozambique are slightly different, 
Mozambique offered a more rapid and broad liberalisation than BLNS. 
First of all the BLNS schedule has a positive list where every item that is going 
to be liberalised is listed; if an item is not listed no agreement has been 
made.775 The liberalisation will occur in three tranches that end before or in 
2012 and four tranches that begin before 2012 and will end later. In 2008 the 
liberalisation includes about 4200 items which account for 55% of imports and 
2008-2012 about 1300 items that account for circa 12% of imports. In 2006 
some of these items faced tariffs of up to 33.75% or specific duties; all items in 
the tranche between 2008 and 2010 faced positive tariffs in 2006. By 2012 the 
liberalisation process will be completed for 84% of the countries’ imports. Only 
2.8% of products are excluded from liberalisation altogether (2.8% of the value 
of BLNS imports from the EU).776 In 2012 the liberalisation of imports will be 
similar to the TDCA apart from the fact that the underlying Harmonised System 
(HS) versions differ and therefore it is difficult to compare the products 
concerned. 
Before the EPA, goods from Europe entered the SACU differently: goods that 
entered SACU via Botswana, Lesotho, South Africa or Swaziland entered under 
the TDCA tariff; goods that entered via Namibia entered under the MFN tariff of 
the SACU CET. Therefore, the tariff reductions for BLS will not be exceptionally 
large except for products exempted from TDCA; Namibia will facer higher tariff 
cuts on goods from Europe.777  
The exclusion basket includes products that face tariffs of over 10% but also 
some products that enter duty-free. Goods to be excluded are: clothing and 
textiles, motor vehicles, agricultural and manufactured products, meat and 
preparations of meat, mineral fuels and oils, dairy products, products of the 
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milling industry, sugar and sugar confectionary, cereals and preparations of 
cereals, and miscellaneous edible preparations.778 South Centre criticises that 
only actual sensitive products were protected but future sensitivities have not 
been anticipated.779 
Products that have been liberalised in 2008 by all BLNS countries above 20% 
ad valorem duties or specific duties are fish products. The additional products 
Namibia liberalises in the first tranche include, amongst others, beverages and 
(prepared) fruits and vegetables.780 
The liberalisation commitments of Mozambique contain no positive list of 
exclusions; it lists about 2100 tariff lines of which 85% (accounting for nearly 9% 
of imports) are already duty free, nearly 2000 tariff lines that should be 
liberalised in 2008 (accounting for 50.8% of imports) and further 65 (what 
equals 2.8% of imports) to be liberalised in 2018. Over 3000 items are not listed 
and therefore they seem to be no subject to liberalisation. Mozambique should 
liberalise the bulk of imports in 2008 (about 51% facing positive tariffs) and has 
only a liberalisation period of 11 years, which is the shortest of all liberalisation 
commitments. The ODI analysis is based on incomplete data material; 
therefore, it seems that 37.7% of Mozambique’s imports from the EU are 
exempted from liberalisation. Products that seem to be excluded are industrial 
inputs, clothing, fish, vegetables, and processed agriculture (for instance, 
preparations of vegetables and fruits as well as preparations of meat).781 
Stevens et al. show that 21% of excluded products in BLNS and Mozambique 
are identical but 79% are not.782  
Most of the liberalisation is not back-loaded but rather front-loaded. Moreover, 
South Centre analyses that gradual liberalisation is “not always based on 
dynamic policy objectives”783 (e.g., economic diversification) but static 
considerations, for instance, “the need to protect fiscal revenues or specific 
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commercial sensitivities, particularly in the agricultural sector.”784 The products 
excluded by SADC IEPA countries protect agriculture and infant industry; 
furthermore, the “exclusion lists were not as large as they could have been 
under WTO rules”785 and the countries agreed to a higher liberalisation level 
than necessary. 
The non-LDC SADC countries were under pressure to secure their market 
access to the European market because they would have faced severe 
increases of tariffs under the GSP after the expiry of the waiver at the end of 
2007. Roux refers to the fact that  
“A specific complication for Namibia (and Botswana) is that beef is not 
included in the list of beneficiary products under the EU’s GSP. This 
means that beef exports to the EU under the GSP would receive no 
preference, hence the WTO’s Most Favoured Nation (MFN) duties would 
apply. In this case beef exports would attract EU import duties of between 
40% and 140%, depending on the type of product exported.”786 
But Braude and Sekolokwane were surprised at the rapid liberalisation schedule 
“in spite of the presumed negotiating capacity of SACU”787 and the fact that 
“they were still unable to secure slower liberalization than other EPA groups”.788 
They assume that a reason for the “very busy liberalization agenda of SACU”789 
could have been “a lack of negotiating capacity or a belief that the de facto 
impact of the TDCA negated the need for slower liberalization.”790 South Centre 
states that most of the sensitive products – dairy, beef and veal as well as sugar 
– are already liberalised under the TDCA: for instance, in Mozambique about 
95% and in Angola about 91.6% of the more sensitive tariff lines.791  
As previously mentioned, not only was there a lack of negotiating capacity and 
the resignation because of the de facto liberalisation under the TDCA that could 
explain why the BLNS commitment outruns the WTO requirements. But Weller 
                                            
784 South Centre: Market access for trade in goods in Economic Partnership Agreements, 2008, 
p.8. 
785 South Centre: Market access for trade in goods in Economic Partnership Agreements, 2008, 
p.10. 
786 Roux, W.: Economic Partnership Agreements: The new game of divide and rule. A reader, 
2008, p.18. 
787 Braude/Sekolokwane: Sustainable development, 2008, p.62. 
788 Ibid. 
789 Ibid. 
790 Ibid., p.63. 
791 South Centre: EPA negotiations in Southern Africa, 2007, p.19. 
 163
and Ullmer also state that in trade negotiations developing countries often tend 
to overestimate the interests of exporters and ignore other interests (e.g., of 
smallholders struggling with unfair competition at the domestic market).792 The 
attempt to maintain market access for exporters – along with the enormous 
pressure of the EC with regard to the deadline in late 2007 and the lack of time 
SADC negotiators had to explore the EC draft – could be another explanation 
for the rapid liberalisation and the small number of excluded products.  
The benefits of liberalisation might be neglected due to the inability of SADC 
IEPA countries to adapt to increasing competition because of serious supply-
side constraints and a lack of competitiveness. Unfair competition and import 
surges of European agricultural products could affect SADC IEPA countries’ 
local markets negatively and threaten the livelihoods of smallholder farmers and 
rural population.  
5.3.2.2 Standstill Clause 
The African IEPAs and the Pacific agreement contain standstill clauses on 
customs duties that require ACP countries to freeze their customs duties at the 
current applied level. While the Pacific and the SADC IEPA standstill clauses 
are limited to products that are subject to liberalisation, the East African 
standstill clauses include the freezing of tariffs on sensitive products that are 
excluded from liberalisation.793  
The SADC IEPA states the following:  
“No new customs duties shall be introduced, nor shall those already 
applied be increased in trade between the Parties as from the entry into 
force of this Agreement for all products subject to liberalisation.”794 
The idea behind the introduction of a standstill clause might have been the 
insistence on liberalisation commitments that should not have been undermined 
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by the opportunity to raise tariffs again. Moreover, it provides more security for 
European exporters that tariffs would not rise.795  
In their listing of counter-arguments Lui and Bilal suggest establishing start 
rates to create a baseline for tariff liberalisation, these are not necessarily those 
tariffs applied when the agreement enters into force. They also discuss the 
opportunity to allow liberalisation from WTO bound rates rather than applied 
tariffs since these bound rates are higher than the latter. Moreover, they 
propose a review of the standstill clause particularly regarding regional 
integration efforts that necessitate modifications, for instance, “in order to avoid 
conflict or incoherence between the EPA and the customs union 
programme.”796 
The request for more flexibility with regard to liberalisation commitments and in 
particular the standstill commitments are matter of ongoing negotiation. It has 
been announced that the ESA region is negotiating the modification of the 
standstill clause and Angola has asked to be exempt from this clause with the 
argument that for LDCs the SDT should be reflected. Lui and Bilal state that no 
objective criteria suggest the imposition of a standstill clause: “The flexibility 
permitted in some regions indicates that the EU has room to manoeuvre on this 
issue and the same flexibility could be extended to other regions.”797 
The introduction of the standstill clause is criticised by many NGOs to have 
negative effects on agriculture in ACP countries because it limits their options to 
be flexible with more competitive imports.  
South Centre argues that this clause is not necessary to achieve WTO 
compatibility:  
“While WTO norms require tariff liberalisation over a reasonable length of 
time, it contains no obligation to maintain duties at a predetermined rate 
before their reduction or elimination.”798 
Agritrade warns that together with high food prices this standstill clause might 
damage food security in the ACP countries. Many developing countries have 
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reduced their import duties in response to the high food prices or in some cases 
even set them at zero. The IEPAs could “result in freezing in place exceptionally 
low import duties on basic food products.”799 
Though the EU might seek for a rapid liberalisation of trade relations with ACP 
countries it acknowledges asymmetry in the EPAs with regard to transition 
periods and the exclusion of sensitive products. Thus, the standstill clause 
could be subject to more flexibility.  
5.3.2.3 Safeguards 
The SADC IEPA recourses to the multilateral safeguard provisions of the WTO. 
In Article 33 it is stated that nothing in the IEPA should prevent European or 
SADC countries from applying the multilateral safeguards of the GATT (Article 
XIX), the Agreement on Safeguards, the AoA, and other relevant WTO 
provisions. Moreover, for a period of five years SADC EPA imports into the EU 
will be exempted from the imposition of safeguards (except South Africa). A 
review will decide on the continuation of this exemption.800 
As already shown in the WTO chapter, the existing safeguards are “more or 
less reserved for developed countries”801 due to complex procedural and 
administrative requirements, a lengthy investigation process, delays due to 
consultative processes, and the gradual dismantling of the measure. In order to 
benefit ACP countries it would be necessary to introduce automatic (price and 
volume) triggers, the application only to ACP countries, and transparency 
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provisions. The SSM under negotiation at the WTO Doha Round – if designed 
adequately – might be useful in the EPAs, as well.802 
But Kwa refers to the fact that 
“It should be noted that in the WTO’s Agricultural Chairman’s draft of 10 
July 2008, before the WTO mini-Ministerial, the text of the SSM did not 
allow countries to use the SSM for preferential trade, only for import surges 
caused by most favoured nation (MFN) trade. If this clause remains, the 
SSM will not be of any use to African countries to counter import surges 
from the EU as a result of liberalization through the EPAs.”803 
The EPA-specific safeguard mechanism is defined in Article 34; safeguard 
measures of limited duration are allowed under specific circumstances. They 
can be applied “in such increased quantities and under such conditions as to 
cause or threaten to cause: (a) serious injury to the domestic industry producing 
like or directly competitive products in the territory of the importing Party”, in the 
case of disturbances in a sector that produces competitive products in the 
importing country or if disturbances as a result of competitive agricultural 
products impend.804 
The measures that can be applied are the “suspension of the further reduction 
of the rate of import duty for the product concerned”, the increase of the 
customs duty up to the WTO bound rate, or the introduction of tariff quotas.805 
The safeguards are not allowed to exceed two years; if the threat still exists an 
extension of two more years will be allowed. Moreover, safeguards that exceed 
one year should contain “clear elements progressively leading to their 
elimination at the end of the set period”. Another restriction states that a 
safeguard “shall be applied to the import of a product that has previously been 
subject to such a measure, within a period of at least one year from the expiry 
of the measure.”806 If a country intends to apply a safeguard it has to consult the 
Trade and Development committee; if no recommendation is reached within 30 
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days the country is allowed to apply the safeguard measures. Moreover, the 
safeguard should be subject to consultations aiming at a timetable for the 
abolition.807 A safeguard may be provisionally applied if there are “critical 
circumstances where delay would cause damage which it would be difficult to 
repair” by maximum 200 days for SADC countries; the other party must be 
informed and the matter explained to the Trade and Development committee.808 
One critical point of the bilateral safeguard in the IEPA is that it does not contain 
a price trigger, for instance, in comparison to the EU IEPA safeguard for sugar 
that allows an automatic trigger if the price falls for a period over two months.809 
An additional problem is the fact that many ACP countries have difficulties 
collecting reliable data on import volumes while they normally dispose of data 
on import values and prices.810 Another point of critique is the limitation of 
raising the customs duty to the WTO bound rate, which would not be 
sufficient.811 Moreover, the wording of “serious injury” and “disturbance” is not 
defined; therefore, a factor of insecurity. Furthermore, the EC secured 
antidumping and countervailing measures against goods from ACP states as 
well as bilateral safeguards in particular for agricultural products.812 In the light 
of the asymmetry between the trading partners these measures are considered 
as unfair.  
There is a criticism that the provision on infant industry is treated in the same 
chapter like the multilateral and bilateral safeguards because there are 
differences between classical safeguards dealing with import surges and infant 
industry protection, “which relates more to a policy choice by a government to 
protect a certain industry for a limited period of time to enable it to achieve a 
degree of competitiveness.“813 Article 34 contains the protection of infant 
industries; it is applicable  
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“as a result of the reduction of duties is being imported into its territory in 
such increased quantities and under such conditions as to cause or 
threaten to cause disturbances to an infant industry producing like or 
directly competitive products.”814 
The infant industry protection is available for 12 years for Botswana, Namibia, 
and Swaziland and 15 years for LDCs; the period is subject to a review by the 
Joint Council.  
As EPAs do not allow the use of tariff policy to support domestic production and 
emerging industries there is only a limited set of instruments available; 
therefore, infant industry provisions are highly important. Critics list that the 
timeframe might be too short for the development of industrial sectors and that 
the measures are limited to those of the bilateral safeguard.815 Moreover, tariffs 
can only be increased in the case of import surges that have to cause a serious 
injury to the sector. Lui and Bilal state that  
“the clauses have been designed to act as limited safeguards to defend 
against import surges during liberalisation, rather then as a more flexible 
instrument of trade policy that might more readily be associated with text-
book discussions of infant industry protection.”816 
An important point of critique is the fact that new industries can hardly be 
protected:  
“the clause may not allow for new industries to be established using 
protective tariffs, since an industry which did not yet exist could not be 
threatened with serious injury by an import surge.”817 
The threat to regional integration is considered by Lui and Bilal. Since many 
small ACP countries will not be able to develop efficient industries themselves it 
might be important for them to create regionally-competitive industries. They 
state:  
“Being able to shield such industries from competition outside the region 
for a while at this particular point in time may be an important part of the 
regional integration process itself”.818 
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At last, the ACP countries are deprived of their ability to make political choices:  
“Tariffs may be increased only in response to an increase in the volume of 
imports, not because of any policy choice by an ACP government to 
pursue a comparative advantage in a particular new industry.”819 
The assertions of the European Commission and proponents might deal with 
the argument of WTO compatibility: safeguards are seen as a “package” 
together with provisions on tariff liberalisation, the definition of “substantially all 
the trade” and the opportunity to exempt sensible products from liberalisation 
commitments. From this point of view stronger safeguards may be regarded as 
a threat to the promise of continued liberalisation. Moreover, infant industry 
policies in SSA have not been successful in the past when pursuing import-
substituting industrialisation strategies.820 
As already stated, multilateral safeguards are only available for a few 
developing countries; therefore, the reference to the WTO safeguards in the 
IEPA is relatively meaningless. The limitations of the bilateral safeguard – no 
trigger, raise of customs duty only to bound rate, and the non-defined wordings 
– could prevent SADC IEPA countries from benefiting from an effective 
protection against agricultural import surges from Europe. Moreover, the 
bilateral safeguard does not provide a “flexible instrument of trade policy”.821 
Agritrade criticises that agricultural safeguards in IEPAs are only “of temporary 
duration and aimed at dealing with temporary import surges”.822 But “distortions 
to trade in food and agricultural products are structural in nature (arising from 
the deployment of EU public aid to farmers, which encourages higher levels of 
production and trade than would be the case in the absence of such extensive 
levels of public support).”823 
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5.3.2.4 Export Taxes 
In Article 24 of the IEPA on “Duties, taxes or other fees and charges on exports” 
it is defined that no “new customs duties on exports or charges having 
equivalent effect shall be introduced, nor shall those already applied be 
increased”. Only in “exceptional circumstances” which are “specific revenue 
needs, protection of infant industries, or protection of the environment” SADC 
IEPA countries can introduce temporary export charges or charges having an 
equivalent effect after consultation with the European side. A review is foreseen 
after three years.824  
In ACP countries export taxes are sometimes used to encourage domestic 
value added production and in SACU countries they act as protection against 
South African companies.825 The use of export duties must be seen in the 
context of “the more limited range of policy tools open to developing countries in 
stimulating value-added processing.”826  
Although the restriction of export taxes is limited to the trade between Europe 
and the SADC IEPA countries “in the agriculture and food-and-drink sector 
there are concerns that such provisions could also limit the application of such 
duties on internal SACU trade.”827 
With regard to agriculture in ACP countries, export taxes are a “policy tool to 
promote value-added processing and the structural transformation of ACP 
economies, particular in the agricultural value chain”.828 Agritrade uses the 
example of Namibia where  
“government policies […] has encouraged the development of a 
slaughtering and meat-processing industry, as well as tanning and leather-
working industry. This has extended the beef-sector value chain in 
Namibia and created thousands of new jobs.”829 
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Moreover, the Namibian government also tries to apply this measure for the 
small-stock sector. Similarly, export taxes can be used as instrument to support 
the diversification of production by taxing exports of unprocessed goods and the 
rising local supply of inputs for processing prices are lowered on domestic 
markets. Export taxes can also contribute to export diversification if traditional 
exports are discriminated against. In this situation governments can encourage 
producers to switch to other products. Lui and Bilal argue that export duties can 
help to stabilise the macro-economy by influencing currency appreciation and 
contributing to food security objectives with the outcome of lowered prices.830 
Moreover, for ACP countries export duties can be an important source of 
government revenues and easier to administer than other forms of taxation.831  
Lui and Bilal list arguments that support the restriction of export taxes and 
analyse the interests of the European Union: export taxes restrict the supply of 
raw materials for European industries. Therefore, the EU makes the effort to 
reduce the practise of export duties in FTAs, at WTO level, and at other 
institutions at multilateral level.832 Therefore, the EPAs could serve as an 
example for multilateral and other FTA negotiations.833 
Moreover, according to the EC the use of export taxes violates the WTO 
provisions on “substantially all the trade” with regard to import as well as export 
regulations.834 While at WTO level there is no consensus on the inclusion of 
export duties in the scope of “substantially all the trade”, economic theory 
suggests that export taxes are trade distorting and might limit the increase of 
exports. However,  
“In general, export taxes are rarely the ‘first-best’ policy option, but have 
been used as a policy instrument where alternatives are expensive, 
unavailable or difficult to implement.”835 
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The IEPA contains some flexibility with regard to export duties as they allow the 
protection of infant industries and the environment. However, Lui and Bilal 
guess that it could be difficult to apply these provisions in practice.836 
Export taxes are not only contested at WTO level but even in developing 
countries. As a result of the increase in food prices in the first half 2008, some 
governments applied export restrictions to lower domestic prices and avoid food 
shortages. This introduction has not been welcomed in all developing countries, 
e.g., in Argentina people opposed the government’s decision. But export taxes 
could, in theory, provide the opportunity to react on food crises as FAO predicts 
that in medium-term and long-term food prices will remain high.837 In general, 
export taxes can contribute to diversification and agricultural development 
though they are not the “‘first-best’ policy option”838. 
5.3.2.5 Most Favoured Nation Provision 
In the MFN provisions of the SADC IEPA it is defined for the SADC countries, in 
case of a new FTA with developed or developing countries, that any favourable 
treatment provided to this new trading partner(s) must be provided to the EU as 
well; “the Parties will consult and jointly decide how best to implement the 
provisions”.839 This applies to the scope of liberalisation as well as the 
liberalisation of different tariff lines than in the IEPA. The clause is restricted on 
major trading partners that are defined as a country whose share of world 
merchandise exports is above 1% in the year before the agreement entered into 
force or regions whose share exceeds 1.5% of world merchandise exports in 
the same period.840 Lui and Bilal refer to the fact that this definition includes 
strong trading partners like India and Brazil and powerful regions like ASEAN 
and MERCOSUR. 
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The EC argument for the inclusion of the MFN clause into the IEPAs is the fair 
treatment of ACP countries: they should not be treated worse than their 
competitors with regard to trade in goods. Lui and Bilal show that Development 
Commissioner Michel links the MFN clause to development assistance:  
“The European Commission and our member states provide 56 percent of 
all development assistance in the world. It is difficult to say that Europe 
should let our partner countries treat our economic adversaries better than 
us. We are generous but not naive.”841 
Moreover, the Commission argues that the clause may restrict demands of 
future negotiating partners in FTA negotiations since any provisions will also 
have to be granted to the EU.842  
The concerns of NGOs and some ACP countries are related to the restrictions 
of relations between ACP countries and more developed developing countries. 
Favourable provisions granted to Brazil would to be granted to the EU as well 
and could restrict trade relations between EPA regions and these developing 
countries. 
South Centre states that provisions exchanged between developing countries 
would have to be provided to the EU, and therefore would be incompatible with 
the Enabling Clause and South-South trade integration.843 
Oxfam International analyses:  
“Just at the point when historical dependence on Europe is waning, this 
provision limits the leverage of ACP countries to negotiate favourable 
deals with the very countries where their exports are growing most rapidly. 
Brazil, supported by China and India, has raised concerns about this 
provision at the WTO.”844 
Another point of critique is that the MFN clause may constrain the sovereignty 
of the EPA/IEPA countries in pursuing trade relations with non-EU countries. 
ACP countries signing the EPA will be  
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“unable to offer them anything that could confer any trade advantage over 
the EU. The effect may be to discourage ACP States from taking steps to 
become more integrated into the global economy.”845 
Lastly, one aspect in the CARIFORUM EPA raises mistrust with regard to the 
European motivation and the threat to the development dimension. The 
CARIFORUM EPA MFN clause covers the treatment of goods, services, and 
investment but excludes an important services aspect: the temporary movement 
of natural persons (GATS mode 4).846 This is regarded as an example for the 
flexibility of the European side, which is available in certain circumstances and 
seems to be a political decision.  
Lui and Bilal propose increased flexibility with regard to the wording of the MFN 
clause that should clearly define that the Enabling Clause not will be affected 
and define more criteria to assess more favourable treatment. Moreover, they 
recommend to refrain from the automatic granting of MFN treatment and the 
introduction of conclusions between the trading partners.847 
As scope of liberalisation and tariff lines are affected the MFN clause could 
affect agricultural trade e.g., in the trade with Brazil and India.  
5.3.2.6 Free Movement of Goods and Regional Preference 
In Article 27 the free circulation of goods is defined and it is stated that 
“Customs duties shall be levied only once for goods originating in the EC Party 
or in the SADC EPA States in the territory of the other Party.”848 Moreover,  
“Any duty paid upon importation into a SADC EPA State shall be refunded 
fully when the goods are re-exported from the customs territory of the 
SADC EPA State of first importation. Such products shall then be subject 
to the duty in the country of consumption.”849 
Its aim is to further the facilitation of the movement of goods and the 
simplification of customs procedures.  
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While the provision itself is reasonable in trade between the EU and other 
common markets or customs unions it might be problematic in the trade 
between the EU and regions that have not yet integrated their internal markets: 
the “risk is that EU products circulate freely in EPA regions whereas local 
products still do not.”850 
Lui and Bilal define more precisely the cases where the free movement of 
goods can be problematic: if countries do not have a common external tariff or a 
common schedule for EPA tariff liberalisation, if they did not liberalise trade 
within themselves, and if there is no compensatory mechanism to redistribute 
duty revenues. These provisions can prevent countries from earning duty 
revenues because “duties were paid in one country but the goods were 
consumed in another.”851 
The clause on free circulation on goods might  
“undermine choices in individual countries’ liberalisation schedule, in terms 
of transitional periods and excluded goods – although the exceptions may 
make such objections redundant.”852 
As far as Southern Africa is concerned the provision is difficult with regard to 
regional integration: SACU countries receive the majority of imports via South 
Africa which is no SADC member.853 
Moreover, the reciprocity introduced “is rather ‘unequal’ since the challenges of 
implementation and compliance fall entirely on the ACP, with the clause merely 
reflecting what already happens in the EU.”854 
Lui and Bilal show that in the CARIFORUM EPA a “’best endeavour’ 
commitment” is included while the ESA IEPA does not seem to include a 
provision on the free movement of goods at all; this indicates that more flexibility 
with regard to this issue is possible.855 
Article 101 on “Regional preferences” states that  
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“Any more favourable treatment and advantage that may be granted under 
this Agreement by any SADC EPA State to the EC Party shall be enjoyed 
by the other SADC EPA States.”856 
Some observers are concerned that through this the EU has “direct control over 
regional integration” which is a threat to sovereignty and legitimacy. The 
breadth of a comprehensive EPA might restrict EPA regions from establishing 
their own regional integration process in cases of a lack of a binding agreement 
between members of a region (SPS, trade facilitation, services, and other 
issues).857 On the contrary, the EC argues that the clause supports regional 
integration by “ensuring that commitments which are not currently being 
honoured within respective regional integration agendas will now be taken more 
seriously”.858 
Lui and Bilal propose that it should be clarified if this clause applies to all 
provisions of the EPAs or only to scheduled commitments; moreover, “a simple 
reaffirmation of existing regional agreements in the EPA, might help to solve the 
problem.”859 
5.3.2.7 Supply-side Constraints and Competitiveness  
In the SADC IEPA an article on “Cooperation in supply-side competitiveness” is 
included. Article 11 states that it is necessary to increase competitiveness of 
SADC IEPA countries and remove supply-side constraints. It lists fields of 
cooperation including:  
“production, technology development and innovation, marketing, financing, 
distribution, transport, diversification of economic base, as well as 
development of the private sector, improvement of the trade and business 
environment and support to small and medium enterprises in the field of 
agriculture, fisheries, industry and services.”860 
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Agritrade criticises that no specific provisions on how to deal with commodity 
issues is entailed in the SADC IEPA and states that  
 “A clearer policy is required on how to deploy public aid in support of 
private-sector-led processes of trade and production adjustment in pursuit 
of clearly articulated public-policy objectives in ACP countries.”861 
Supply-side constraints with regard to agriculture like a lack of capital, transport, 
communications, and energy infrastructure, the poor management of public 
resources, low levels of technological know-how, a lack of fertiliser and 
irrigation, and limited agricultural production systems have severe 
consequences for the ACP economies. The stagnation of agricultural 
production, weak links between agriculture and other sectors, the degradation 
of natural resources and unfavourable climate conditions as well as the 
declining competitiveness on the global market encroach on the ACP countries’ 
agricultural sectors. Therefore the “agricultural sector must occupy a central 
position in these [EPA; K.B.] agreements.”862 
One opportunity to address the challenge of increasing competitiveness is the 
strengthening of diversification of agricultural production. The diversification 
towards value-added agricultural products in the trade with the EU can be 
tackled by identifying new distribution channels through which value-added 
goods can be launched at the European market. Moreover, commodity prices 
need to be stabilised by a stabilisation mechanism of the EU or simplified 
access to the European market. Simplified access to credit as well as eased 
SPS measures would contribute to the aim of launching SSA value-added 
agricultural products to the European market. The conversion of the production 
apparatus as well as the provision of adequate policy instruments would be 
necessary.863 
However, the diversification strategy should not only target the European luxury 
purchase markets by providing value-added goods but also the diversification 
into fair trade production could be an option although the shift is time consuming 
and costly. Furthermore, there is no exclusive way to access high price markets 
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but it is “intended to improve standards and fairness of production”.864 The 
diversification into non-agricultural products as well as the targeting of non-
European markets could be a strategy to decrease the dependence on a few 
unprocessed raw materials.  
However, farmers' organisations raise the issue that in the internal market low 
income levels require low cost products which are available to all sectors of 
population.865 
The SADC IEPA does not provide any specific provisions or binding financial 
provisions on supply-side constraints and competitiveness. As already shown in 
chapter 4, addressing supply-side constraints and competitiveness is crucial to 
support SSA countries in enhancing agriculture and economic development. 
5.3.3  Regional Integration 
SACU is the oldest customs union of the world founded in 1889 and was 
restructured between South Africa and three territories formerly under British 
protectorates: Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland in 1910. In 1969 the SACU 
agreement replaced the 1910 customs union agreement. Namibia joined in 
1990 before being a de facto member administered by South Africa. A revision 
of the 1969 agreement occurred in 2002. The 2002 agreement tried to improve 
the 1969 agreement with regard to enhanced regional integration through 
further harmonisation of trade policies. The renewed agreement aims at:  
• the movement of goods between the member states, 
• the establishment of effective, democratic, transparent institutions, 
• fair competition,  
• increasing investment, 
• improvement of economic development and diversification,  
• integration into world economy,  
• facilitation of sharing of revenues, 
• development of common policies and strategies.866 
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The common revenue pool requires that all customs, excise, and additional 
duties collected in the CU are paid in the common pool. The distribution is 
calculated on the basis of three components: customs component, excise 
component, and development component. Each member’s share is specifically 
calculated; the BLNS are compensated because they are disadvantaged 
compared with South Africa.867  
In Article 39 a common agricultural policy is defined but at a more general level: 
the importance of agriculture is recognised and member states agreed to “co-
operate on agricultural policies in order to ensure the co-ordinated development 
of the agricultural sector within the Common Customs Area.”868 
A result of the liberalisation process within the TDCA, the Common Revenue 
Pool as a compensatory mechanism for the smaller countries in the SACU is 
shrinking. Because it is a source of income for the smaller SACU countries their 
revenue is declining. In general, the impact of the TDCA on SACU countries is 
difficult to assess because tracking is difficult and a lack of data makes it more 
complicated.869 
The SADC was founded in 1992 to “promote sustainable and equitable 
economic growth and socio-economic development”, alleviate poverty, support 
regional integration, “consolidate, defend and maintain democracy, peace, 
security and stability”, and secure “self-sustaining development”.870 
The trade protocol signed in 1996 aimed at the establishment of a FTA within 
eight years. Products have been grouped in three categories with different 
liberalisation commitments – 2012 about 98% of SADC merchandise trade 
should be set at zero tariffs. SADC countries made different offers to SACU, 
non-SACU SADC countries, and to South Africa following the principle of 
asymmetric integration.871 According to Article 21 of the agreement agriculture 
is one area of cooperation.872 
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In Article 4 the IEPA of the SADC countries states that “regional integration is 
an integral element of their partnership and a powerful instrument to achieve the 
objectives of this Agreement” and is aimed at “greater economic opportunities, 
enhanced political stability and to foster the effective integration of developing 
countries into the world economy.” Moreover, it is highlighted that the “pace and 
content of their regional integration is determined exclusively by the SADC EPA 
States in the exercise of their sovereignty.”873  
Although EPAs aimed at the strengthening of regional integration; thereby, 
supporting the integration into the global economy, there emerged several 
obstacles that will make it difficult for EPAs to support the regional integration in 
ACP countries particularly in SSA.  
Stevens et al. state that EPAs became an “additional layer of complexity” to the 
“already intricate picture of regional integration in Africa.”874 The EPA grouping 
did not match the already existing configurations. Oxfam International states 
that  
“The EPA negotiations are splintering existing regional alignments and 
forcing ACP countries to choose the body through which they will negotiate 
with the EU. This is particularly the case in Southern and Eastern Africa, 
where parties to the Southern Africa Development Community (SADC) 
Trade Protocol have split into three groups”.875  
SADC Trade protocol countries negotiated under the ESA configuration, the 
Central African configuration, and the Southern African group. 
The European Commission states that the imposition of EPA configurations can 
help SSA to arrange regional integration in Africa and end the regional 
confusion.  
In a letter responding to concerns of Namibian civil society organisations 
Mandelson states that  
“the EPA can play its part in simplifying trade relations to the benefit of 
traders in the region and in Europe. In the SADC EPA group for instance, 
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trade was governed before by four different regimes […]. Overall, the EPA 
should streamline existing trade relations between the EU and countries in 
Southern Africa.”876 
But Bilal and Braun-Munzinger state that  
“Whether a regional integration process can be driven or supported by 
external forces such as the EU or should be internally driven in order to be 
sustainable is a question that can ultimately only be answered by the 
African (and by extension, the ACP) countries themselves.”877 
The outcome at the end of 2007 worsened the situation. Apart from the fact that 
EPAs splintered existing regional configurations, not even the constructed EPA 
regions initialled agreements as a whole. Individual countries and sub-regions 
agreed to the interim EPAs; though ACP countries and EU stated similarly that 
they will negotiate towards comprehensive EPAs including all EPA countries, 
the outcome is completely unsettled.  
Furthermore, the different market access commitments within one region might 
create new regional barriers of trade which contradicts the original intentions of 
the EPAs. 
Bilal and Braun-Munzinger provide three alternatives for the future development 
of the SADC EPA region; the role of South Africa will be crucial as well as the 
services and trade-related issues and their inclusion in the comprehensive 
EPAs. As already stated Botswana, Lesotho, and Swaziland prefer the inclusion 
of these issues into the full EPAs while Namibia and South Africa reject this 
proposal. One option describes the inclusion of South Africa in the regional EPA 
and the establishment of identical liberalisation schedules but varying degrees 
of commitments on trade-related issues and services. In the second option 
South Africa is also included in the EPA but the agreement is limited to the 
liberalisation of goods. Negotiations on services and trade-related issues could 
continue at a later stage. The third option acts on the assumption that South 
Africa will not sign the EPA and continues trading under the TDCA:  
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“This may jeopardise the relevance, and ultimately survival, of SACU. 
Hence, the opportunity of promoting stronger coherence in SACU and 
SADC through an EPA would be lost.“878 
The development of regional markets is helpful for African agriculture with 
regard to food security issues, improved market access for small producers, 
and the opportunity of higher returns of investment than through the export to 
European markets. Unfortunately, SSA countries face a lot of constraints: high 
transport costs, the small size of regional and local markets, informal trade 
barriers, and – this will be discussed in this chapter – the fragmentation of 
regional areas through EPAs.879 
Regarding agriculture, the integration of national and regional markets can 
support price stabilisation and the diversification of production. Measures to 
support agricultural development is the prioritisation of agriculture at the 
regional level, the adequate sequencing of liberalisation (strengthening of 
national production before market opening), a flexible timetable for negotiations, 
improving supply-side issues, the establishment of regional strategies, and the 
harmonisation of standards at regional levels. Moreover, the diversification of 
agricultural production is necessary to reduce the SSA countries’ dependency 
on commodity exports.880 
The degree of regional integration is relatively low in Southern Africa and a 
common agricultural policy is rather weak, while national agricultural policies 
are relatively restricted by liberalisation efforts in the 1980s and 1990s. The 
relatively low degree of intra-regional trade in general and, in particular, in 
agriculture constricts Southern African countries from developing their 
economies and participating in world trade. Regional integration could benefit 
food security, improve market access, and create higher returns on investment 
but is limited due to supply-side constraints, e.g., insufficient infrastructure. 
Despite official rhetoric, regional integration has been negatively affected by the 
creation of EPA regional configurations that ignored existing regional integration 
efforts. Moreover, the conclusion of interim EPAs with individual countries and 
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sub-regions contributed to further disintegration. The future of this development 
is unclear: in the SADC EPA region countries could be divided further if 
Botswana, Lesotho, and Swaziland sign the IEPA in 2009 and Angola, Namibia, 
and South Africa will not sign.  
5.3.4  Revenue Losses 
The SADC IEPA deals with this issue but only at a general level in the following 
provisions. Article 7 “Development cooperation framework” states that both 
parties cooperate “to support the SADC EPA States' trade and development 
strategies within the overall SADC regional integration process.” It is stated that 
the “cooperation can take financial and non financial forms.”881 
Article 8 is more specific on “Development finance cooperation” which is a 
“crucial element” of the partnership. It refers to the development finance 
cooperation of the Cotonou Partnership Agreement, European Development 
Fund and the General Budget of the EU. Moreover, the article alludes to the 
financing of EU member states as well as other donors and states that an  
“EPA fund would provide a useful instrument for efficiently channelling 
development financial resources and for implementing EPA accompanying 
measures. The EC Party agrees to support the efforts of the region to set 
up such a mechanism.”882 
Article 17 on the “Cooperation on fiscal adjustment” acknowledges the fiscal 
revenue losses as result of the liberalisation of customs duties. Cooperation 
should include the “support to fiscal reforms” and  
“on support measures complementary to fiscal reforms for the mitigation of 
the net fiscal impact of EPA that will be determined in accordance with a 
jointly agreed mechanism.”883 
The EC has not been willing to discuss financial issues during the negotiations 
since the Regional Preparatory Task Forces (RPTF) has the mandate to link 
EPA negotiations with the programming of EC development finance. The 10th 
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EDF finalised in 2008 disposes of 22.7 billion Euro for the period between 2007 
and 2013. Moreover, the EU member states agreed in 2006 to provide a 
substantial share of the AfT funding to ACP countries for trade-related 
assistance. But above all Europe is not willing to provide binding commitments 
in the Economic Partnership Agreements.884 
Hofmann refers to the fact that translating AfT “into concrete and effective 
action proves to be a continuous challenge.”885 She highlights that the AfT 
packages are not only “another financial commitment at the regional level” but 
“tools to better align the process of regional integration and EPA support on the 
one hand, and donor coordination on the other.”886  
SSA governments are heavily dependent on import duties: on average the tariff 
revenue accounts for 7-10% of government revenue. Since a high share of ACP 
imports comes from the EU the liberalisation of tariffs might have a drastic 
effect. As already shown several studies assessing the potential losses arrive at 
different conclusions.887 But even if the losses seem to be low they might have 
a high impact. South Centre states that  
“For instance, for Burundi, Cameroon, Congo, Kenya and Mauritius the 
loss in tariff revenue could be greater than their entire spending on health. 
In Congo, Mauritius and Togo, the drop in their government revenue from 
trade liberalisation under an EPA is nearly equivalent to their government 
expenditure on education.”888 
Stevens et al.’s analysis for SADC countries, particularly Mozambique asserts: 
“As a result of its EPA liberalisation Mozambique will lose theoretical 
revenue of $10 million. Unsurprisingly, given the front loading of the 
liberalisation, 91% of this loss will take place in 2008.“889 
According to them “it is Côte d’Ivoire and Mozambique that will be hit most and 
soonest.”890 For the BLNS countries the situation is more difficult:  
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“The majority of countries face a severe short-term revenue shock […]. 
BLNS are included in the table for the sake of completeness but, of course, 
their revenue is determined by the SACU revenue-sharing formula and will 
be barely affected directly by the EPA. Were the EPA to lead, though, to 
the dissolution of SACU (which cannot be ruled out though hopefully it is 
not probable), the revenue effects would be very, very severe.”891 
With regard to the exclusion of sensitive products, African ACP countries have 
to trade off government revenue need against the protection of domestic 
activity. If countries concentrate on the exclusion of high-level tariffs they would 
have to liberalise the medium-level ones but “mid-level tariffs raise the most 
revenue”.892 
Stevens and Kennan conclude that “all the states would lose a substantial share 
of their theoretical revenue of imports from the EU if exemptions were 
concentrated on items with the highest tariffs.”893 They reason that  
“most countries will feel obliged to allocate part of the ‘exclusion basket’ to 
items that are important for revenue raising and the corollary that some 
items with higher-than-marginal applied tariffs will be liberalised in order to 
‘make room’ in the basket.”894  
As already shown SADC IEPA countries excluded products with high tariffs but 
also products at zero tariff rates.  
South Centre discusses ways to mitigate losses from decreased government 
revenues. They also mention the necessity of deciding between the objectives 
of protecting domestic agricultural and industrial production on one hand and 
tariff revenue on the other. Moreover, ACP countries should improve their 
collection efficiency and tax administration. Improving tariff collection rates 
could be a solution to the problem, but they are difficult to implement and 
enforce. A broadened tax base could be conducive to mitigating this problem 
but the introduction of a consumption tax would harm the poorest because their 
income is used to buy food stuffs. Finally, South Centre states that experiences 
from the past do not encourage this attempt in that the revenue recovery in low 
income countries “has been particular weak. For each $1 of trade tax revenue 
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low-income countries have lost from liberalisation, they have recovered no more 
than 30c at best.”895 
The consequences of losses of government revenue could be twofold. First, 
“State capacity to finance public policies” will be negatively affected (though 
already at a relatively low level since SAPs in the 1990s). Second, there could 
emerge an “impact of the transfer of taxation from frontier to internal taxation on 
the competitiveness of formal sector enterprises” that will affect the agro-food 
processing industry.896 An indirect effect might be the reduction of public 
spending on education and health that will threaten rural populations and 
smallholder families who are highly dependent on local employment.  
5.3.5 Services and New Generation Issues  
Chapter 11 of the SADC IEPA is concerned with ongoing negotiations towards 
a comprehensive EPA. It states that the negotiating parties – Botswana, 
Lesotho, Mozambique, and Swaziland – commit to the continuation “of 
negotiations in 2008 to extend the scope of this agreement.”897 Angola, 
Namibia, and South Africa will have the opportunity to join negotiations at a later 
stage. Botswana, Lesotho, Mozambique, and Swaziland were obliged to 
negotiate services until the end of 2008 including: a “liberalisation schedule for 
one services sector for each participating SADC EPA state”, a commitment to a 
standstill for all services sectors, and an obligation to negotiate the other 
services sectors within three years. On investment, the IEPA state that the 
parties negotiate an investment chapter until the end of 2008. With regard to 
competition:  
“The EC Party agrees to cooperate with a view to strengthening regional 
capacity in the areas of competition and government procurement 
                                            
895 South Centre: Trade liberalisation and the difficult shift towards reciprocity in the EPAs, 
2007, p.20. 
896 EAFF, PROPAC, ROPPA, SACAU, WINF: Midterm review of the Economic Partnership 
Agreements, 2006, p.10. 
897 Council of the European Union: Interim Economic Partnership Agreement between the 
SADC EPA States, on the one part, and the European Community and its Member States, on 
the other part, 2008, Chapter 11, Article 67. 
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Negotiations will only be envisaged once adequate regional capacity has 
been built.”898 
SADC IEPA countries have not been able to abide by the ambitious timeframe; 
negotiations continue in 2009. SADC IEPA countries are divided with regard to 
negotiations on services and other trade-related issues: Namibia and South 
Africa refuse to negotiate while Botswana, Lesotho, and Swaziland push for 
negotiations.  
Khumalo states that these countries were ambitious, in that the liberalisation of 
national trade in services should take place “in order to deepen national 
economic integration, to have coordinated positions vis-à-vis third parties and to 
improve their participation and influence at the multilateral level.”899 
Services are of vital importance for SSA economies; the share of the services 
sector in total GDP accounts for 43% in SADC and over 50% for Botswana.900 
Moreover,  
“Efficient and affordable services help workers and producers to gain a fair 
share in the global economy, providing access to credit for starting a 
business, communication with customers, and transportation of goods to 
the marketplace. Essential services – including water, health care, and 
education – are fundamental to a decent life everywhere.”901 
Oxfam International refers to the fact that the liberalisation of services entails 
dangers for developing countries: the opening up of services like banking to 
foreign investors led to a reduced rather than increased access to credit in SSA, 
particularly in rural areas.902 Oxfam International analyses the Caribbean EPA 
and states that national treatment impedes Caribbean countries from treating 
domestic companies differently; thereby,  
“limiting the number of suppliers, or providing requirements that foreign-
service companies train and employ local people or that they provide 
benefits to local communities affected by the service.”903 
                                            
898 Ibid. 
899 Khumalo, N.: CARIFORUM EPA and beyond: Recommendations for negotiations on 
services and trade related issues. EPA negotiations on trade in services: Implications and 
recommendations for Southern Africa, 2008, p.10. 
900 South Centre: EPA negotiations in Southern Africa, 2007, p.22. 
901 Oxfam International: Partnership or power play?, 2008, p.21. 
902 Ibid. 
903 Ibid., p.22. 
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Moreover, governments could be prevented from providing affordable essential 
services, like water and education. For instance,  
“By making an irreversible commitment to private sector provision in these 
essential services sectors, countries are placing themselves on a slippery 
slope. In the event that the participation of foreign companies does not 
assist countries to meet national development objectives and unexpectedly 
undermine access for the poorest and most vulnerable people in society, 
the EPA provisions make it very difficult for countries to alter conditions of 
foreign providers.”904 
Meanwhile, it is most important for developing countries’ services sector to gain 
improved access to the European market. But restricted access of highly-
educated professionals, resulting from many requirements, undermines 
potential gains.905  
Braude and Sekolokwane assume that the EU insistence on services and trade-
related issues is related to the potential that the SADC EPA may serve as a 
precedent. “Once this has been achieved, it would then be able to seek similar 
provisions in deals with countries with larger markets that offer even greater 
potential for European firms.”906 
They argue that “the ‘hard-line’ approach to the SADC-EPA negotiations may 
have more to do with the potential India and other markets than SADC itself.”907 
With regard to agriculture, services could be an “important intermediary for the 
traditional agricultural and industrial sectors, particular through financial, 
telecommunications, transport, and distribution services”.908 
There are challenges with the export of services (all SADC IEPA countries are 
net importers of services). These challenges include weak transport services, 
expensive telecommunication services, and an expected tourism boom with 
only a limited export capacity of support infrastructure (e.g. hotels, roads 
etc.).909 
                                            
904 Ibid., p.24. 
905 Ibid. 
906 Braude/Sekolokwane: Sustainable development, 2008, p.63. 
907 Ibid. 
908 South Centre: EPA negotiations in Southern Africa, 2007, p.22. 
909 Ibid. 
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5.4 EPA Negotiations and Outcome – Conclusions  
These considerations were based on the negotiated outcome at the end of 2007 
where the goods-only agreements have been initialled. With regard to the role 
of agriculture in EPA negotiations and, in particular, in the IEPA of the SADC 
IEPA countries, it is relatively difficult to assess the role that agriculture has 
played. There are only a few direct provisions on agriculture in the agreement 
and so indirect provisions that might affect agriculture must also be considered.  
Above all, the market access for agricultural products to the EU is considered 
one of the most important issues in the negotiations. As already shown, the 
SADC IEPA countries have few offensive interests regarding improved market 
access with the exception of meat, fruit, and vegetables. Sugar would have 
been an important product for Swaziland, but sugar and rice are exempted from 
liberalisation until 2009 and 2015 respectively. Most importantly for SADC IEPA 
countries but also for the other negotiating groups, has been maintaining their 
access to the European market. The EU did not offer any alternatives, thus ACP 
countries would have to fall back on the GSP system if they would not initial an 
EPA, which would have implied tariff increases for their most important export 
products.  
The rapid liberalisation schedule and the low number of excluded products 
(though some are agricultural) may have a negative impact on agriculture and 
could result in unfair competition that will threaten the domestic agricultural 
markets and the livelihoods of rural producers in African countries. Moreover, 
the standstill clause and the prohibition against using export taxes do not 
support agricultural policy, particularly because the exceptions for the use of 
export taxes do not address agricultural issues. The standstill clause and export 
tax provisions do not allow SADC IEPA countries to apply a flexible agricultural 
policy. Moreover, agriculture is not adequately reflected in addressing supply-
side constraints and competitiveness; only a small and more general article 
handles this issue. The effect of the IEPA on regional integration is 
disappointing and will not contribute to increased regional trade that might 
benefit the agricultural sector. Finally, agriculture could be negatively affected 
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due to the weak provisions for financing and the loss of government revenue 
could also have an impact on agricultural policies.  
Generally, agriculture played an important role in the provisions on market 
access to the European market, but has had a small and relatively unimportant 
role in the other provisions like those on trade in goods – although the impact 
could be immense.  
One reason could be that nearly all considerations were subordinated under the 
market access issue due to the high cost in the event of a fall back on the GSP 
system. Moreover, it is evident that exporters exerted pressure on their 
governments (e.g., in Namibia) to initial EPAs to maintain their market access. 
Other interest groups were less organised and could not raise their voices in the 
same way as economically powerful actors could. And as Weller and Ullmer 
state, governments tend to overestimate the role of exporters in trade 
negotiations.910 The interests of smallholder farmers and the rural poor were not 
taken into account. 
Furthermore, the agreements were concluded in haste and under immense 
pressure of the approaching deadline at the end of 2007. SADC negotiators at 
the technical level had little time to analyse the provisions carefully before 
initialling the agreements. The fact that many issues of the IEPA are currently 
contested supports this assumption.  
Lastly, raising concerns in the course of negotiations could have been subject to 
tactical considerations: liberalisation of trade is contentious domestically in ACP 
countries. ACP governments could have called for the same internal reforms 
within the EU that the EU was calling for in their countries. 
The EU aimed at several issues in the beginning of negotiations. Most important 
was the introduction of reciprocity in order to comply with WTO rules. The scope 
and speed of proposed reforms called for a liberalisation of 90% for the EU and 
of 80% for ACP countries over a period of 15 years. Moreover, the EU 
highlighted the importance of both regional integration and integration into the 
world economy. Another important point has been the negotiations on 
Singapore issues. The European Commission refused to include financial 
                                            
910 Weller/Ullmer: Trade and Governance, 2008, p.13. 
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commitments in the EPAs to address supply-side constraints and 
competitiveness issues. At the beginning of 2008 after initialling the IEPAs the 
EU emphasised the need to negotiate comprehensive EPAs. The Commission 
stated repeatedly that there would be no renegotiation of contentious issues 
except in the negotiations towards comprehensive EPAs.  
ACP countries, in particular, SADC IEPA states tried first to maintain their 
preferential access to the EU market without reciprocity. Failing to do so, they 
emphasised the importance of asymmetry in the new trade negotiations with the 
European Union. In the beginning of the negotiations they requested for a 
scope of liberalisation of 60-70% over a period of up to 25 years. Regarding 
improving their market access to the European market, the enhancement of 
SPS and TBT provisions was crucial for SADC IEPA countries. SADC IEPA 
countries insisted on the provision of additional funding aimed at supply-side 
constraints, potential revenue losses as a result of tariff reduction, and capacity 
building. SADC countries were not willing to negotiate Singapore issues.  
In their framework proposal in 2006, SADC IEPA countries proposed an 
approach to the TDCA provisions, they requested for improved rules of origin, 
and they asked for increased financial support. Two other proposals were 
modified in the course of negotiations. First, in mid-2007, under pressure from 
the approaching deadline, SADC IEPA countries accepted the inclusion of 
services in the negotiations. Second, they also accepted the TDCA market 
access provisions.  
Regarding the outcome of negotiations on market access to the European 
Union, the DFQF offer cannot be overestimated. SADC IEPA countries only 
have a few offensive interests with regard to a small number of agricultural 
products and the IEPA is only weak in addressing SPS and TBT. But SADC 
countries were able to secure their market access to the EU at all with the IEPA 
which has been crucial for them. While the EU has few offensive interests 
concerning market access, its offer improved the EU’s negotiating position in 
2007 and increased pressure on ACP countries to make a market access offer 
themselves. SADC IEPA countries benefit from the DFQF, but they were not 
able to negotiate stronger provisions regarding SPS and TBT. 
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The liberalisation schedule for SADC IEPA countries is far from the original 
SADC offer and even farther from the EU proposal on liberalisation of market 
access in ACP countries. A rapid, front-loaded liberalisation will occur within a 
short period of time and few products are exempted from liberalisation. While 
the European Commission achieved its aim of introducing reciprocity and 
thereby achieving WTO compatibility, SADC countries did not. Several reasons 
might have played a role for this outcome: SADC IEPA countries did not 
negotiate more generous provisions because the TDCA is applied de facto. 
Moreover, due to the haste at the end of 2007, SADC IEPA countries 
subordinated this issue in order to focus on maintaining their access to the 
European market. Tactical considerations could be of importance, too.  
The more detailed provisions on trade liberalisation, i.e., the standstill clause, 
export taxes, and safeguards are difficult to assess because there is no 
information available on the position of SADC countries at the beginning of the 
negotiations. Some of these provisions go beyond WTO requirements, the 
agreements were concluded in haste, and some of these provisions are already 
under renegotiation. SADC IEPA countries do not seem to be satisfied with 
these provisions. The European Commission defines these provisions as 
complement to the liberalisation commitments and allows renegotiation only in 
the negotiations towards full EPAs.  
With regard to supply-side constraints and competitiveness, the rather weak 
provisions in the SADC IEPA (no operationalisation, no binding financial 
commitments), SADC countries did not achieve what they aimed for. After the 
European Commission opposed the inclusion of these issues in the EPA it 
could be regarded as compromise that the provisions are included in the IEPA.  
As far as regional integration is concerned, both negotiating partners are not 
satisfied because several market access offers within one region resulted in the 
disintegration and the potential for further division of the SADC IEPA region 
(Botswana, Lesotho, and Swaziland on the one side, Namibia, Angola, and 
South Africa on the other side). At the end of 2007 this issue was also 
subordinated to maintain market access to the European market and WTO 
compatibility. 
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The problem of revenue losses is included in the IEPA: despite the lack of 
binding commitments from the EU negotiated in the agreement, the EU offers 
AfT funding to support trade-related issues in EPAs. This is not what the SADC 
IEPA countries aimed for since these resources are provided unilaterally and 
not negotiated, but it is a compromise with regard to additional funding.  
SADC IEPA countries committed themselves to negotiate towards 
comprehensive EPAs including the liberalisation of services. While details are 
currently under negotiation it can be noted that SADC IEPA countries originally 
refused to include the liberalisation of services but they offered it in mid-2007 in 
view of the approaching deadline. This put pressure on the EU to accept the 
compromise and negotiate only services and investment rather than all issues it 
declares necessary to make EPAs development-friendly. 
The negotiating structure is characterised by an asymmetric power relationship 
between the powerful EU and the rather weak ACP countries, which is reflected 
permanently in these EPA negotiations. ACP countries struggle with a lack of 
negotiating capacity as well as a weak resource base. The delay in negotiations 
intensified these problems and they had neither time nor capacity to carefully 
assess the EPA draft at the end of 2007. Moreover, the complex negotiations 
on numerous issues oppose their weak capacity. Furthermore, they are 
relatively dependent on the EU, for instance, regarding financial support in the 
framework of the EDF and other development funding. The regional 
configuration for negotiations was determined by the European Commission 
and was further weakened during negotiations. SADC IEPA countries were not 
able to develop strong common negotiating positions. Lastly, the phasing of the 
negotiations and the expiry of the waiver at the end of 2007 resulted in 
immense pressure on ACP countries. This led to the subordination of crucial 
issues under the primary objective of maintaining their market access to the 
European market.  
The largest obstacle during the entire negotiating process was the fact that both 
partners insisted on their positions and were unwilling to make concessions to 
the other partner. Due to the immense delay in the negotiations, substantial 
dialogue did not take place until the summer of 2007. By then neither partner 
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had the time nor the capacity to conclude negotiations by exchanging positions. 
ACP countries have not been able to convince the European Commission to 
extend the waiver or find another solution, which would allow them to conclude 
the negotiations carefully and with more time. The EU had a relatively harsh 
position during the EPA negotiations: it refused to offer any alternatives, 
provided no additional funding within the EPA framework, insisted on the expiry 
of the waiver, exerted immense pressure in the negotiations, escalated the 
negotiating situation at the end of 2007 offering the two-step approach in last-
minute, and refuses to renegotiate contentious issues in the framework of 
IEPAs. The DFQF offer in 2007 increased the incentive for ACP countries to 
sign the EPA and together with the impending waiver pushed for the conclusion 
of the agreements at the end of 2007. The EU increased its reliability and 
improved its negotiating position. The two-step approach was offered in last 
minute – the European Commission exerted the pressure on ACP countries as 
long as possible. Despite the threat to impose tariffs on ACP countries’ exports, 
it would have been impossible to increase tariffs for poorest countries in the 
world. Therefore, the IEPA offer was an opportunity to save face and to secure 
the continuation of negotiations in 2008. 
In the IEPA ACP countries committed themselves to continue negotiations until 
the end of 2008; because of the remaining contentious issues the negotiations 
have not yet been finalised. It is likely that some of the provisions affecting 
agriculture directly or indirectly will be subject to change. 
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6 Conclusions and Outlook 
The question, Will Southern African countries develop their economies soon, 
alleviate poverty, and integrate into the world economy – despite the financial 
crisis or as a result of it? is difficult to answer. Their economies still depend on a 
few export commodities and there is still a low degree of diversification towards 
processed agricultural goods and manufactured products. This is the reason 
why the economic crisis might hit them hard in the light of falling prices for 
primary goods. The attempt to shift economies towards diversification is existent 
but transformation of economies is expensive – it is doubtful if additional funding 
will be available, particularly in view of the emerging economic crisis. The EPAs 
do not provide additional funding except for Aid for Trade measures and 
considered regional funds, but funding for concrete operationalisation is still 
outstanding.  
Moreover, it is difficult to assess whether trade liberalisation within the free 
trade agreements will benefit Southern African countries or will be a threat to 
their volatile economies. First, negotiations are not yet finalised and the 
outcome of negotiations in 2009 is unclear. Furthermore, even if 
(comprehensive) EPAs are in force it will take time until it is possible to assess 
their economic and political impact. Thirdly, EPAs are complex agreements 
dealing with various provisions – it will be difficult to distinguish their impact 
from other factors, for instance, other free trade agreements or global factors. 
The fact that EPAs are very complex agreements contains the danger that 
individual preconditions of the particular countries are not taken adequately into 
account; a more differentiated development strategy could be necessary.  
EPAs are of high importance in the trade relations between EU and ACP 
countries but also in international trade. EPA and WTO negotiations run parallel 
but the EPA outcome for the Southern African region goes far beyond WTO 
provisions and could influence WTO negotiations as well as other free trade 
negotiations serving as precedence. In the WTO negotiations, concessions 
were made and arguments have been exchanged back and forth. Moreover, the 
negotiations are open-ended and for this reason an important instrument to 
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exert pressure on the trading partner that would lose most in case of non-
signing, is not available. In comparison, EPA negotiations were delayed until 
mid-2007 and then were concluded in haste with the looming deadline in sight. 
The political relevance of EPA negotiations and outcome is not only the impact 
on WTO and other trade negotiations between developed and developing 
countries, but also their implications for EU and SADC countries. The EPA 
negotiations illustrate a significant change in EU ACP relations; unfortunately, 
many ACP countries feel fleeced and doubt whether these new relations could 
be described as a partnership. While the EU might have achieved its objective 
to conclude WTO compatible trade agreements and secure its access to raw 
materials, the relations between EU and its former colonies could be seriously 
damaged.  
During the negotiations on Economic Partnership Agreements the negotiating 
partners completely disagreed regarding the development dimension of the 
EPAs. The European Commission highlighted that development concerns are 
examined in the Cotonou Partnership Agreement and EPAs will boost trade 
through liberalisation, regional integration, and integration into the world 
economy. Moreover, trade-related issues complete the development dimension 
of the trade agreements and funding is secured in EDF and AfT. The ACP 
countries insisted on their position that trade alone is no sufficient instrument to 
strengthen their development and additional funding is necessary to address 
supply-side constraints, potential revenue losses as result of tariff reductions, 
and competitiveness. The trading partners advanced their views at the 
beginning of the negotiating process and continue to advance these views 
today. During the EPA negotiations, these different opinions did not reconcile. 
Nevertheless, the agreements were initialled at the end of 2007, but not as a 
result of a well-balanced negotiating process with negotiating parties 
exchanging views and finding togetherness by making concessions. In fact, the 
negotiating process has been characterised by enormous delays – despite the 
beginning of negotiations in 2002, substantial negotiations took place in mid-
2007 with a looming deadline. The expiry of the waiver at the end of 2007 and 
the, legitimate or illegitimate, insistence of the European Commission asserting 
 197
that the only alternative options would be either to sign an EPA or to fall back on 
the less generous GSP system; thus, imposing tariffs on the poorest countries 
in the world and exerted enormous pressure on the ACP countries. The EU 
presented drafts for the agreements in autumn 2007 and in many cases 
technical negotiators did not read these drafts before they were initialled at the 
political level.  
Chapter 2 has shown that agriculture is of high importance in WTO Doha 
negotiations, one of the most contentious issues is the question of the 
safeguard (SSM). In these WTO negotiations, new coalitions negotiated 
relatively successfully while EPA negotiations have been characterised by the 
fragmentation of regions in the course of negotiations. The already existing 
asymmetric power relations became more important in this constellation. 
Chapter 2 together with chapter 5 have also shown that WTO rules on trade 
agreements were crucial in EPA negotiations because WTO compliance was 
one of the strongest arguments for the necessity to conclude EPAs and during 
the negotiations the looming deadline was a persuasive reason to initial the 
agreements. 
In chapter 3 the importance of European agriculture was discussed and it was 
shown that despite the low share in GDP, agriculture is still relevant in 
European countries. Moreover, the CAP is an instrument to strengthen the EU 
position in WTO negotiations, while WTO negotiations are an incentive to 
reform the CAP towards less support and more liberalisation. The ambivalence 
between protection of agriculture and liberalisation attempts still exists; CAP 
reform is still a challenge and not yet completed. 
The central role of agriculture in ACP countries, in particular, SADC states was 
discussed in chapter 4. It was shown that agriculture is crucial for SADC 
economies despite the heterogeneity of these countries. Even though the 
contribution to GDP differs between these countries, agricultural trade is 
important and agriculture is essential for the large rural population that 
characterises all SADC countries. Moreover, agriculture is central to food 
security and the livelihoods of millions of small-scale farmers. 
 198
Chapter 5 analysed the role of agriculture in EPA negotiations and outcome. In 
comparison with the WTO negotiations, where agriculture plays an important 
role and is an independent area of negotiation, in the EPA negotiating process 
agriculture is negotiated under the area of market access. Therefore, only few 
provisions in the IEPAs deal directly with agriculture; most provisions impact the 
agricultural sector indirectly. This approach contradicts the central role 
agriculture plays in African economies as shown in chapter 4. The most 
important provision addresses the market access of ACP countries to the 
European market. The fall back on the GSP system would have had serious 
consequences for ACP countries; therefore, countries were striving to maintain 
their (nearly) duty-free and quota-free market access for their agricultural 
exports. Provisions regarding the market opening of the ACP countries do not 
reflect the crucial role agriculture plays in the ACP economies. The trade 
agreement between South Africa and the EU SADC IEPA countries and, 
because of their membership in the SACU, the TDCA provisions are de facto 
applied in SADC IEPA countries could have been one reason for the broad 
liberalisation commitments of the SADC IEPA countries. The subordination of 
all negotiating issues under the maintenance of market access to the European 
market contributed to the underestimation of agriculture in the IEPA provisions 
as well.  
Since the market opening conditions at WTO level are still unclear, many ACP 
countries would have to open their markets to European competition quickly 
and extensively. This could result in a threat at WTO level to concede deeper 
liberalisation commitments because EPAs might serve as precedents.  
With regard to the CAP, the fact that ACP countries agricultural exports should 
increasingly target luxury purchase markets is not adequately reflected in the 
SADC IEPA – provisions on SPS and other standards are relatively weak and 
do not provide any financial support. Moreover, the CAP still allows agricultural 
subsidies; therefore, the quick and extensive market opening for some ACP 
countries and sub-regions might have a negative impact on them due to unfair 
competition.  
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Because this thesis is descriptive and endeavours to provide a basis for serious 
and profound analysis, further investigation is necessary. Potential changes in 
the (I)EPAs during the negotiations in 2009 and beyond must be considered 
carefully. A more detailed analysis of the different actors in the negotiating 
process is required as soon as facts and data are available. Moreover, an 
examination of other relevant sectors for ACP countries and, in particular, 
SADC states is necessary to analyse the impact of these trade agreements on 
the African economies more broadly.  
In this text one question has not been considered: the request for support to 
deal with supply-side constraints and competitiveness issues ignores the 
question what kind of agriculture should be supported at all. Hoering states that 
“another agriculture is possible”911 and questions the attempt to bring the green 
revolution to SSA. He draws attention to the fact that sustainable agriculture of 
smallholders is already highly productive. The strengthening of smallholder 
farmers would result in increased food security – these farmers produce for 
home consumption and sell the remaining produce at local markets without 
costs for expensive inputs. Their use of local techniques, application of own 
seeds, composting as well as biological pest control would reduce their 
dependence on highly volatile markets. Furthermore, agriculture is multi-
functional and responsible for environmental, water, and climate issues. The 
smallholder farmers often produce organic agriculture with the use of 
Mapambano, the exchange of seeds, small decentralised irrigation systems and 
other elements. According to Hoering this allows a high degree of autonomy for 
the rural population in Africa. One should not try to bring a second green 
revolution to Africa, instead one should realise that the “backwardness” of Africa 
could be a chance for sustainability and food security.  
 
                                            
911 Hoering: Agrarkolonialismus in Afrika, 2007, p.141 et seq. 
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8 Annex 
European Community/ACP Group of States: Partnership agreement 
between the members of the African, Caribbean and Pacific group of 
states, of the one part, and the European Community and its member 
states, of the other part, signed in Cotonou, 23 June 2000. 
 
 
ARTICLE 1 
Objectives of the partnership 
The Community and its Member States, of the one part, and the ACP States, of 
the other part, hereinafter referred to as the "Parties" hereby conclude this 
Agreement in order to promote and expedite the economic, cultural and social 
development of the ACP States, with a view to contributing to peace and 
security and to promoting a stable and democratic political environment.  
The partnership shall be centred on the objective of reducing and eventually 
eradicating poverty consistent with the objectives of sustainable development 
and the gradual integration of the ACP countries into the world economy. 
These objectives and the Parties’ international commitments shall inform all 
development strategies and shall be tackled through an integrated approach 
taking account at the same time of the political, economic, social, cultural and 
environmental aspects of development. The partnership shall provide a 
coherent support framework for the development strategies adopted by each 
ACP State. 
Sustained economic growth, developing the private sector, increasing 
employment and improving access to productive resources shall all be part of 
this framework. Support shall be given to the respect of the rights of the 
individual and meeting basic needs, the promotion of social development and 
the conditions for an equitable distribution of the fruits of growth. Regional and 
sub-regional integration processes which foster the integration of the ACP 
countries into the world economy in terms of trade and private investment shall 
be encouraged and supported. Building the capacity of the actors in 
development and improving the institutional framework necessary for social 
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cohesion, for the functioning of a democratic society and market economy, and 
for the emergence of an active and organised civil society shall be integral to 
the approach. Systematic account shall be taken of the situation of women and 
gender issues in all areas – political, economic and social. The principles of 
sustainable management of natural resources and the environment shall be 
applied and integrated at every level of the partnership. 
 
ARTICLE 2 
Fundamental principles 
ACP-EC cooperation, underpinned by a legally binding system and the 
existence of joint institutions, shall be exercised on the basis of the following 
fundamental principles: 
- equality of the partners and ownership of the development strategies: for the 
purposes of implementing the objectives of the partnership, the ACP States 
shall determine the development strategies for their economies and societies in 
all sovereignty and with due regard for the essential elements described in 
Article 9; the partnership shall encourage ownership of the development 
strategies by the countries and populations concerned; 
- participation: apart from central government as the main partner, the 
partnership shall be open to different kinds of other actors in order to encourage 
the integration of all sections of society, including the private sector and civil 
society organisations, into the mainstream of political, economic and social life; 
- the pivotal role of dialogue and the fulfilment of mutual obligations: the 
obligations assumed by the Parties in the framework of their dialogue shall be 
central to their partnership and cooperation relations; 
- differentiation and regionalisation: cooperation arrangements and priorities 
shall vary according to a partner's level of development, its needs, its 
performance and its long-term development strategy. Particular emphasis shall 
be placed on the regional dimension. Special treatment shall be given to the 
least-developed countries. The vulnerability of landlocked and island countries 
shall be taken into account. 
 
 228
ARTICLE 28 
General approach 
Cooperation shall provide effective assistance to achieve the objectives and 
priorities which the ACP States have set themselves in the context of regional 
and sub-regional cooperation and integration, including inter-regional and intra-
ACP cooperation. Regional Cooperation can also involve Overseas Countries 
and Territories (OCTs) and outermost regions. In this context, cooperation 
support shall aim to:  
a) foster the gradual integration of the ACP States into the world economy; 
b) accelerate economic cooperation and development both within and 
between the regions of the ACP States; 
c) promote the free movement of persons, goods, services, capital, labour 
and technology among ACP countries; 
d) accelerate diversification of the economies of the ACP States; and 
coordination and harmonisation of regional and sub-regional cooperation 
policies; and 
e) promote and expand inter and intra-ACP trade and with third countries. 
 
ARTICLE 34 
Objectives 
1. Economic and trade cooperation shall aim at fostering the smooth and 
gradual integration of the ACP States into the world economy, with due regard 
for their political choices and development priorities, thereby promoting their 
sustainable development and contributing to poverty eradication in the ACP 
countries. 
 
ARTICLE 36 
Modalities 
1. In view of the objectives and principles set out above, the Parties agree 
to conclude new World Trade Organisation (WTO) compatible trading 
arrangements, removing progressively barriers to trade between them and 
enhancing cooperation in all areas relevant to trade. 
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2. The Parties agree that the new trading arrangements shall be introduced 
gradually and recognise the need, therefore, for a preparatory period. 
3. In order to facilitate the transition to the new trading arrangements, the 
non-reciprocal trade preferences applied under the Fourth ACP-EC Convention 
shall be maintained during the preparatory period for all ACP countries, under 
the conditions defined in Annex V to this Agreement. 
4. In this context, the Parties reaffirm the importance of the commodity 
protocols, attached to Annex V of this Agreement. They agree on the need to 
review them in the context of the new trading arrangements, in particular as 
regards their compatibility with WTO rules, with a view to safeguarding the 
benefits derived therefrom, bearing in mind the special legal status of the Sugar 
Protocol. 
 
ARTICLE 37 
Procedures 
1. Economic partnership agreements shall be negotiated during the 
preparatory period which shall end by 31 December 2007 at the latest. Formal 
negotiations of the new trading arrangements shall start in September 2002 and 
the new trading arrangements shall enter into force by 1 January 2008, unless 
earlier dates are agreed between the Parties. 
[…] 
3. The preparatory period shall also be used for capacity-building in the 
public and private sectors of ACP countries, including measures to enhance 
competitiveness, for strengthening of regional organisations and for support to 
regional trade integration initiatives, where appropriate with assistance to 
budgetary adjustment and fiscal reform, as well as for infrastructure upgrading 
and development, and for investment promotion. 
[…] 
5. Negotiations of the economic partnership agreements will be undertaken 
with ACP countries which consider themselves in a position to do so, at the 
level they consider appropriate and in accordance with the procedures agreed 
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by the ACP Group, taking into account regional integration process within the 
ACP. 
6. In 2004, the Community will assess the situation of the non-LDC which, 
after consultations with the Community decide that they are not in a position to 
enter into economic partnership agreements and will examine all alternative 
possibilities, in order to provide these countries with a new framework for trade 
which is equivalent to their existing situation and in conformity with WTO rules. 
7. Negotiations of the economic partnership agreements shall aim notably 
at establishing the timetable for the progressive removal of barriers to trade 
between the Parties, in accordance with the relevant WTO rules. On the 
Community side trade liberalisation shall build on the acquis and shall aim at 
improving current market access for the ACP countries through inter alia, a 
review of the rules of origin. Negotiations shall take account of the level of 
development and the socio-economic impact of trade measures on ACP 
countries, and their capacity to adapt and adjust 
8. their economies to the liberalisation process. Negotiations will therefore 
be as flexible as possible in establishing the duration of a sufficient transitional 
period, the final product coverage, taking into account sensitive sectors, and the 
degree of asymmetry in terms of timetable for tariff dismantlement, while 
remaining in conformity with WTO rules then prevailing. 8. The Parties shall 
closely cooperate and collaborate in the WTO with a view to defending the 
arrangements reached, in particular with regard to the degree of flexibility 
available. 
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Council of the European Union: Interim Economic Partnership Agreement 
between the SADC EPA States, on the one part, and the European 
Community and its Member States, on the other part, 2008. 
 
SADC IEPA 
ARTICLE 4 
Regional integration 
1. The Parties recognise that regional integration is an integral element of 
their partnership and a powerful instrument to achieve the objectives of this 
Agreement. 
2. The Parties reaffirm the importance of regional and sub-regional 
integration amongst the SADC EPA States to achieve greater economic 
opportunities, enhanced political stability and to foster the effective integration 
of developing countries into the world economy. Without prejudice to the 
commitments undertaken in this Agreement, the pace and content of their 
regional integration is determined exclusively by the SADC EPA States in the 
exercise of their sovereignty. 
3. The Parties support in particular the integration processes and related 
development policies and political agendas, based on the Southern African 
Customs Union Agreement signed on 21st October 2002, the Southern African 
Development Community Treaty signed on 17 August 1992 and the Constitutive 
Act of the African Union adopted on 11 July 2000. They aim at building and 
deepening their partnership on the basis of those processes and at 
implementing this Agreement in a mutually supportive manner with those 
instruments, taking into account the respective levels of development, needs, 
geographical realities and sustainable development strategies. 
 
ARTICLE 7 
Development cooperation framework 
The Parties commit themselves to cooperating in order to implement this 
Agreement and to support the SADC EPA States' trade and development 
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strategies within the overall SADC regional integration process. The 
cooperation can take financial and non financial forms. 
 
ARTICLE 8 
Development finance cooperation 
1. The Parties recognise that development cooperation is a crucial element 
of their partnership and an essential factor for the realization of the objectives of 
this Agreement as laid down in Article 1. Development finance cooperation for 
regional economic cooperation and integration, as provided for in the Cotonou 
Agreement, shall be carried out so as to support and promote the efforts of the 
SADC EPA States to achieve the objectives and to maximise the expected 
benefits of this Agreement. Areas of cooperation and technical assistance are 
set out, as appropriate, in Chapter 3 and in the other Chapters of this 
Agreement. Cooperation shall be implemented according to the modalities 
provided for in this Article, shall be kept under ongoing review and shall be 
revised as necessary according to the provisions of Article 108 of this 
Agreement. 
2. The European Community2 financing pertaining to development co-
operation between the SADC EPA States and the European Community 
supporting the implementation of this Agreement shall be carried out within the 
framework of the rules and relevant procedures provided for by the Cotonou 
Agreement, in particular the programming procedures of the European 
Development Fund and within the framework of the relevant instruments 
financed by the General Budget of the European Union. In this context, 
supporting the implementation of this Interim EPA shall be a priority. 
3. The Member States of the European Union collectively undertake to 
support, by means of their respective development policies and instruments, 
development cooperation activities for regional economic cooperation and 
integration and for the implementation of this agreement in the SADC EPA 
States and at the regional level, in conformity with the complementarity and aid 
effectiveness principles. 
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4. The Parties recognize that adequate resources will be required for the 
implementation of this Agreement and the fullest realization of its benefits. In 
this respect the Parties shall cooperate to enable SADC EPA States to access 
other financial instruments as well as facilitate other donors willing to further 
support the efforts of the SADC EPA States in achieving the objectives of this 
Agreement. 
5. The Parties agree that a regional development financing mechanism 
such as an EPA fund would provide a useful instrument for efficiently 
channelling development financial resources and for implementing EPA 
accompanying measures. The EC Party agrees to support the efforts of the 
region to set up such a mechanism. The EC Party will contribute to the fund 
following a satisfactory audit. 
 
ARTICLE 10 
Cooperation in trade in goods 
The aim of cooperation in this area shall be to enhance trade in goods and the 
SADC EPA States capacity to trade, including the phasing out of tariffs and 
customs duties, properly implementing rules of origin, trade defence 
instruments, non-tariff measures including sanitary and phyto-sanitary (SPS) 
measures and technical barriers to trade (TBT), and promoting customs 
cooperation and trade facilitation. 
 
ARTICLE 11 
Cooperation in supply-side competitiveness 
The aim of cooperation under this Article shall be to increase the 
competitiveness of the SADC EPA States and remove supply side constraints 
at national, institutional and, in particular, at company level. This cooperation 
includes, amongst others, fields such as production, technology development 
and innovation, marketing, financing, distribution, transport, diversification of 
economic base, as well as development of the private sector, improvement of 
the trade and business environment and support to small and medium 
enterprises in the field of agriculture, fisheries, industry and services. 
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ARTICLE 17 
Cooperation on fiscal adjustment 
1. The Parties recognize that the phasing out or reduction of customs duties 
laid down in this Agreement may affect the fiscal revenues of the SADC EPA 
States and agree to cooperate on this matter. 
1. The Parties agree to cooperate in accordance with the provisions of 
Article 8 in particular: 
a) on support to fiscal reforms and 
b) on support measures complementary to fiscal reforms for the mitigation 
of the net fiscal impact of EPA that will be determined in accordance with a 
jointly agreed mechanism. 
 
ARTICLE 19 
Free trade agreement 
1. This Agreement establishes a free trade area (FTA) between the Parties, 
in conformity with the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (hereinafter 
referred to as "GATT 1994"), in particular Article XXIV. 
2. The FTA shall respect the principle of asymmetry, commensurate to the 
specific needs and capacity constraints of the SADC EPA States, in terms of 
levels and timing for commitments under this Agreement. 
3. The FTA will apply to trade between, on one side, the European 
Community and, on the other side, the SADC EPA States. 
 
ARTICLE 21 
Rules of origin 
1. For the purposes of this Chapter, "originating" means qualifying under 
the rules of origin set out in Protocol 1. 
2. Within the first three years of the entry into force of this Agreement, the 
Parties shall review the provisions of Protocol 1, with a view to further 
simplifying the concepts and methods used for the purpose of determining 
origin. In such review the Parties shall take into account the development of 
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technologies, production processes and all other factors, including on-going 
reforms of rules of origin, which may require modifications to the provisions of 
this Protocol. Any such modifications shall be effected by a decision of the Joint 
Council as defined in Article 93. 
3. Particular attention shall be given to these provisions within the 
framework of the review foreseen in paragraph 2. 
 
ARTICLE 23 
Standstill 
No new customs duties shall be introduced, nor shall those already applied be 
increased in ,trade between the Parties as from the entry into force of this 
Agreement for all products subject to liberalisation. 
 
ARTICLE 24 
Duties, taxes or other fees and charges on exports 
1. No new customs duties on exports or charges having equivalent effect 
shall be introduced, nor shall those already applied be increased, in the trade 
between the European Community and the SADC EPA countries from the date 
of entry into force of this Agreement. 
2. In exceptional circumstances where the SADC EPA States can justify 
specific revenue needs, protection of infant industries, or protection of the 
environment, these SADC EPA States may introduce, after consultation with the 
EC Party, temporary export taxes or charges having equivalent effect on a 
limited number of additional products. 
3. The Parties agree to review the provisions of this Article in the Joint 
Council no later than three years after the entry into force of this Agreement, 
taking fully into account their impact on development and diversification of the 
SADC EPA States' economies. 
 
ARTICLE 27 
Free circulation of goods 
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1. Customs duties shall be levied only once for goods originating in the EC 
Party or in the SADC EPA States in the territory of the other Party. 
2. Any duty paid upon importation into a SADC EPA State shall be refunded 
fully when the goods are re-exported from the customs territory of the SADC 
EPA State of first importation. Such products shall then be subject to the duty in 
the country of consumption. 
3. The Parties agree to cooperate with a view to facilitating the circulation of 
goods and simplifying customs procedures. 
 
ARTICLE 28 
More favourable treatment resulting from free trade agreements 
1. With respect to matters covered by this Chapter, the EC Party shall 
accord to SADC EPA States any more favourable treatment applicable as a 
result of the EC Party becoming party to a free trade agreement with third 
parties after the signature of this Agreement. 
2. With respect to the subject matter covered by this Chapter, the SADC 
EPA States shall accord to the EC Party any more favourable treatment 
applicable as a result of the SADC EPA States or any Signatory SADC EPA 
State becoming party to a free trade agreement with any major trading economy 
after the signature of this Agreement. 
3. Where a SADC EPA State can demonstrate that it has been given by a 
third Party substantially more favourable treatment than that offered by the EC 
Party, the Parties will consult and jointly decide how best to implement the 
provisions of paragraph 2. 
4. The provisions of this Chapter shall not be so construed as to oblige the 
EC Party or any SADC EPA State to extend reciprocally any preferential 
treatment applicable as a result of the EC Party or any SADC EPA State being 
party to a free trade agreement with third parties on the date of signature of this 
Agreement. 
5. For the purposes of this Article, 'major trading economy' means any 
developed country, or any country accounting for a share of world merchandise 
exports above 1 percent in the year before the entry into force of the economic 
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integration agreement referred to in paragraph 2, or any group of countries 
acting individually, collectively or through an economic integration agreement 
accounting collectively for a share of world merchandise exports above 1.5 
percent in the year before the entry into force of the economic integration 
agreement referred to in paragraph 2. 
 
ARTICLE 33 
Multilateral safeguards 
1. Subject to the provisions of this Article, nothing in this Agreement shall 
prevent the SADC EPA States and the EC Party from adopting measures in 
accordance with Article XIX of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
1994, the Agreement on Safeguards, Article 5 of the Agreement on Agriculture 
annexed to the Marrakech Agreement Establishing the World Trade 
Organization and any other relevant WTO Agreements. 
2. Notwithstanding paragraph 1, the EC Party shall, in the light of the overall 
development objectives of this Agreement and the small size of the economies 
of the SADC EPA States, exclude imports from any SADC EPA State from any 
measures taken pursuant to Article XIX of the GATT 1994, the WTO Agreement 
on Safeguards and Article 5 of the Agreement on Agriculture. 
3. The provisions of paragraph 2 shall apply for a period of five years, 
beginning from the date of entry into force of the Agreement. Not later than 120 
days before the end of this period, the Joint SADC-EC Council shall review the 
operation of those provisions in the light of the development needs of the SADC 
EPA States, with a view to determining whether to extend their application for a 
further period. 
4. The provisions of paragraph 1 shall not be subject to the Dispute 
Settlement provisions of this Agreement. 
 
ARTICLE 34 
Bilateral safeguard 
1. Notwithstanding Article 33, after having examined alternative solutions, a 
Party may apply safeguard measures of limited duration which derogate from 
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the provisions of Articles 25 and 26, under the conditions and in accordance 
with the procedures laid down in this Article. 
2. Safeguard measures referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article may be 
taken where a product originating in one Party is being imported into the 
territory of the other Party in such increased quantities and under such 
conditions as to cause or threaten to cause: 
a) serious injury to the domestic industry producing like or directly 
competitive products in the territory of the importing Party, or 
b) disturbances in a sector of the economy producing like or directly 
competitive products, particularly where these disturbances produce major 
social problems, or difficulties which could bring about serious deterioration in 
the economic situation of the importing Party, or 
c) disturbances in the markets of like or directly competitive agricultural 
products912 or mechanisms regulating those markets. 
3. Safeguard measures referred to in this Article shall not exceed what is 
necessary to remedy or prevent the serious injury or disturbances, as defined in 
paragraph 2 of this Article. 
4. Those safeguard measures which may be taken by the importing Party 
may only consist of one or more of the following: 
a) suspension of the further reduction of the rate of import duty for the 
product concerned, as provided for under this Agreement, or 
b) increase in the customs duty on the product concerned up to a level 
which does not exceed the WTO bound rate of duty, or 
c) introduction of tariff quotas on the product concerned. 
5. Without prejudice to paragraphs 1, 2 and 3 of this Article, where any 
product originating in one or more SADC EPA State is being imported in such 
increased quantities and under such conditions as to cause or threaten to cause 
one of the situations referred to under 2(a), (b) and (c) of this Article to a like or 
directly competitive production sector of one or several of the EC Party's 
outermost regions, the EC Party may take surveillance or safeguard measures 
                                            
912 For the purpose of this article agricultural products are those covered by Annex I of the 
WTO 
Agreement on Agriculture. 
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limited to the region or regions concerned in accordance with the procedures 
laid down in paragraphs 6 to 9. 
6.  
a) Without prejudice to paragraphs 1, 2 and 3 of this Article, where any 
product originating in the EC Party is being imported in such increased 
quantities and under such conditions as to cause or threaten to cause one of 
the situations referred to under 2(a), (b) and (c) of this Article to a SADC EPA 
State, the SADC EPA State concerned may take surveillance or safeguard 
measures limited to its territory in accordance with the procedures laid down in 
paragraphs 7 to 10 of this Article. 
b) A SADC EPA State may take safeguard measures as provided for in 
paragraph 2 of this Article, where a product originating in the EC Party as a 
result of the reduction of duties is being imported into its territory in such 
increased quantities and under such conditions as to cause or threaten to 
cause disturbances to an infant industry producing like or directly competitive 
products. Such provision is applicable for a period of twelve years for 
Botswana, Namibia and Swaziland or fifteen years for LDCs from the date of 
entry into force of this Agreement. This application period can be further 
extended on review by the Joint Council, in view of the overall level of 
development achieved by the SADC EPA States. Measures must be taken in 
accordance with the procedures laid down in paragraph 6 to 9 of this Article. 
7.  
a) Safeguard measures referred to in this Article shall only be maintained 
for such a time as may be necessary to prevent or remedy serious injury or 
disturbances as defined in paragraphs 2, 5 and 6 of this Article. 
b) Safeguard measures referred to in this Article shall not be applied for a 
period exceeding two years. Where the circumstances warranting imposition 
of safeguard measures continue to exist, such measures may be extended for 
a further period of no more than two years. Where one or more SADC EPA 
State applies a safeguard measure, or where the EC Party applies a measure 
limited to the territory of one or more of its outermost regions, they may 
however apply that measure for a period not exceeding four years and, where 
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the circumstances warranting the imposition of safeguard measures continue 
to exist, extend it for a further period of four years. 
c) Safeguard measures referred to in this Article that exceed one year shall 
contain clear elements progressively leading to their elimination at the end of 
the set period, at the latest. 
d) No safeguard measure referred to in this Article shall be applied to the 
import of a product that has previously been subject to such a measure, within 
a period of at least one year from the expiry of the measure. 
8. For the implementation of the above paragraphs, the following provisions 
shall apply: 
a) Where a Party takes the view that one of the circumstances set out in 
paragraphs 2, 5 and/or 6 exists, it shall immediately refer the matter to the 
Trade and Development Committee for examination. 
b) The Trade and Development Committee may make any recommendation 
needed to remedy the circumstances which have arisen. If no 
recommendation has been made by the Trade and Development Committee 
aimed at remedying the circumstances, or no other satisfactory solution has 
been reached within 30 days of the matter being referred to the Trade and 
Development Committee, the importing Party may adopt the appropriate 
measures to remedy the circumstances in accordance with this Article. 
c) Before taking any measure provided for in this Article or, in the case to 
which paragraph 9 of this Article applies, as soon as possible, the Party or the 
SADC EPA State concerned shall supply the Trade and Development 
Committee with all relevant information required for a thorough examination of 
the situation, with a view to seeking a solution acceptable to the parties 
concerned. 
d) In the selection of safeguard measures pursuant to this Article, priority 
must be given to those which least disturb the operation of this Agreement. 
e) Any safeguard measure taken pursuant to this Article shall be notified 
immediately to the Trade and Development Committee and shall be the 
subject of periodic consultations within that body, particularly with a view to 
establishing a timetable for their abolition as soon as circumstances permit. 
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9. In critical circumstances where delay would cause damage which it 
would be difficult to repair, the importing Party concerned, whether the EC 
Party, or one or more SADC EPA States as the case may be, may take the 
measures provided for in paragraph 3, 5 and/or 6 on a provisional basis without 
complying with the requirements of paragraph 8. Such action may be taken for 
a maximum period of 180 days where measures are taken by the EC Party and 
200 days where measures are taken by one or more SADC EPA States as the 
case may be, or where measures taken by the EC Party are limited to the 
territory of one or more of its outermost region(s). The duration of any such 
provisional measure shall be counted as a part of the initial period and any 
extension referred to in paragraph 6. In the taking of such provisional measures, 
the interest of all parties involved shall be taken into account. The importing 
Party concerned shall inform the other Party concerned and it shall immediately 
refer the matter to the Trade and Development Committee for examination. 
10. If an importing Party subjects imports of a product to an administrative 
procedure having as its purpose the rapid provision of information on the trend 
of trade flows liable to give rise to the problems referred to in this Article, it shall 
inform the Trade and Development Committee without delay. 
11. Safeguard measures adopted under the provisions of this Article shall not 
be subject to WTO Dispute Settlement provisions. 
 
ARTICLE 35 
Prohibition of quantitative restrictions 
All prohibitions or restrictions applying on the import or export of goods between 
the Parties, other than customs duties and taxes, and fees and other charges 
provided for under Article 22 of this Agreement, whether made effective through 
quotas, import or export licenses or other measures, shall be eliminated upon 
the entry into force of this Agreement, unless justified under the exceptions of 
Article XI of the GATT 1994. No new such measures shall be introduced. The 
provisions of this Article shall be without prejudice to the provisions of Article 32 
Title II on antidumping and countervailing measures. 
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ARTICLE 49 
Objectives 
1. The Parties agree to co-operate in order to facilitate and increase trade in 
goods between them, by identifying, preventing and eliminating unnecessary 
barriers to trade within the terms of the TBT Agreement. 
2. The Parties undertake to co-operate in strengthening regional and 
specifically SADC EPA States' integration and co-operation on matters 
concerning technical barriers to trade. 
3. The Parties undertake to establish and enhance SADC EPA States' 
technical capacity on matters concerning technical barriers to trade. 
 
ARTICLE 50 
Scope and definitions 
1. The provisions of this Chapter shall apply to technical regulations, 
standards and conformity assessment procedures as defined in the TBT 
Agreement in so far as they affect trade covered by this Agreement. 
2. For the purposes of this Chapter, the definitions used by the TBT 
Agreement shall apply. 
 
ARTICLE 53 
Measures for identifying, preventing and eliminating technical barriers to 
trade 
The Parties agree to identify and implement mechanisms among those 
supported by the TBT Agreement that are the most appropriate for particular 
priority issues or sectors. Such mechanisms may include: 
1. Intensifying their collaboration, with a view to facilitating access to their 
respective markets, by increasing the mutual knowledge and understanding of 
their respective systems in the field of technical regulations, standards, 
metrology, accreditation and conformity assessment; 
2. Exchanging information, identifying and implementing appropriate 
mechanisms for particular issues or sectors, i.e. alignment to international 
standards, reliance on the supplier’s declaration of conformity, the use of 
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internationally recognized accreditation to qualify conformity assessment bodies 
and the use of international product testing and certification schemes; 
3. Identifying and organising sector-specific interventions on technical 
regulations and conformity assessment with a view to facilitating understanding 
of and access to their respective markets. These sectors will be chosen taking 
into account key areas of trade, including priority products; 
4. Developing co-operation activities and measures with a view to 
supporting the implementation of the rights and obligations under the TBT 
Agreement;  
5. Where appropriate, developing common views and approaches on 
technical regulatory practices, including transparency, consultation, necessity 
and proportionality, the use of international standards, conformity assessment 
requirements, the use of impact and risk assessment, enforcement and market 
surveillance; 
6. Promoting harmonisation, whenever possible and in areas of mutual 
interest, towards international standards, and the use of such standards in the 
development of technical regulations and conformity assessment procedures; 
7. Undertaking to consider, in due course, negotiating mutual recognition 
agreements in sectors of mutual economic interest; 
8. Promoting collaboration between the Parties' and SADC EPA States, as 
the case may be, organizations responsible for technical regulations, metrology, 
standardisation, testing, certification, inspection and accreditation; and 
9. Promoting the participation by the SADC EPA States in international 
standardssetting bodies. 
 
ARTICLE 57 
Objectives 
1. The Parties agree to facilitate trade and investment within the SADC EPA 
States and between the Parties while ensuring that measures adopted shall 
apply only to the extent necessary to protect human, animal or plant health or 
life in accordance with the provisions of the SPS Agreement. 
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2. The Parties undertake to co-operate in strengthening regional integration 
and specifically SADC EPA States' co-operation on matters concerning sanitary 
and phytosanitary measures (herein after referred to as "SPS measures") and 
to address problems arising from SPS measures on agreed priority sectors and 
products5 whilst giving due consideration to regional integration. 
3. As a result thereof, the Parties agree to promote bi-regional collaboration 
aiming at recognition of appropriate levels of protection in SPS measures. 
4. The Parties agree to establish and enhance SADC EPA States' technical 
capacity to implement and monitor SPS measures, including promoting greater 
use of international standards and other matters concerning SPS. 
 
ARTICLE 59 
Competent authorities 
1. The respective SPS authorities shall be the competent authorities in the 
SADC EPA States and the EC Party for the implementation of the measures 
referred to in this Chapter. 
2. The Parties or the SADC EPA States, as the case may be, shall, in 
accordance with this Agreement, inform each other of their respective 
competent SPS authorities and any changes thereto. 
 
ARTICLE 60 
Transparency 
1. The Parties reaffirm the principle of transparency in the application of 
SPS measures, in accordance with the SPS Agreement. 
2. The Parties recognise the importance of effective mechanisms for 
consultation, notification and exchange of information with respect to SPS 
measures in accordance with the SPS Agreement. 
3. The importing Party shall inform the exporting Party of any changes in its 
sanitary and phytosanitary import requirements that may affect trade falling 
under the scope of this Chapter. The Parties undertake to establish 
mechanisms for the exchange of such information where appropriate. 
4. The Parties will apply the principle of zoning or compartmentalization 
when defining import conditions, taking into account international standards. 
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Zones or compartments of defined sanitary or phytosanitary status may also be 
identified and proposed jointly by the Parties, on a case by case basis, 
wherever possible, in order to avoid disruption to trade. 
 
ARTICLE 61 
Information exchange 
1. The Parties agree to establish an early-warning system to ensure that the 
SADC-EPA States are informed in advance of new EC SPS measures that may 
affect SADC EPA exports to the EU. This system shall be based on existing 
mechanisms where appropriate. 
2. The Parties or the SADC EPA States, as the case may be, agree to 
collaborate in the further development of the epidemiological surveillance 
network on animal disease and in the domain of plant health, the Parties will 
exchange information on the occurrence of pests of known and immediate 
danger to the other Party. 
 
ARTICLE 63 
Consultations 
If either Party or a SADC EPA State, as the case may be, considers that 
another Party has taken measures which are likely to affect, or have affected, 
access to its market, appropriate consultations will be held with a view to 
avoiding undue delays and finding an appropriate solution in conformity with the 
WTO SPS Agreement. In this regard, the Parties shall exchange names and 
addresses of contact points with sanitary and phytosanitary expertise in order to 
facilitate communication and the exchange of information. 
 
ARTICLE 64 
Cooperation, capacity building and technical assistance on sanitary 
and phytosanitary measures 
1. The Parties agree to promote cooperation between SADC EPA States' 
SPS institutions and equivalent EC Party institutions. 
2. The Parties agree to cooperate in facilitating regional harmonization of 
measures and the development of appropriate regulatory frameworks and 
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policies within and between the SADC EPA States, thereby enhancing intra-
regional trade and investment. 
3. The Parties agree that the following are priority areas for cooperation: 
a) the building of technical capacity in the public and private sectors of 
SADC EPA States to enable sanitary and phytosanitary control, including 
training and information events for inspection, certification, supervision and 
control; 
b) the building of capacity in SADC EPA States to maintain and expand 
their market access opportunities; 
c) the building of capacity to ensure that measures adopted do not become 
unnecessary barriers to trade, while recognizing the Parties' rights to set their 
own appropriate levels of protection; 
d) the enhancement of technical capacity for the implementation and 
monitoring of SPS measures, including promoting greater use of international 
standards; 
e) the promotion of cooperation on the implementation of the SPS 
Agreement, particularly strengthening SADC EPA States' notification and 
enquiry points as well as other matters concerning relevant international 
standards setting bodies; 
f) the development of capacities for risk analysis, harmonization, 
compliance, testing, certification, residue monitoring, traceability and 
accreditation including through the upgrading or setting up of laboratories and 
other equipment to help SADC EPA States comply with international 
standards. In this regard, the Parties acknowledge the importance of 
strengthening regional cooperation and the need to take into account the 
priority products and sectors identified in accordance with this Chapter; and 
g) the support for the participation of SADC EPA States in relevant 
international standards setting bodies. 
 
ARTICLE 67 
Second stage of negotiations 
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The Parties agree to continue negotiations in 2008 to extend the scope of this 
Agreement. For the purpose of this Title, the SADC EPA States will be 
constituted of Botswana, Lesotho, Mozambique and Swaziland. The remaining 
SADC EPA States may join the process of negotiation on a similar basis. To 
this end, they will notify in writing the EC Party and the other SADC EPA States. 
1. Trade in Services 
a) The Parties recognise the growing importance of trade in services for the 
development of their economies and reaffirm their respective rights and 
obligations under the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS). 
b) No later than 31 December 2008, the Parties will complete negotiations 
on services liberalisation on the basis of the following: 
i. liberalisation schedule for one service sector for each participating SADC 
EPA State; 
ii. commitment to a standstill as specified in Article V(1)(b)(ii) GATS, for all 
services sectors; and 
iii. agreement to negotiate progressive liberalisation with substantial sectoral 
coverage within a period of three years following the conclusion of the full 
EPA. 
2. Cooperation in Services 
a) The Parties recognise that trade capacity building can support the 
development of economic activities, in particular in services sectors. To this 
end, the EC Party agrees to support capacity building aimed at strengthening 
the regulatory framework of the participating SADC EPA States. 
b) By the time of laying down the necessary arrangements for the 
liberalisation of trade in services, the Parties will define the specific 
cooperation objectives, principles and procedures that will accompany trade 
liberalisation. 
3. Investment 
The Parties agree to negotiate an Investment chapter, taking into account the 
relevant provisions of the SADC Protocol on Finance and Investment, no later 
than 31 December 2008. 
4. Cooperation on Investment 
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The EC Party agrees to provide adequate technical assistance to facilitate 
negotiations and implementation of the Investment chapter. 
5. Competition and Government Procurement 
The EC Party agrees to cooperate with a view to strengthening regional 
capacity in the areas of competition and government procurement. Negotiations 
will only be envisaged once adequate regional capacity has been built.
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